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The era of climate change involves the mutation of sys-
tems beyond 20th century anthropomorphic models and 
has stood, until recently, outside representation or address. 
Understood in a broad and critical sense, climate change 
concerns material agencies that impact on biomass and 
energy, erased borders and microbial invention, geological 
and nanographic time, and extinction events. The possibil-
ity of extinction has always been a latent figure in textual 
production and archives; but the current sense of deple-
tion, decay, mutation and exhaustion calls for new modes 
of address, new styles of publishing and authoring, and new 
formats and speeds of distribution. As the pressures and re-
alignments of this re-arrangement occur, so must the critical 
languages and conceptual templates, political premises and 
definitions of ‘life.’ There is a particular need to publish in 
timely fashion experimental monographs that redefine the 
boundaries of disciplinary fields, rhetorical invasions, the in-
terface of conceptual and scientific languages, and geomor-
phic and geopolitical interventions. Critical Climate Change 
is oriented, in this general manner, toward the epistemo-
political mutations that correspond to the temporalities of 
terrestrial mutation.
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Introduction
Theory Ground Zero 
Terror, Theory and the Humanities after 9/11
Jeffrey R. Di Leo and Uppinder Mehan
[F]ear makes people inclined to deliberation.
– Aristotle, Rhetoric
No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its 
powers of acting and reasoning as fear.
– Edmund Burke, On the Sublime and Beautiful
Terror is an emotion, a state of mind. Because extreme fear 
can be provoked at any time, terror cannot be ended.
– George Lakoff, “Beyond the War on Terror”
The opening of the twenty-first century was cast in the crucible of terror. 
The world watched in fear as the clock struck midnight and carried us 
into the year 2000. Many feared the world was going to end; many oth-
ers expected a massive computer crash that would bring down the stock 
market and global markets; the emotion of terror rang in the new mil-
lennium. In retrospect, this fear turned out to be only a prelude to the 
turning loose of this emotion on the morning of September 11, 2001. 
As planes struck the Pentagon and the Twin Towers, many in America 
watched—and rewatched—their televisions in terror.
While there was no doubt that the towers were falling—and that many 
people were killed as a result—the emotions that were aroused by the 
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media reportage of the events often mirrored those felt while watching a 
classic Hollywood disaster movie like The Towering Inferno or reading a 
Stephen King novel. Film and literature have long used similar storylines 
to arouse the emotions and engage the imagination. In fact, Nosebleed, a 
film starring Jackie Chan about a plot to blow up the World Trade Center, 
was under production at the time of the attacks, and was subsequently 
cancelled. Of course, the attacks were no movie, but the emotions they 
brought out (fear and pity), especially for those who were not experienc-
ing these events firsthand, bore an uncanny and uncomfortable relation-
ship with the arts and the emotions associated with them.
One need only recall Aristotle’s view that good tragedy “must imitate 
actions arousing fear and pity, since that is the distinctive function of this 
kind of imitation” (Poetics 1452b31–33) to gain a sense of the type of 
relationship to which we are alluding. For him, too, the plot of a tragedy 
“should be so framed that, even without seeing the things take place, he 
who simply hears the account of them shall be filled with horror and pity 
at the incidents; which is just the effect that the mere recital of the story 
in Oedipus would have on one” (Poetics 1453b4–6). Is this not what most 
felt when the events were relayed to them by email or phone? Life was 
imitating drama in these attacks—which films like Nosebleed provided an 
all too proximate reminder.
And what of the fear that was aroused when we heard about the events 
of September 11, 2001? Aristotle’s term for it is phobos, and it is some-
times translated as “terror”—or even “horror.” He defines it as “a sort of 
pain or agitation derived from imagination of a future destructive or pain-
ful evil” (Rhetoric 1382a1). He continues that this evil is near at hand, and 
not far off, and that the persons threatened are ourselves. But, as Hans-
Georg Gadamer has noticed, the translation of phobos as “fear” gives it 
a “far too subjective ring” (130). Aristotle’s phobos “is not just a state of 
mind but,” notes Gadamer, “a cold shudder that makes one’s blood run 
cold, that makes one shiver” (130). While one may question whether a 
recital of the story in Oedipus still elicits phobos—especially after being 
told and retold for thousands of years—there is no doubt about the pres-
ence of this emotion when recounting the story of 9/11, for which, even 
ten years later, the evil continues to be near at hand.
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Perhaps it is this uncanny and uncomfortable relationship that has 
brought so many scholars in the humanities to think and write about the 
events of September 11, 2001, and their aftermath. Or perhaps it is be-
cause contemporary theoretical discussions can provide much insight 
into the attacks and the emotions associated with them. Whatever the 
reason, there has been a wealth of work in the humanities over the past 
ten years that has provided much insight into what happened on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, why it happened, and what and how it means. The attacks 
not only opened a new chapter for contemporary theory, but also pro-
vided the humanities a subject ideally suited to their expertise—and one 
which theorists could help others understand. From the rhetoric and pol-
itics of the attacks to their philosophical foundations and historical roots, 
the humanities have had a lot to say about the new world order of terror 
and terrorism that has radically shaped the structure of the new millen-
nium. Perhaps this is only fitting, for as Aristotle contends, fear and terror 
do not make us irrational; rather, “fear makes people inclined to delibera-
tion” (Rhetoric 1383a14).
Theory’s Event
Very few historical events define a generation—and fewer still become 
the central focus of the theoretical energies of its scholars. For example, 
while the war in Vietnam occupied our attention for most of the sixties 
and early seventies, and defined a generation, it is still difficult to argue 
that the war became the central focus of our theoretical energies during 
this same period. In American philosophy, conceptual analysis and ana-
lytic methodology dominated the Vietnam era, whereas during the same 
period, the New Criticism was in vogue in progressive English depart-
ments, with structuralism and semiotics just beginning to become more 
mainstream within the humanities. Given then the dominant theoretical 
climate of this period, it seems a stretch to maintain that the roots of the 
New Criticism or analytic philosophy were grounded or determined by 
the major historical events of the sixties and early seventies. While events 
like Vietnam, Watergate and the assassinations of John F. Kennedy and 
Martin Luther King Jr. “shocked” and defined a generation, they did not 
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become the central focus of our theoretical attention nor did they domi-
nate the scholarly critical agenda.
In fact, only a handful of events across history even seem to qualify for 
the kind of impact that we are describing, which is namely, the ability of 
a historical event to configure—or even reconfigure—theoretical dis-
course around or through it. The French Revolution immediately comes 
to mind as a good example of the kind of impact a major event can have 
on theoretical discourse, as well as the two world wars of the last cen-
tury. With these thoughts in mind, the uniqueness of the theoretical situ-
ation brought about by the events of September 11, 2001 should stand 
out. Even a cursory survey of contemporary scholarship will reveal the 
extraordinary degree of critical and theoretical attention that has been af-
forded this event over the last ten years. Consequently, it seems reason-
able to at least postulate that the foreign terrorist attacks on the United 
States on September 11, 2001 qualify as both defining a generation and 
occupying the center of our theoretical energies.
One of the sure signs of a historical event dominating the theoretical 
landscape is when words or concepts associated with that event come to 
mean something very different after the occurrence of the event—when 
they in effect become “infected” with or “inflected” through that event 
to the extent that the event and the word or concept associated with that 
event become indistinguishable or dissociable with each other. For ex-
ample, after the French Revolution, “liberty” became dissociable with 
this historical event in the same way that “holocaust” became indistin-
guishable from the genocidal events that occurred during World War II. 
Moreover, these major—or better yet, “extreme”—historical events tend 
to reify terms and concepts. “Liberty,” for example, became reified by 
the French Revolution in the same way “terror” has come to be reified 
as a consequence of the events of September 11, 2001. “Terror,” prior to 
September 11, 2011, was simply an emotional state describable as be-
ing greatly frightened or being in a state of intense fear. However, after 
September 11, 2011, terror became more than simply a mental state that 
most seek to avoid—or to experience through artworks such as horror 
movies or tragic plays in an act of catharsis. Rather, it was hypostatized
into something that exists—or persists—in the world; something with 
which we are at “war.”
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To notice this transformation is to notice one of the ways in which an 
historical event can go from being a “mere” event to a “major” one. One 
would assume that any event that has the power to reify an emotion is 
one that warrants the term “major.” However, this is not an uncontrover-
sial assumption. And it should not be surprising that strong resistance to 
it comes, for example, from someone who throughout his career sought 
to undermine or put under “erasure” the difference between the ideal and 
the real—between the conceptual and the empirical—namely, Jacques 
Derrida—one of our generation’s exemplary theorists.
In a wonderful interview with him on October 22, 2001, just weeks af-
ter the US terrorist attacks, Giovanna Borradori asks Derrida whether he 
regarded them as a “major event.” “September 11 [le 11 septembre] gave 
us the impression of being a major event,” says Borradori, “one of the most 
important historical events we will witness in our lifetime, especially for 
those of us who never lived through a world war” (85). Then she asks 
Derrida whether he agrees with her. Unlike just about everyone else at 
that time—and after—Derrida will not concede that the attacks were a 
“major event”—nor will he concede that they were not. “I agree with you: 
without any doubt, this ‘thing,’ ‘September 11,’ ‘gave us the impression of 
being a major event,’” comments Derrida, “But what is an impression in 
this case? And an event? And especially a ‘major event’?” (88). Rather, 
after a lengthy philosophical commentary on what a “major event” is and 
is not, he finally says, “A major event should be so unforeseeable and ir-
ruptive that it disturbs even the horizon of the concept or essence on the 
basis of which we believe we recognize an event as such” (90).
Derrida is of course right to complicate Borradori (and our) “im-
pression” that September 11, 2001 is a “major” event. However, in de-
constructing the ways in which September 11, 2001 is commonly fash-
ioned, Derrida risks deflating his entire response to a mere philosophical 
quibble or exercise. Derrida, who towered over theory beginning with his 
criticisms of structuralism in the late sixties and elegant deconstructive 
readings of literature and philosophy in the seventies and eighties, seems 
out of place in the wake of the events of September 11, 2011; he appears 
as a representative of theory’s playful intellectual capacities as opposed to 
its power to bring about social and political change. While it might have 
been possible for Jean Baudrillard to theoretically play with the notion 
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of whether the Gulf War “really took place” in 1991—though he took a 
lot of flack for it—the events of September 11, 2001 don’t seem to be as 
open to similar deconstructive play. Why?
Perhaps it is because September 11 was a major event, and hesitation on 
Derrida’s part to regard it as such shows how his approach to historical 
events might be better suited to a theoretical epoch that is not centered 
upon a major event. Still, however, his speculation as to what it would 
mean to regard it “as such”—that is, as a “major event”—is important be-
cause it opens up a new vista for theory. By arguing that a major event “dis-
turbs even the horizon of the concept or essence on the basis of which we 
believe we recognize an event as such,” Derrida is opening September 11, 
2001 up for a species of event for which very few can qualify—namely, 
one that fundamentally undermines our notion of “event”—and other 
concepts associated with the specifics of the event.
Later in his conversation with Borradori, Derrida asserts that regard-
less of whether September 11 is regarded as a “major” event,
Such an “event” surely calls for a philosophical response. 
Better, a response that calls into question, at their most fun-
damental level, the most deep-seated conceptual presuppo-
sitions in philosophical discourse. The concepts with which 
this “event” has most often been described, named, catego-
rized, are the products of a “dogmatic slumber” from which 
only a new philosophical reflection can awaken us, a reflec-
tion on philosophy, most notably on political philosophy and 
its heritage. The prevailing discourse, that of the media and 
of the official rhetoric, relies too readily on received concepts 
like “war” or “terrorism” (national or international). (100)
It is this space of “new philosophical reflection” awakened or brought 
about by the events of September 11, 2001 that we would like to say that 
“terror” has refigured the landscape of twenty-first century theory. Prior 
to September 11, 2001, critical theory and philosophy was in a sort of 
“dogmatic slumber.” However, this “event” has not only reawakened “re-
flection on philosophy”—it has also reawakened reflection on “theory.” In 
many ways, the events of September 11, 2001 were also theory’s “ground 
zero.” But how?
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Theory Ground Zero
The events of September 11, 2001 were a wake-up call for theory. Prior to 
these terrorist attacks, theory was on life support—and toying with the 
notion of whether it was or should be dead. To a large extent, the ques-
tion of theory’s death was brought about by its continued reluctance to 
fully embrace its political dimensions—a change for theory that could 
only be accomplished at the expense of the epistemological net it had 
cast over the preceding twenty-five or so years. Or, to put it somewhat 
differently, if the 1970s and 1980s allowed theorists to talk about politics, 
albeit through an epistemological shadow, and if the rise of cultural, post-
colonial, and other studies in the 1990s back-doored politics into theory, 
then 2001 was the year when theory’s political unconscious became con-
scious—and desperately significant.
Derrida was right to posit in the weeks after the September 11, 2001 
attacks that received concepts like “war,” “terror,” and “terrorism” do not 
adequately account for what happened. They didn’t—and don’t—as ef-
forts like those of many contemporary Anglo-American philosophers 
after September 11, 2001 to deal with these concepts in the “standard” 
way have revealed. In Anglo-American philosophy prior to September 
11, 2001, there was nary any discussion of “terrorism” (and far less dis-
cussion of “terror”). However, after this date, there has been a flurry of 
activity to both “define” terrorism as well as to address the question “Can 
terrorism ever be morally justified?” However, by and large, work in this 
area suffers because most of the definitions and moral justifications fol-
low the well-worn and expected lines of response, that is, largely fall into 
either a consequentialist or non-consequentialist framework.1
And, for the most part, they do not, as Derrida says, open up “reflec-
tion on philosophy.” Nevertheless, they are still valuable as they both 
reveal the limits of contemporary philosophy to account for events like 
those of September 11, 2001, and in toto demonstrate the need for “a new 
philosophical reflection”—which we simply prefer to call “theory,” par-
ticularly if it is a form of reflection that re-grounds speculation on global 
culture, politics and society. To a large extent, rethinking concepts and 
questions related to “terrorism” has become the cause célèbre for progres-
sive thinkers over the past ten years—and in many ways represents the 
best of what theoretical work in the humanities has to offer. Not only has 
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this work taken theory off of life-support, but it has also opened up a fer-
tile debate as to what theory is and should be after the attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001.
Theory today (as the essays in this collection amply demonstrate) is 
now more heterogeneous than ever. The post-theory generation of the 
1990s opened the path for less doctrinaire approaches to theory. No 
more is it “By their theoretical camp they shall be known”—or judged. 
And no more is theory the sole province of English and comparative lit-
erature departments. Rather, theoretical work today is distributed across 
the disciplines more evenly than ever before. And, public access to theory 
has come to be more important than theoretical rigor and complexity. 
While well-thought out theoretical work is still valuable, it should not 
come at the cost of severely restricting its audience. Moreover, in the 
1990s, which theoretical approach one utilized came to be secondary to 
the object of theoretical work. “Literary” theory just became “theory” in 
the post-theoretical 1990s.
In many ways, the events of September 11, 2001 saved theory from 
complete dissolution by recalibrating its concepts, object, and objec-
tive. They also blew theory once and for all out of its social and politi-
cal amnesia—and foregrounded its engagement with social and political 
philosophy. Post-9/11, it no longer seems responsible for theorists to en-
gage in apolitical analysis; to dwell on the concept at the expense of the 
empirical; to ignore the social while reveling in the ideal. Cultural capital 
gave way to financial capital after 9/11. But something else happened to 
theory in the wake of 9/11: it became more difficult for theorists to voice 
dissent without fear of reprisal.
The Terror of Dissent
Not only did the events of September 11, 2001 change the character of 
theory, they also changed the relationship between theory and the acad-
emy, and between theory and the public sphere. As theorists began to 
increasingly comment on the events of September 11, 2001, the acad-
emy and the public began to react to them with a weakening sense of 
free speech and academic freedom, particularly to comments expressing 
dissenting interpretations of the events. The most well-known instance 
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of this is the case of University of Colorado humanities scholar Ward 
Churchill’s comments about the events of September 11, 2001.2
In an essay entitled “‘Some People Push Back’: On the Justice of Roost-
ing Chickens,” published one day after the attacks, Ward Churchill wrote 
that the events of September 11, 2001 are “chickens [coming] home to 
roost in a very big way at the twin towers of New York’s World Trade 
Center.” In the increasingly polarized idiom of contemporary American 
politics, the University of Colorado professor’s comments on the terror-
ist attacks drew much attention from both the “progressive Left” (who 
aimed to champion them) and the “reactionary Right” (who aimed to de-
monize them).
Churchill’s comments were largely viewed by the progressive Left as 
clearly within the domain of his First Amendment right to free speech 
and were staunchly defended by the ACLU. The reactionary Right, how-
ever, most visibly represented by the Board of Regents and upper admin-
istration of the University of Colorado, David Horowitz, and Fox News, 
used Churchill’s comments as an opportunity restrict academic freedom 
and intellectual activism that was out of line with their ideology—and 
the logic of patriotism.
For some, the Churchill’s “chickens” incident was just another—al-
beit more extreme—chapter in the culture wars that had been ongoing 
between the progressive Left and reactionary Right since the late 1980s. 
For others, however, something of a different order occurred; namely, 
the events of September 11, 2001 created a critical climate so sensitive 
that expressing dissenting views could override one’s right to academic 
freedom—and lead to dismissal from a tenured faculty position. What 
is most discouraging about this is that tenure was invented in the early 
part of the twentieth-century, in part, to protect the professoriate from 
situations like this, where faculty could lose their jobs for expressing po-
litically unpopular opinions. The terrorist attacks in the United States—
in conjunction with increasingly neoliberal university administration—
changed this.
September 11, 2001 brought about a critical climate for theorists in the 
humanities such that it was no longer permissible to make critical state-
ments or draw theoretical conclusions without fear of reprisal. Whereas 
even ten years earlier (that is, in 1991, before the attacks), comments like 
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Churchill’s would have been controversial, but probably would not have 
triggered a series of events leading to dismissal from an academic posi-
tion, the reactionary Right used the attacks as an opportunity to make 
headway in the culture wars against the Left and discourage dissent.
One of the unfortunate consequences for theory and the humanities 
as a result of the awakening of the spectre of terror in the United States 
is that humanities discourse now needs to be highly attuned not only 
to what it says, but also to how it says it. For some, Churchill’s problems 
came not from simply expressing a dissident position on the events of 
September 11, 2001, but rather for not doing it more “respectfully” or 
“artfully.” For example, instead of using simple and direct statements, 
he should have provided more complex and indirect commentary on 
the events—and in so doing, he would have shielded his dissent more 
effectively from easy criticism from the logic of patriotism.3 For others, 
the problem was not the aesthetics and rhetoric of the essay, but rather 
its psychology. Churchill should have been more sensitive to the emo-
tional needs of post-trauma.4 Doing so would have led him to avoid, for 
example, comparing the financial workers who were killed in the World 
Trade Center as “little Eichmanns,” that is, as cogs in the American gears 
of financial empire and war. But what does this case—and related ones—
mean for theory and the humanities in the age of terror?
The response to Churchill was many times more vicious than the at-
tacks on Baudrillard ten years earlier for questioning whether the Gulf 
War took place. To us, the age of terror presents a more complicated situ-
ation for theorists to engage in publicly accessible discourse. On the one 
hand, there is an obligation to take theory out of the classroom and the 
library, and to bring it into the public arena; on the other hand, there 
are cases like Churchill’s which illustrate the new restrictions which hu-
manities academics face in the shadow of the events of September 11, 
2001. Balancing rigor with access, and direct statement with respect, is 
perhaps the best way to sum up the goal of theory, which aims to avoid 
political confrontation in the age of terror. Dissent is possible without 
negative ramifications only if it carefully avoids divisive rhetoric and 
emotional upheaval.
This situation puts theorists whose work touches on both events with 
direct connections to the attacks—for example, the wars in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan and the torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib, and events with 
less direct connections, such as the increasing restrictions to academic 
freedom and frequent challenges to intellectual activism—on notice. 
Though the attacks of September 11, 2001 may be regarded as theory’s 
event, theorists must be more careful than usual in discussing them, espe-
cially theorists in Middle Eastern, Near Eastern, and Islamic Studies, one 
of the few areas of growth in higher education since September 11, 2001 
(Wilson A11). Theorists in these positions should be aware that they are 
both crisis-driven as well as crisis-prone: one misstatement can easily 
compromise one’s academic position.
The essays in this book, however, are all both direct in the positions 
which they seek to advance, but also highly rigorous in their approach. 
And those in the first half expand upon many of the critical concerns 
raised by bringing terror and theory both to bear in the humanities class-
room and the university at large.
The first, Christian Moraru’s “‘Cosmopolitisme ou barbarie’? Septem-
ber 11, Higher Education, and Cosmopolitan Literacy: An Asymmetric 
Manifesto,” stresses the need to teach a cosmopolitan literacy based on an 
attempt to understand the other in his/her material, particular human-
ness rather than as an allegorical other. Moraru’s essay both establishes 
not only new classroom imperatives in the wake of the events of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, but also suggests that cosmopolitan literacy should be re-
garded as the preferred literacy in the age of terror.
The next essay, “Universities, Terrorists, Narrative, Porcupines” by 
Terry Caesar, uses Donald Barthelme’s short story “Porcupines at the 
University” and John Updike’s novel Terrorist as means of exploring the 
university as an unlikely site of terror. Caesar suggests that the university 
is part of two contradictory narratives relative to terror: the self-enclosed 
physical site impervious to the world, and the ideologically open space 
that is home to all manner of radical experiments. Rather than see the 
two narratives as oppositional, we should see them as interacting in trou-
bling ways that Caesar suggests keep the university oscillating between a 
target for ideological terror and an exception for physical terror.
In “World Bank University: The War on Terror and the Battles for the 
Global Commons,” David B. Downing focuses on the political usage 
of “the war on terror.” According to Downing, the “War on Terror” has 
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become a cause which licenses all manner of regressive policies. Educa-
tion has been further commodified and emphasis has been placed on 
vocational skills. The World Bank and the IMF continue to pursue eco-
nomic policies which, combined with military policy, lead to a greater 
proportion of the education commons becoming privatized.
“The Company They Keep: How Apologists for Faith Rationalize Ter-
rorism” by Horace L. Fairlamb considers the epistemic practices that al-
low for religious terrorism in academic examinations of the links between 
faith and terror. He suggests that all too often, Western philosophers of 
religion are actually pursuing an apologetics of faith in place of an inquiry 
of faith. Apologetics puts certain beliefs beyond question and such a de-
marcation renders full inquiry impossible.
The final essay in this section, Emory Elliott’s “Terror, Aesthetics, and 
the Humanities in the Public Sphere,” opens with the question of speak-
ing truth to power by pointing out that writers past and present have 
found ways to critique the political and military rhetoric of war. In this 
paper Elliott suggests that both Don DeLillo and Philip Roth use the aes-
thetics of astonishment to shock their audience into seeing beyond the 
well-crafted and simplistic post 9/11 representations employed by the 
powerful to control popular dissent.
Terror, Film, and Exceptionalism
Terrorism is a form—and perhaps the most extreme form—of political 
violence. It is violence that is generally regarded as “unofficial” or “un-
authorized,” though always said to be in pursuit of some political end or 
ends. In many ways, it is the paradigmatic form of political violence in a 
group of violent acts that includes demonstrations, revolutions, and civil 
war. As such, for an event to count as terrorism, it needs to be not only a 
violent or intimidating action, but, more importantly, it needs to be un-
official or unauthorized. An authorized or official action using violence 
and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims is not terrorism but war. 
As an act of war, such an official action can count on indignation and an 
attempt at retaliation. The official warrant of an act of violence provides it 
with a comprehension of moral clarity that is denied the act of terrorism 
or that terrorism, it might be more accurate to say, denies its target.
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The response to terrorism is at first fear and confusion. After the initial 
casting about for the source of the terroristic attack, the questions circu-
late around the motivations of the attackers. People ask each other who 
might possibly have done such a horrible and frightening thing. Even 
after a group or individual takes responsibility for the action, there is a 
gap between the professed identity and the action. The gap in compre-
hension widens and swallows even the professed political aims clearly 
stated by those responsible. Indeed, for terrorism to function as terror-
ism, the agents of the terror must claim responsibility and provide a state-
ment of intent.
The significant terrorist attack forces a culture to question both itself 
and the terrorist. Indeed, many Americans wondered why anyone would 
wish to harm them. The naïveté of the question is surprising only if it is 
taken as an actual question seeking a specific answer. The bewilderment 
has more to do with a key aspect of American identity, exceptionalism, 
than ignorance of American involvement in world affairs (although that 
too plays a larger part than one would hope).
The United States is either lucky or—as many in this country believe—
divinely favored. For two-hundred and twenty-five years, there has not 
been an act of foreign terrorism on American soil. It is no wonder that 
just as many believe that we have “God on our side”—more too believe 
in America’s “exceptionalism.” And why not? What other country—now 
or across world history—can claim to be both free of foreign terrorist 
attacks and to be the most powerful global empire in the world—if not 
world history?
It is probably only against such an overblown bas-relief that one can 
begin to understand the type of effect produced when two hi-jacked 
planes were flown into the World Trade Center in New York City on Sep-
tember 11, 2001. With this major event, along with the concurrent plane 
crash in Shanksville, Pennsylvania and the destruction of the Pentagon 
in Washington, DC, the United States experienced its first act of foreign 
terrorism on American soil. It also, arguably, experienced the first seri-
ous challenge in its history to its alleged “exceptionalism”—along with a 
severe test to the limits of its pluralism and tolerance.
It is no overstatement to say that the attacks of September 11, 2001 had 
immediate and significant political, economic, and social effects like no 
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event since Pearl Harbor. And even though there have not been any re-
ported acts of foreign terrorism in the United States since the destruction 
of the Twin Towers, a decade later, we are still experiencing the effects of 
9/11. In addition to the thousands of lives taken or altered by the terror-
ist acts on September 11, 2001, the most devastating effects, of course, 
come from the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan (justified, according to 
the Bush and Obama administrations, respectively), which have resulted 
in hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries (and the numbers con-
tinue to mount in Afghanistan and spill over into Pakistan).
Domestically, American rights to privacy have been attenuated as the 
number of employees and agencies devoted to gathering information has 
increased dramatically. According to a recent investigative report for The 
Washington Post, “the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency has gone 
from 7,500 employees in 2002 to 16,500 today. The budget of the Na-
tional Security Agency, which conducts electronic eavesdropping, dou-
bled. Thirty-five FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces became 106” (Priest 
and Arkin n.p.). And ten years after 9/11, one need only try to board an 
airplane with a king size tube of toothpaste for a real-time demonstration 
of the continuing presence of post-9/11 culture.
As then-President George Bush’s response made clear, Americans see 
themselves in the role of the good in the moral order of the world. Hav-
ing been attacked unofficially has forced an examination of that identity, 
with one immediate result being a greater sense of justified aggression 
against a questionable target. While the Bush administration was making 
the case for war to a public groping for a response, it was also urging a 
continuation of another aspect of American identity, consumerism.
Much commentary on the cultural effects of 9/11 has necessarily fo-
cused on trauma. While public health therapists and researchers have 
sought to offer treatment to individuals traumatized by the attacks, many 
humanities researchers have studied primarily larger cultural effects. Ear-
lier horrific events such as the Holocaust perpetrated by the Nazis, the 
Partition of India into Pakistan and India, and the history of slavery in 
the US can provide a frame of study for the cultural trauma of 9/11. All 
three have had immediate, direct effects, as well as long-term insidious 
effects (common memory vs. deep memory as commonly termed in Holo-
caust studies).
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In cultural terms, national and racial identities, as well as the responsi-
bilities of artists and scholars, have been effected. After despairing at the 
genocide at Auschwitz, Adorno famously questions the possibility of art 
and culture to exist in the face of such barbarity. One of the important 
tasks Indian writers gave themselves in pre-independence India was the 
construction of a pan-Indian identity. Bollywood films and fiction con-
tinue to extol the virtues of a pluralist pan-Indian identity, especially in 
the face of the provocations of an orthodox Hindu majority that sees its 
identity under threat by further linguistic and cultural divisions. Postco-
lonial thought has benefited tremendously from W.E.B. DuBois’ under-
standing that one of the strongest effects of slavery on African American 
identity is the development of a double consciousness.
While the theorists, critics, and philosophers may have been remiss 
in trying to understand terror, the writers have been wrestling with its 
aesthetic and ethical dimensions for quite a long time. As noted earlier, 
Aristotle’s analysis of Oedipus gives us our earliest formulation of the im-
portance of the arousal of terror and pity. Not much more is said on the 
subject until the beginning of the gothic with The Castle of Otranto by 
Horace Walpole. In the preface to the first edition, Walpole defends his 
writing by informing the reader that he keeps up the narrative force of the 
story by the contrasting emotions of terror and pity. Make no mistake, 
though, terror is “the author’s principal engine [by which] the mind is 
kept in a constant vicissitude of interesting passions” (Walpole).
Edmund Burke’s understanding of the sublime in his A Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the  Sublime and Beautiful makes 
terror the centerpiece. Contra Aristotle, who believed, as mentioned ear-
lier, that fear makes us more deliberative, Burke held that “No passion so 
effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear” 
(Burke, “Terror” n.p.). For him, the two qualities that evoke terror in us 
are size and obscurity, with the latter being more important. Although 
Burke’s focus is on actual visual obscurity, he is clearly also mindful of 
knowledge or awareness: “When we know the full extent of any danger, 
when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension 
vanishes” (Burke, “Obscurity” n.p.). Knowing that danger is imminent 
but not knowing its severity or the time or manner of its realization 
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produces a variety of emotional and psychic states that were, for the large 
part, absent from the baby-boomer generation of Americans.
Other people in other lands in other times have become all too accus-
tomed to living with terror. And writers from other lands have certainly 
been eloquent about the effects of terror. Writing in English alone, Jo-
seph Conrad, Chinua Achebe, Nadine Gordimer, Mulk Raj Anand, J. M. 
Coetzee, and Arundhati Roy immediately spring to mind, not to mention 
those writing in other languages, such as Franz Kafka, Alexander Sol-
zhenitsyn, and Gabriel Garcia Marquez. But those with even a passing fa-
miliarity with an introductory survey course in American literature know 
that there are American writers who have explored more than the bored 
lives of middle-class anglos nattering on and on about self-actualization 
or extra-marital affairs.
Stephen Crane’s The Red Badge of Courage, Hemingway’s Nick Adams 
stories, Tim O’Brien’s The Things They Carried and many other “war” sto-
ries depict American life that is certainly not charmed. Ralph Ellison’s 
Invisible Man, Leslie Marmon Silko’s Almanac of the Dead, and Sherman 
Alexie’s Indian Killer portray the lives of those “lesser” Americans for 
whom the American Dream is more frequently a nightmare. In a recent 
interview with the magazine Foreign Policy, Alice Walker casts such a life 
as one lived under terrorism: “I know what terrorism feels like—when 
your father could be taken out in the middle of the night and lynched 
just because he didn’t look like he was in an obeying frame of mind when 
a white person said something he must do. I mean, that’s terrorism…” 
(Walker par. 24). In that same interview (the occasion for which is her 
presence on a flotilla planning to disrupt the Israeli maritime blockade of 
the Gaza strip), Walker offers a succinct definition of terrorism: “When 
you terrorize people, when you make them so afraid of you that they 
are just mentally and psychologically wounded for life—that’s terror-
ism” (Walker).
So some American writers have, then, written about what it is like to 
live in terror, but for the majority, difficult lives are distinguished by a set 
period of turbulence. Their characters make accommodations to specific 
conditions that amount to life during wartime. There is a qualitative dif-
ference between an awareness of imminent danger in a restricted setting 
and understanding that the safe contours of your mundane life, the kind 
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of life that most Americans had learned to take for granted, have been 
blown away. The fates are back.
The connection between acts of terrorism and terror is apparent to 
Walker: when your actions make others “mentally and psychologically 
wounded for life—that’s terrorism.” But what are these wounds, these 
signs of terror written upon the self? Since the attacks of 9/11, American 
writers have begun to explore this altered American psyche.
Americans, post 9/11, have a much more difficult time convincing 
ourselves and others that the US is an exceptional country, and the fear 
and anger have brought about a hardening of the categories of good and 
bad: 24, the popular television show that debuted two months after 9/11, 
portrayed torture as an effective means of gathering intelligence. And we 
have all witnessed the semantic and moral contortions of Bush adminis-
tration lawyers and spokespersons as they tried to reconcile Bush’s asser-
tion that we don’t torture with the facts.
Perversely, reactionaries and progressives both looked to the deca-
dence of American culture as our fatal flaw. While not naming specific 
groups of people or “lifestyles” as the cultural conservatives did, a num-
ber of more liberal commentators and essayists in the US announced the 
death of irony. A columnist for Time magazine, Roger Rosenblatt,5 and 
the editor of Vanity Fair magazine, Graydon Carter,6 were the quickest 
off the mark. Rosenblatt and Carter both hoped that the attacks would 
end a period of superficiality and fascination with surfaces and usher in 
a return to sincerity, earnestness, and true identity. While the response 
to Rosenblatt and Carter was quick and correctly pointed out that nei-
ther understood the potent subversive power of irony which was needed 
now more than ever, the proclamation did tap into a feeling that some-
thing momentous had happened. If Virginia Woolf were alive today, she 
too would have recognized that there was now a “before” and an “after”; 
she may have said that “on or about September 11, 2001 human charac-
ter changed.”
Woolf made her pronouncement a good fourteen years after December 
1900 and could include in her selected date the build-up to World War I, 
the dramatic political shift in Britain, the first show of Modernist art in 
England, and any number of personal events associated with the Blooms-
bury group. Ten years after 9/11, we have a major event, and we also have 
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military and political “adventures” that might have led to our change in 
human character.
The essays in the second part of this book examine some of the aes-
thetic, cultural, and political dimensions of our responses to terror. 
Elaine Martin’s essay “Films about Terrorism, Cinema Studies and the 
Academy” is based on her examination of a number of films about ter-
rorism. Martin finds a number of shared concerns and methodologies in 
three contemporary films from Brazil, India, and Palestine (Four Days in 
September, The Terrorist, and Paradise Now, respectively). The films from 
various parts of the world find not only a commonality in a renewed in-
terest in Third Cinema aesthetics but also in socio-political orientations 
which might suggest a universal frame for films about terror.
Robin Truth Goodman’s essay “Shaherazad On-Line: Women’s Work 
and Technologies of War” discusses the relations of technology to trans-
formations in women’s work. Goodman applies the comparison between 
the philosophy of Donna Haraway and that of Herbert Marcuse to the 
Iraqi blog Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog from Iraq and notes that Haraway’s 
disruption of the private/public and male/female and machine/human 
binaries is a richer approach to understanding how women trapped in a 
narrative of terror might create spaces for themselves through the various 
technologies currently available.
“Neoliberalism as Terrorism; or State of Disaster Exceptionalism” by 
Sophia A. McClennen argues that the post 9/11 US state incorporates 
two fundamental shifts: the permanent state of exception caused by the 
war on terror and the corporate state of neoliberalism. Both radically al-
ter civic identities on US soil and abroad. The civic identities McClennen 
then focuses on involve the representation of Afghanistan as a failed state 
that both precedes the war on terror and is also a large part of the current 
rhetoric about the country. Continuing to characterize Afghanistan as a 
failed state allows the US to pursue policies that it might not otherwise.
“Terror and American Exceptionalism” by William V. Spanos finds in 
Melville’s work an early instance of American exceptionalism. Spanos 
traces the psychological and social effects of placing an entity (admin-
istration, nation, ship) outside the norms that govern daily interactions. 
Spanos strongly suggests that such exceptionalism leads to a diminution 
not only of ideals but of civilization.
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The essay by Zahi Zalloua, “The Ethics of Trauma/The Trauma of Eth-
ics: Terror After Levinas,” examines the Levinasian understanding of self 
and other that might illuminate terror’s othering of social relations. Al-
though Levinas provides an ethical frame for seeing the other necessarily 
as a radical other, an other who forces the self to see more than simply the 
self ’s reflection, he has a blind spot when it comes to accepting the uni-
versalizing of the Jewish experience of the holocaust and of slavery in an-
cient Egypt into the Jew as the victim. This, in turn, makes it problematic 
then in the case of Israel where the Jew is not the victim. Zalloua suggests 
that critics be wary of the intersection of the philosophical and political 
in the Levinasian ethical framework.
Conclusion
The events of September 11, 2001 have had a strong impact on theory 
and the humanities. Whether or not the attacks were “theory’s event” is 
not as important as a recognition of the way in which they have provided 
theorists with an historical event to ground their work. For most, the at-
tacks were so “unforeseeable and irruptive,” such that, in Derrida’s words, 
they disrupted “even the horizon of the concept or essence on the basis 
of which we believe we recognize an event as such.” They do call for a 
new philosophy, as the old philosophy is inadequate to account for them. 
They also call for both reflection on theory, philosophy, and the humani-
ties in general, which is what the essays in this collection provide.
But also, in an important way, the events of September 11, 2001 have 
changed the academy—or refigured it through the lens of terror. We now 
study “religious terrorism” rather than “religion”; we encourage the study 
of Arabic while closing Romance language departments; we are encour-
aged to engage in scholarship which helps us to understand and perhaps 
avoid events like the attacks—though always with the fear that our ac-
ademic freedom cannot protect us from negative consequences for ev-
erything that we say; and so on. It is a positive sign for theory and the 
humanities that many academics have responded to the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001 with conferences, symposia, books, articles, and special 
journal issues. And even ten years after the event, ours is still the age of 
terror—in much the same way that the late sixties were the age of love.
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Perhaps the recent location and killing of the leader of the militant Is-
lamic group al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, in Pakistan on May 2, 2011—
almost ten years after he and his confederates carried out the 9/11 
attacks—has ended the age of terror. However, it has not ended the jour-
ney to understand what it means to be a theorist in the age of phobos—
nor the effort to create a new philosophy that measures up with life in 
the new millennium. It is in the spirit of hope—the hope that theory will 
help to bring us out of the age of terror—that we offer the essays in this 
collection to you.
Notes
1. See, for example, Coady and O’Keefe, Govier, Honderich (After the Terror and 
Humanity, Terrorism, Terrorist War), Primoratz, Shanahan, and Sterba.
2. Much has been written about this topic. However, for a comprehensive 
introduction, see the 2008/09 special issue of the journal Works and Days, 
“Academic Freedom and Intellectual Activism in the Post-9/11 University.” 
As evidence that dissident readings of the events of September 11, 2001 (still) 
elicit powerful reactions, it should be noted that an evening of readings from 
the issue was threatened with cancellation.
3. See, for example, Ivie.
4. See, for example, Schulz and Reyes.
5. See Rosenblatt: “One good thing could come from this horror: it could spell 
the end of the age of irony” (par. 1).
6. Carter was quoted by Seth Mnookin as saying “It’s the end of the age of 
irony.” See “In Disaster’s Aftermath, Once-Cocky Media Culture Disses the 
Age of Irony,” Inside.com, Sept. 18, 2001.
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ITerror, Philosophy, and the University

Chapter 1
“Cosmopolitisme ou barbarie”?
September 11, Higher Education, and Cosmopolitan 
Literacy: An Asymmetric Manifesto
Christian Moraru
I am the content of a relation.
– Haruki Murakami, Kafka on the Shore
[T]he central human worries as “world” problems…
– Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Manifesto”
Terror, the ruin of language and consciousness…
– Marc Redfield, The Rhetoric of Terror
Driven by competing agendas and inevitably fraught with their high-
pitched discord, the post-9/11 debate over terror in general and terrorism 
in particular rests, nonetheless, on an implied epistemological consensus 
of sorts: the traditional notions no longer hold water. By “traditional,” I 
mean, of course, “modern.” To be sure, the dictionary definition of ter-
rorism, on which we often fall back mechanically, has been handed down 
to us by modernity, namely by the post-Westphalian modernity of sov-
ereign Western nation-states. Along with so many others, this definition 
too has all but outlived its pertinence. Underscoring rather abstractly the 
use or threat of physical, sometimes deadly, anti-governmental and even 
anti-civilian force for political purposes, this understanding provides lit-
tle orientation in the contemporary geography of violence. No question 
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about it: the conceptual map we inherited from the moderns is hardly the 
twenty-first-century territory where terrorism’s contentions, plots, and 
meanings play out. To come to terms with these evolving meanings and 
their complex bearings on our lives as students, teachers, and citizens, I 
propose, accordingly, that we begin with this territory itself. For, it seems 
to me, what terror—no less than counter-terror—purports and stands 
for at the turbulent dawn of the new millennium is ultimately a function 
of this territory, of terror and terrorism’s position, reach, and scope.
If terrorism is, among other things, politics, this politics is fundamen-
tally and sometimes fundamentalistically a politics of location. Terror-
ism constitutes a territoriality epiphenomenon. Or, more precisely, it 
did so until recently. Whatever else they may have entailed or impacted, 
terrorist claims have involved, not unlike the claims laid by the nation, 
self-determination, sovereignty, and, in the final analysis, territoriality. 
Historically speaking, terror, political terror rather than its psychologist 
counterpart (terror as a “state of mind”) has been territorialized, place-
bound. Local, or territorial, terror has had a spatial pathos to it. It has 
bodied forth a “separatist,” hence topological militancy, has been ener-
gized (has been “about”) and therefore has been circumscribed by a cer-
tain terrain—a terra, ţară, tierra, terre, and so on in Latin and a number 
of Romance languages—that is, by a (home)land, country, or domain 
of the nation-state and its subdivisions or extensions inside or around its 
ever-contested borders and policies. Thus, terror and its modern enact-
ments have been ordinarily a violent variety of political teratology in the 
twofold sense that sets up the familiar-domestic, the territorial, as a stage 
for the teratological, the monstrous, the “terrifying” (from Lat. terrēre). 
Waged by individuals, groups, state-sanctioned military or paramilitary 
apparatuses of surveillance and repression such as the secret police from 
the Tsarist CEKA to East German Stasi and the Iranian Basij, or by whole 
governments during the recurrent “reigns of terror” for which latter-day 
apologists like Slavoj Žižek still offer cynical encomia, terror has been a 
non-deliberative, anti-parliamentary formation or malformation within 
the home of the nation, a homegrown aberration inside or alongside the 
Heimat’s body politic (Žižek, “No Solution”).
Not so much in the post-1989 era. Fundamentally symptomatic of 
the Cold War’s aftermath, the September 11, 2001 attacks, as well as the 
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worldwide developments they spurred, bear witness to the spectacularly 
global dissemination of terror. Like most anything else, terror has been 
deterritorialized. Decoupled from a well-marked territory, terror has gone 
global. Both in its actions and in the counter-actions it has unleashed—
as “Jihadism” and “War on Terror” alike—it is now supralocal, transna-
tional, arguably planetary. The nation-state neither contains it topologi-
cally nor accounts for it descriptively, as a unit of analysis. Not any more. 
As before, our time’s terrorism is militarily and politically transgressive, 
or, as we say these days, “asymmetrical,” in that it overall bends and even 
shuns the more or less agreed-upon rules of martial and political engage-
ment. Its geographical asymmetry, its territorial unpredictability, is, how-
ever, quasi unprecedented. Practically, terror may originate anywhere 
nowadays, including “at home,” and it can also strike anywhere. In fact, 
whether the target is (or is “in”) Manhattan or Waziristan, and whether 
the targeting is carried out by isolated operatives or by networked, state-
sponsored, or self-described statal agents such as regular armed forces, 
terrorist acts predominantly and characteristically stem from “elsewhere.”
Does this mean that terrorism is not our problem, here and now, in a 
here and now almost overnight became, after 9/11, more problematic, 
more replete with problems and questions than ever? Absolutely not. It 
is our problem. Moreover, should it seem otherwise, we must show ex-
plicitly that we can make it our problem. It does not mean that this else-
where is solely a spatial category either. To the contrary, it means, as I will 
expound in what follows, that terrorism qua our problem, as an Ameri-
can problem and possibly as the problem of America overall, of US cul-
ture and its current place in the world, cannot be tackled apart from the 
highly charged problematic of elsewhere, of other terrains, cultures, and 
peoples. If that is true, then let me say a few words about this geocultural-
ly asymmetric elsewhere and its thought-provoking, irregular landscape 
of otherness, as a preamble to a “provocation” of my own—the post-
9/11 higher-education manifesto of sorts that I will offer in the last part 
of this essay.
“Meaning can happen when you least expect it,” Alan Alda writes in 
his 2007 memoir Things I Overheard While Talking to Myself (72–73). I 
certainly agree. The “aha!” moment or place usually catches us by sur-
prise. It may even strike us as “out of place.” Why? Because it is just so, 
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out of place and order, inordinate and ex-centric geographically, cultur-
ally, or both, displaced and perhaps déplacé, as the French would say; be-
cause effective cognition entails a critical displacement, puts to test our 
habitual takes on things insofar as “getting it” is often not of “this” place, 
ours, but obtains in places remote or off the beaten path. Like identity, 
to whose fostering it is key, understanding is not a given but a gift on an 
other, “de l’Autre.”1 If, as one of Kundera’s novel titles assures us, “life is 
elsewhere,” there is a good reason for it. This elsewhere and its troubling, 
perhaps “terrible” if not “terrifying” “otherwise” are vital to us here, in our 
America. Being and thinking feed off the less conspicuous nearness and 
seemingly less consequential immediacy of the distant, the strange, and 
the different. These set in train the requisite, Levinasian sortie de soi, the 
“release from self-sameness,” from the inherited ways and clichés poised 
to shape our lives and thoughts into mindless rehearsals of previous lives 
and thoughts.2 To be sure, we are and understand with others and their 
places; self-identity presupposes them (Taylor qtd. in Scharlemann 18). 
Admittedly, “being elsewhere,” être ailleurs, can betoken “distraction” 
and “absence of thought,” but they also mark the very place of being and 
thinking because we ultimately come to terms with ourselves and our 
world ailleurs, “elsewhere,” as Montaigne once remarked.3 In the heter-
onomous scene of understanding, the existential, the epistemological, 
and the ethical intertwine.4 It is in this arena that comprehension, self-
comprehension, and the self itself eventuate, relationally, in relation and 
thus as debt to an other. It is here that we learn about our own here and 
now (and their past), from others’ “out there” and their “far-out,” “exotic,” 
and “implausible” territories, histories, and notions.
So did Alda himself. As he reminisces in his volume’s sixth chapter, 
“A Passion for Reason,” he had to travel all the way to China a few years 
ago to “make a personal connection to [Thomas] Jefferson” and, by the 
same token, to himself as an American for whom our third President was 
a personification of America (Alda 65). As the actor told a roomful of 
Jeffersonian experts back in Monticello, a rice paddy “on the other side 
of the world” proved to be the unlikely place where, at long last, he “got” 
Jefferson (71).
One wonders, though: are we now offshoring national identity too, 
how we feel about who we are? Is the postmodern making of Americans, 
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the manufacturing, that is, of our innermost associations and self-reve-
lations going the way most other manufacturing jobs have? More to the 
point: must we connect with others and their cultures in order to con-
nect with ourselves as Americans, Americanists, or otherwise? Must 
we take the deterritorializing route of otherness, of cultural transit and 
translation, to be and “find” ourselves?5 Not entirely new, the questions 
are more timely now than ever. We must raise them if we really want to 
find out who we are as citizens of the US and the world, and we must 
raise them too, I submit, to get a handle on terror’s twenty-first-century 
meanings. The gist of the answers—and the main tenet of my argument 
below—is encapsulated by Alda’s realization that Yuan Long Ping, a Chi-
nese biologist, made him “underst[and] Jefferson for the first time” (71). 
Yuan did so, Alda intimates, as a “Chinese Jeffersonian” who reenacted 
an experiment “Jie Fu Sun” had done with rice back in his day. Following 
Jefferson and running similarly serious risks—the American smuggled 
rice out of Italy; the Chinese defied the People’s Republic’s pseudosci-
entific yet “official” botany—Yuan created a high-yield rice hybrid by 
cross-pollinating two strains of rice. Cross-pollination is, of course, key 
here, at once a Jeffersonian technique and an American modus operandi, 
driving force of national creativity and code of Americanness on so many 
levels. More notably, the Chinese Jefferson, himself an incarnation of this 
methodology, broke the code for his American guest. In other words, it 
was the latter’s enlightening encounter with his host that enabled Alda to 
relate to Jefferson, to forge the bond we normally assume we already have 
with those close to us, with kin, relatives, and like relations. What Yuan 
did and said as well as what he was—a hybrid in his own right—helped 
Alda and, through him, Alda’s American listeners back in Virginia get a 
fresh grip on their individual and collective identities.
The other and the far-flung may speak to us from afar, with an accent 
if not in tongues, or so we may hear them and their Jie Fu Sunian whis-
pers. But we had better pay attention to what they say because it may just 
unveil us to ourselves. We need not be—I for one am not—sold on a 
view of an identity and perception thereof wholly “disembedded,” “off-
shored,” much less on the economic metaphor itself. Nor should we un-
derestimate the powerfully formative sway of the hic et nunc. What we 
might entertain instead and what I advance here is the hypothesis of a 
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cultural-epistemological “outsourcing” of sorts, with others and their 
“out-of-place” sites, images, texts, styles, ideas, and Weltanschauungen as 
sources of defining “parts” and junctures of a fairly distinctive protocol of 
identity production and self-representation. This protocol, I further sug-
gest, is pivotal to a kind of picturing of the self and of its world—to a cul-
tural imaginary—that in the Cold War’s aftermath becomes more typical 
of American culture than at any time in its history. The logic underlying 
this imaginary is fundamentally, systematically, and pointedly relational, 
turning as it does on self and other’s foundational co-relationality with 
respect to one another. Whatever they are and regardless of how much 
they care for this situation, both are (stand for, exist) correlatively, in rela-
tion with each other. Alda’s little scene is relational because it decisively 
plays on relatedness, to wit; it premises the self and the self ’s own thema-
tization of itself and its culture on the self-other nexus.
With this in mind, let us circle back to our “terror.edu,”6 to this title 
masquerading as an Internet domain name. Is it a pun? A play many times 
over? Yes, but not gratuitously so, for it is also a memento, a reminder 
beginning with a full stop, so to speak, with the dot that links up in the 
spurious domain name two legitimate domains otherwise apart if not 
at odds in the public imaginary: terror, terrorism more specifically, irre-
spective of its manifestation, on the one hand, and education, higher-ed-
ucation more exactly, on the other. Giving the lie to the old Ivory Tower 
cliché, “terror.edu” forefronts the mutual articulation of terror—with 
its events, policies, and disputes—on one side, and the academy on the 
other, so much so that there is no other side, no sides, discrete, or outside 
domains any more, but a single albeit conflicted continuum of occurrenc-
es, implications, and discourses. “No more outside”: this is Hardt and 
Negri’s reiterated Deleuzian conclusion in Empire (194); within months, 
9/11 corroborated this supremely apposite post-Cold War geopolitical 
observation, and before long, our universities followed suit, finding it in-
creasingly difficult to position themselves outside those events, policies, 
and debates.
Many of us have deplored the encroachments of counterterrorist mea-
sures and regulations on our libraries and computers, and rightly so. But, 
whether or not the “War on Terror” as such makes precisely for the kind 
of knee-jerk, unreflective reaction we think it is our job to help students 
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control intellectually and ethically; whether or not this all-out campaign 
threatens the very freedoms in whose defense it was presumably waged 
in the first place—either way, what “terror.edu” does, in my account at 
least, is this: it highlights the intricate, ever-ambiguous imbrications of 
terror, its territorial, or cross-territorial, terrain, rather, and the moral-aes-
thetic values cultivated (cf. Lat. cultura) throughout this globally shifting, 
counter-cartographic territoriality; it thus reminds us that, while it may 
no longer be place- or nation-bound, terror remains germane to culture; 
it suggests, on this very ground, that terror falls under the enlightening 
jurisdiction of education, viz., it can be approached as a cultural forma-
tion of meanings and of those learning about them.
For, no question about it, the dot in question is deceptively terminal. 
That is to say, since culture does not end where terror begins (and vice 
versa), the dot is not a terminus, an ad quem point, but the marker of the 
terms’ inherent interplay, for better or worse: for worse, insofar as this 
imbrication may allow for potentially or effectively censorious intru-
sions of various government agencies on our work—and, to the extent 
counterterrorist suspicions and policies, domestic and foreign, hurt our 
abilities to recruit international students and otherwise do our job, these 
infringements should be challenged vigorously, as they have been (see 
for instance, Hauerwas and Lentricchia’s 2003 collection Dissent from the 
Homeland); for better, in that if terror and culture are indeed bound up 
with one another and, further, if the University continues to be a premier 
place for the critical production and filtering of cultural definitions, iden-
tities, and citizenship, as I think it does, then several points are in order—
I would like to think of them, if I may, as a pedagogical decalogue for the 
twenty-first century.
First, we, educators generally and humanists especially, are uniquely 
positioned to intervene in the ongoing, confusing dispute over terror and 
terrorism. We must understand, and make others understand too, that 
the confusion will persist unless the controversy and pertaining deci-
sions, policies, and so forth take into account cultural issues.
Second, what this intervention might come down to is, in short, a reori-
entation of the discussion and related public perception away from the 
crude us/them, “clashist” dichotomy à la Benjamin Barber and Samuel 
Huntington. This polarity is simplistic, politically counterproductive, 
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and geoculturally fictitious as long as we view it in exclusively adversar-
ial and topologically discontinuous terms. This is not how Alda thinks 
about his dealings with his Chinese friend. I am not implying either that 
self and other do not exist in the modality of a distinction that can be 
deemed, and often simply is, as Levinas stresses, absolute. It is just that, 
distinct as they are and often insist on remaining, self and other stand 
after 1989 willy-nilly inscribed into a material world syntax of co-pres-
ence and co-participation in the very basic sense that I and you, Christian 
and Muslim, white and black (or brown), and so on—whether we/they 
like it or not—“are in this together.” Being-with-, understanding-with-, 
understanding-oneself-with-an other are forms of translocal and trans-
cultural togetherness that define the transition away from modernity’s 
disjunctive, either-or, nation-state-based logic to our conjunctive stage. 
In this post-, perhaps post-postmodern world, to be and mean is to be 
and mean in relation, to be and signify with others, so much so that you 
owe them who you are and how you see yourself, your own people, his-
tory, and the like. More than ever, the problem of culture—“my culture” 
included—and the problem with its analysis no less, is the problem of 
alterity. Relatedness, more specifically the self-other nexus, is, much like 
our connecting dot, the logic of Manuel Castells’s network society and in 
that cuts to the heart of how and who we (no less than “they”) and our 
world are—once more, whether we/they are crazy about it or not.
Third, if this is so, then, once again, the problem of terror is no different 
from the problem of culture, “mine” and “yours,” “American” and “Paki-
stani,” of how we think of it and how we might help our students and the 
public at large think of it. I would propose, then, that this thinking and 
the teaching and learning based on it are or should be relational, ground-
ed in the kind of I-You relation to which thinkers like Martin Buber have 
attended so insistently and inspiringly (I and Thou). Similar to the dot 
knotting together fields and people, this thinking connects the dots too, 
distinct and asymmetrically positioned as these dots may be or appear. 
This “mutualist” worldview sets up relations, places things in a participa-
tory context of interaction, exchange, and negotiation in order to make 
sense of those things.
Fourth, this kind of context also defines the pedagogical environment 
and epistemological paradigm of the twenty-first-century classroom. 
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Reciprocally, it is in this context that the defining essence of culture and 
identity emerges. Both transhistorical and more conspicuous today than 
at any previous stage, this essence, what culture and cultural identity are 
and, consequently, how we think or how we should think about them, 
ultimately disables a disjunctive-adversarial understanding of the self-
other dyad. “Out there” as much as “in here,” across the world and across 
the street, the other no less than the self as the other’s other are—or, if 
they are not yet, they ought to become—no longer the monolithically 
ethno-religious fetish lying behind most acts of terror and anti-terrorist 
retaliations.
Fifth, while imagining ourselves—teaching the images and histories of 
America—in terms of our indebtedness to others may not be an instant 
game-changer, in my judgment it nevertheless is a first step we can and 
should take as students and teachers of culture. This is a step in the direc-
tion of a cultural solution to a problem that, I hasten to add, loud and 
clear, is not solely cultural but also economic, religious, demographic, 
political and geopolitical, and so on. However, what we hear time and 
again from Žižek, Jean Baudrillard, Paul Virilio, and other self-appointed, 
global-era terrorism experts is, as Baudrillard contends in his 2002 essay 
Hypothèses sur le terrorisme, that “It all comes from the fact that the Other, 
like Evil, is unimaginable. It all comes from the impossibility of conceiv-
ing of the Other—friend or enemy—in its radical otherness, in its irrec-
oncilable foreignness…. A refusal rooted,” the philosopher goes on, “in 
the total identification with oneself around moral values and technical 
power. That is the America that takes itself for America and which, bereft 
of otherness, eyes itself with the wildest compassion” (Baudrillard 72). 
Needless to say—or, who knows, perhaps this needs to be said, given 
where the terror debate stands dix ans après—there is hardly any compas-
sion for terrorism’s victims in Baudrillard, and you would find it neither 
in Virilio’s technophobe jeremiad Ground Zero, where the 9/11 attacks 
are defined, following Karlheinz Stockhausen’s despicable 2001 state-
ment, as “the greatest work of art there has ever been” (45). Nor is there 
any in Žižek’s anti-consummerist-anti-Hollywood-anti-postmodern-an-
ti-cultural-studies-anti-multicultural-anti-US-anti-Israeli-anti-Pakistani-
anti-everything tirade Welcome to the Desert of the Real. Oddly enough, 
Žižek fancies himself a sort of iron-fisted Morpheus, not the Greek god of 
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sleep and dreams, of course, but the Laurence Fishburne character in The 
Matrix, moonlighting, appalling as it may sound, as “[a] Minister of the 
Interior or head of the secret service,” which, still in Žižek’s own words, 
was “the only government [post] which interested me” back “in the early 
1990s,” when “I was more involved in Slovene politics” (Welcome to the 
Desert 6) (hey, did somebody say totalitarianism?). Žižek-as-Himmler-
(or Stalin’s Beria—just take your pick)-as Morpheus, then, welcomes the 
terrorist occurrence, the “act,” insofar as the act—never mind its mass-
murderous consequences—serves as a national wakeup call, in turn wel-
coming us to the “thing itself,” the Real underneath the media-generated 
simulacrum also known as the American everyday. In this sense, 9/11’s 
thousands of deaths and, by implication, the many more thousands of 
casualties inflicted on others elsewhere after that make for a reasonable 
“price to be paid for peeling off the deceptive layers of reality,” that is, for 
finally “getting” ideology and the spell it casts on us (Žižek, Welcome to 
the Desert 6). But the careful reader must be disappointed, I presume, 
when the Slovene Morpheus lulls us back to sleep by defining, a bit lat-
er, the cultural anatomy of the event behind the Real’s disclosure as the 
very workings of said ideology. Whether you want to know more about 
yourself or about others, learning about the other’s culture “remains,” he 
claims, “a gesture of ideological mystification par excellence: probing into 
different cultural traditions is precisely not the way to grasp the political 
dynamics which led to the September 11 attacks” (34).
Sixth, the new pedagogical imperative and the cosmopolitan literacy 
that I believe must be this imperative’s ultimate objective go of neces-
sity against this a-cultural cocksureness. Cultural “probing” is hardly the 
compounding problem. Quite the opposite, it provides the solution, in 
classrooms, agoras, and political bodies alike. Why? Because, if terror-
ism is, no matter its origin, venue, and rationale, the violent epitome of 
parochialism, a paroxism of the idiomatic and the ruthlessly exclusive, 
this is due to no negligible degree to a poverty of the anthropological 
imagination. Xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, jingoistic, and, according 
to Roland Barthes, “petit-bourgeois” culture is simply “unable to imagine 
the Other. If [it] comes face to face with him, [it] blinds [it]self, ignores 
and denies him, or else transforms [it]self into him.”21 Barthes talks about 
“class anthropomorphism,” but I would broaden the notion to cover the 
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cultural anthropomorphism of any culturally ingrown self, group, or so-
ciety, “ours” surely no exception, in which “otherness is reduced to same-
ness” (Mythologies 151). On the one hand, such self or group expunges 
the other from the domain of selfhood; on the other hand, it reduces 
the other to (the self) itself in the (pseudo)act of self-knowledge. Both 
are stratagems of negation, denial, and thus self-denial. Historically, they 
have played out, as Barthes alerts us, in a number of superficially conflict-
ing ways: as outright ignorance; as pseudo-recognition that forces the un-
known into the clichés and essences customarily featured by the rhetoric 
of intolerance and more largely into cut-and-dried categories of intelli-
gibility; as “agnostic” rationalization of the supposedly “exotic,” “irratio-
nal,” and “incomprehensible,” which casts the other outside “humanity” 
on principle—the other is in- or sub-human, demonic, barbarian, un-
clean, etc. In the West, this exclusive mentality can be traced back to the 
Greek city-state and its setting itself off against the backdrop of “barbar-
ian” otherness fancied as outlandish, distinct in space and culture, that is, 
incompatible with the local axiology of the polis and thereby im-polite 
and im-politic, uncouth and uncivilized, in sum, “barbarous.” A barbar-
ian, Greek historians and philosophers enlighten us, is fundamentally a 
non-Greek, a foreigner. Vice versa, a foreigner must be barbaric, totally 
different from and adverse to the native in customs and demeanor. Alius 
(“other” for Romans) is thus understood as alienus, “alien.” The self and 
the barbarian other are not only distinct but also politically discordant 
and so liable to clash. As a non-self, the latter threatens the self by its very 
existence. This is how, in the dynamic of self and other as represented by 
the socii of a self-described native community, difference sets itself up as 
incompatibility, disjunction, contest, intolerance, and finally exclusion. It 
becomes so, of course, without necessarily being recognized as such. The 
rationale of this exclusion is reason itself, more precisely, the contrasting 
irrationality of the other, who is “by nature” prone to brutality, to rude, 
irrational if not utterly insane behavior (cf. the French aliéné). This pro-
clivity is putatively born out by the word’s onomatopoeic root. Accord-
ingly, the gibberish spoken by the bárbaroi is nonsensical “bar, bar, bar” 
(“blah, blah, blah”), an etymology corroborated by the Sanskrit barbara
(“stammering” and “non-Aryan”).7 Since presumably phoné barbariké 
serves no rational purpose, it supplies no vehicle to logos, sense-making, 
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communication, and cooperation either, disqualifying its speaker as 
polítes, as a member of a linguistic-rational community. In brief, irratio-
nality is both cultural diagnosis and political subterfuge, language used 
by the “sane,” a priori civilized, and “politic” body to mark and quarantine 
infectious difference, to control the “pathology” of otherness.
Seventh, we have reached a point in world affairs when it is becoming 
abundantly clear that this symptomatology is endemic to insiders and 
outsiders alike, to self-described rational communities, languages, and 
institutions, as well to their supposedly irrational and putatively external 
exteriorities. Regardless of side, then, among all those unable to imag-
ine others and their “alternate” ways of doing and looking at things, the 
terrorist individual, organization, or mindset is the worst in that he, she, 
they, or it cannot picture other people as people, that is, cannot visualize 
others’ humanity as humanity, as concrete, if “atypical” human life worth 
respecting unless it mirrors their own type. And if it does not, it does not 
exist. It falls short not only typologically but also ontologically, or so the 
argument goes. Those others may be “out there,” but they are less than 
human. Further, since they do not fit the bill of humanness, they are not 
worth our humaneness either, a modicum of compassion that would 
make the terrorist think twice before blowing them to smithereens.
Eight, this compassion is cosmopolitan. Very basically, as a modality of 
care, of ethical outward projection of the self, compassion “shap[es] the 
civic imagination” and thus lies at the core of civility, of being “civilized,” 
a cives (polítes) (Nussbaum, “Compassion and Terror” 12). The cosmo-
politan cives, the cosmopolites as the Greeks called him or her, extends or 
is expected to extend “intramural” compassion to those other “out there” 
(or, if in here, not like “us”). He or she possesses the rare ability to care 
about others, and to the extent that this ability is inherent to cosmo-
politanism, a phrase such as “compassionate cosmopolite” is arguably a 
tautology. Conversely, to suggest that the cosmopolitan’s antinomy, the 
barbarian, is uncompassionate would be equally redundant. Along these 
lines, the terrorist individual, entity, or mechanism, no matter how rhe-
torically sophisticated his or its platform, is quintessentially, and no less 
redundantly, barbarous.
Ninth, cosmopolitan compassion, the capacity to feel-for across differ-
ences in space and culture, is—and I here too I follow Nussbaum (Poetic 
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Justice 94)—the one that puts indifference, injustice, aggression, and ul-
timately murderous violence onto an other out of gear. Yet I cannot feel-
for if I cannot feel-with, if I cannot associate myself authentically to the 
ways in which others see and take in the world, without necessarily buy-
ing into their world pictures, in brief, if there is no empathy. But there can 
be no empathy for others, no emotional connection with those who are 
not already my relatives, without the basic ability to relate to them cogni-
tively—cognitively and, I insist, ethically at once—that is, if I make no at-
tempt to know them in their often radical, hard-to-know and sometimes 
unknowable otherness. In this sense, the “impossibility of conceiving the 
Other” in his or her “radical otherness,” in the specific, time- and place-
bound configuration of his or her humanity, is indeed the problem we 
are all facing today, whether we talk about terror or about culture, about 
9/11 or Orientalism (or Occidentalism, for that matter). At the dawn of 
the twenty-first century more than ever in our history, this history and 
the culture produced across it appear to us, with supreme clarity, as a do-
main of relationality.
Tenth, as has been noted, but, apparently, also forgotten repeatedly, 
it was cultural studies that moved “others” to the center of our view of 
ourselves. “Bereft of otherness,” to invoke Baudrillard again (The Spirit of 
Terrorism 62), America makes, indeed, no sense analytically—I suppose 
this is what most of us tell our students more and more these days. Made 
possible by a number of philosophers, sociologists, and political scien-
tists who have taken the first steps in opposing cosmopolitanism, its cul-
tural epistemology, and ethics to the new, state-sponsored or freelancing 
barbarianism of terror—and more largely cosmopolitan “conversational-
ism” to parochial “confrontationalism” (Appiah 246)—the whole point 
of what I would call cosmopolitan literacy is to drive home this notion of 
being and making sense in sine qua non relation with an other’s singular 
humanity.8 Our charge as humanists eager to honor the plurality embed-
ded in the humanities to which we are so dedicated, and also the main 
task of education in general at a time self and other have drawn so close 
in space to one another, is indeed this literacy understood as a system-
atic, cross-curricular, and methodologically apposite effort to help our 
students see others—and with them, ourselves—in the their material, 
particular humanness. For this materiality, I contend, is the very site and 
48 Christian Moraru
vehicle of cultural-existential difference. Difference, then, is no longer a 
hurdle, an obstacle to communication, as classical humanists and critics 
from Žižek and Badiou to Nussbaum herself tend to think, but a bridge, 
a window into the other’s humanity and implicitly an apt instrument 
with which to handle and possibly mitigate the frictions, tensions, frus-
trations, and confusions of twenty-first-century worldly togetherness. 
To think twice, to spare a life, to think a life worth sparing, is not just 
thinking but also feeling. Yet, it bears reiterating in closing, you cannot 
feel for, or feel like, others, nor can you empathize—let alone be compas-
sionate—if you cannot relate, and you cannot relate outside the immedi-
ate circle of kin and kind if you do not get to know those others in their 
most humanly individualizing routines that, at the end of knowing, must 
remain as human as individual, “different.” On this account, Baudrillard 
is wrong: while terrorism may often be logistically “asymmetric,” what it 
actually accomplishes does nothing to “restore” the world of singularities 
threatened by Nike billboards (Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism 46). 
To the extent that any asymmetric claim is the purview of cultural behav-
ior, asymmetry is hardly the terrorist individual or state’s posture. This 
is, in fact, precisely what makes terrorism “immoral” and its posture a de 
facto imposture (12). It is the cosmopolitan cultural analyst and teacher, 
whose methodological self-positioning, object, as well as objective are 
all asymmetrical: unpredictable, slippery, undisciplined, and otherwise 
insubordinate to available cognitive grids. Still, we need to remind our-
selves and our students this: if, much like self-knowledge, our knowl-
edge about others passes the test of this asymmetry, then we have known 
them in their unyielding otherness and thus have also not known them, 
as it were, in the Levinasian sense in which relational rather than rational 
knowledge honors the mystery of others and the common world their 
elusive presence makes possible.
Notes
1. On Lacan and the “ex-centricity” of the self, see, among other places, “The 
Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious” in Modern Criticism and Theory: A 
Reader (83). On Lacan, identity, and “L’Autre,” see the whole issue “L’identité 
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en question dans la psychanalyse” of La Revue de psychanalyse du Champ 
lacanien, especially Jean-Jacques Gorog, “L’identité est ‘de l’Autre,” 59–65.
2. Drawing from Levinas, Adam Zachary Newton discusses the remote, the 
strange, the “not-here,” and their “liberating” role in The Elsewhere. See 
On Belonging at a Near Distance: Reading Literary Memoir from Europe and 
the Levant (116). On Levinas’s sortie de soi and how this “exit,” ex-cedence 
(in Newton), or ex-cessive repositioning of the self outside of itself in the 
“proximity of the other” empowers the self ’s life and mind, see “La proximité 
de l’autre” in Altérité et transcendence (108).
3. Nicole Lapierre glosses on Montaigne’s dictum “Nous pensons tousjours 
ailleurs” (“Our thinking always takes place elsewhere”) (Pensons 
ailleurs 11–20).
4. Following Freud, Lacan also elaborates on the heteronomy of the self in “The 
Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious” (83) and elsewhere.
5. Giles Gunn is one of the critics who have formulated such questions in terms 
of cultural translation (Beyond Solidarity 23).
6. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Terror.edu Winter Theory 
Institute hosted by the Society for Critical Exchange at the University of 
Houston-Victoria, February 11–14, 2010.
7. See Arthur Anthony MacDonnell’s Practical Sanskrit Dictionary for Sanskrit 
barbara (192). The Unabridged Webster’s too mentions the Sanskrit and 
“inhumane” as a meaning of the Greek “barbarian.” “Babbling” is also listed 
as a meaning for “barbarous.” The Liddell-Scott Greek-English Lexicon lists 
barbarízo, “speak broken Greek, speak gibberish,” “violate the laws of speech,” 
whence the modern term, “barbarism.” The bárbaroi were, we learn, originally 
“all non-Greek-speaking people” (306). As for my essay’s title, its first 
part obviously references the French post-World War II group and journal 
Socialisme ou barbarie led by Cornelius Castoriadis.
8. Critics who have made a cosmopolitan case against the brutality of terrorism 
include Daniele Archibugi (“Terrorism and Cosmopolitanism”), Ulrich 
Beck (“The Fight for a Cosmopolitan Future”), and Martha C. Nussbaum 
(“Compassion and Terror” 10–26).
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Chapter 2
Universities, Terrorists, Narrative, Porcupines
Terry Caesar
At one point early in John Updike’s novel, Terrorist, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security upgrades the terror-threat level in Washington, New 
York, and northern New Jersey from yellow to orange. “Financial centers, 
sports arenas, bridges, tunnels, subways,” he explains, “nothing is safe” 
(43). In particular, “robust screening”—of vehicles, packages, deliver-
ies—will be in place in order to secure buildings and underground park-
ing garages. The problem of terrorism is at least in part to try to anticipate 
its targets, its favored sites.
Although in theory any site can conceivably be targeted, in fact, some 
are more favored than others. The most infamous one of all—the World 
Trade Center—has acted to effectively marginalize or efface all other 
sites, even those concurrent with the attack; in the introduction to their 
recent collection of essays Literature after 9/11, Anne Keniston and 
Jeanne Follansbee Quinn note that “literary representations of 9/11 fo-
cus almost exclusively on the events in New York City. The destruction of 
the Pentagon and the crash in Shanksville, PA, while suggestive for film 
makers, has not proved as interesting to writers” (1).
Over and over again, the essays in the Keniston and Quinn collection 
explore what has not been represented in (or as a result of) 9/11: Iraqis 
or Afghans killed by Americans, or the real-time trauma of the actual his-
torical event on this one particular day, to the loss of the father as rep-
resented in fictions such as Jonathan Saffran Foer’s Extremely Loud and 
Incredibly Close, or comix such as Art Spiegelman’s In the Shadow of No 
Towers, and the absence of actual dead bodies.1 As Simon Cooper and 
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Paul Atkinson note, the very use of the numbers “9/11” expresses an ab-
sence, since it is based on “the use of a date in lieu of a name” (62).
Just so, some of the problem of terrorism is the problem of naming. 
“9/11” doesn’t so much state a transcendent solution to the problem as 
much as simply relay the implicit question: what is terrorism?2 If 9/11 
isn’t an example of terrorism, we can certainly conclude, nothing is. And 
yet, 9/11 was so spectacular, so televised and photographed in real time 
throughout the entire surface of the globe, that it still threatens to ren-
der any other examples—or even all subsequent examples—to be, if cer-
tainly not trivial, then less significant, smaller of scale, and more local in 
consequence.
We need to inquire into what other narratives 9/11 conceals as well 
as the ones it reveals. In particular, we need to inquire into the relation 
between terrorism and higher education. The one is not merely the op-
posite of the other; according to Marc Sageman in Understanding Terror-
ist Networks, two-thirds of contemporary al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists 
went to state or Western-style colleges (cited in Evans 13). What are we 
to make of this fact? Or of the larger fact that what counts as “education” 
to Us both is and is not identical to what counts for education for Them? 
At the least, a reading of our education in terms of their presence ought 
to help us understand our stories of education better, if not theirs. Not to 
mention them, in whatever guise.
One
There are few certainties regarding terrorism. Understanding can be 
quickly overcome by proliferating distinctions or lost in endless surmise. 
For example, how is terrorism distinct from jihadism or slaughter? How 
is international terrorism to be distinguished from domestic terrorism? 
Is each merely a manifestation of the same thing, or something quite dif-
ferent from the other? What about the phenomenon of state terrorism? 
And so on. No wonder Gus Martin, in his handbook, Essentials of Ter-
rorism, has to be content to offer the following not as a definition but as 
a “definitional model”: “Terrorism is a premeditated and unlawful act in 
which groups or agents of some principal engage in a threatened or actual 
use of force or violence against human or property targets. These groups 
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or agents engage in this behavior intending the purposeful intimidation 
of governments or people to affect policy or behavior with an underlying 
political objective” (9).
At least one thing seems certain: a college or university campus does 
not constitute a likely terrorist site. Large numbers of people may congre-
gate there, in classrooms or auditoriums, as we saw most spectacularly in 
the case of Virginia Tech in 2007, when Seng Hui Cho killed thirty-two 
students and faculty. But Cho acted alone, as a failed member of the “col-
lege community.” His motives sought no wider politics, and none were 
subsequently discovered.3 Virtually alone among recent fictions about 
terrorism of any sort, Updike’s novel begins in an educational institution. 
However, it is a high school, not a college. Why not a university?
We might suppose that a college would do just as well in order to reg-
ister Ahmed Molloy’s fervent Islamic faith and extravagant revulsions, 
especially since Central High School sits “on its little rise hung above 
the city like a castle, a palace of learning” (11). In other words, Central 
High appears to posses the elevation as well as the isolation of a univer-
sity. However, this is misleading. In fact, Central High adjoins a disused 
downtown area consisting of abandoned trolley tracks and public lava-
tories or boarded-up display windows of old department stores. Its “in-
terface” with private property has at once grown complicated and slum-
ridden; inside the main school building, Ahmed’s guidance counselor’s 
room is a former supply closet.
In other words, one reason Central High has been chosen is because 
it is open to the world, and all too vulnerable to its ravages. A university 
campus would be more physically separate from its larger surroundings, 
though not to say self-enclosed. Central High is all too fatefully part of 
the world, which has already succeeded in eroding its educational pre-
tensions and transforming students who come “encoded in the intri-
cate programming of action figures twitching in their spasmodic way 
through the explosion-producing algorithms of a video game” (34). In 
college, students presumably study such programming; in high school, 
they act it out.
There is, however, another reason why Central High is not Central 
University: something called “college” can therefore become Ahmed’s 
destination. He can do something more with his life than drive a truck. 
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Higher education represents this “something.” Jack Levy, the guidance 
counselor, senses this immediately, as he explains to Ahmed that scholar-
ship money—despite the war against terrorism—is still available to peo-
ple of color: “We could have gotten you some, I’m sure of it. Not Princ-
eton, maybe, and maybe not Rutgers, but a place like Bloomfield or Seton 
Hall, Farleigh Dickinson and Kean, can be excellent. Sorry I wasn’t on to 
your case earlier” (40).
As the novel progresses, the narrative of college remains firmly in place 
as a counter to the narrative of terrorism. Jack later stops by with some 
college catalogues to see Ahmed, and explains to his mother, “Any college 
these days, the way the politics of it are, wants diversity, and your boy, 
what with his self-elected religious affiliation, and, pardon me for saying 
it, his ethnic mix, is a kind of minority’s minority—they’ll snap him up” 
(83–84). It falls to college, in other words, to make good the promise of 
Ahmed’s Egyptian-Irish heritage, whose “diverse” resonances are at best 
muffled in high school.
College, in effect, provides the foundation for the central tenet of 
American ideology, whereby all groups are reborn as American. As Jack 
maintains to Ahmed at the end (after the boy has voiced disapproval of 
his mother sleeping with a Jew): “Hey, come on, we’re all Americans here. 
That’s the idea, didn’t they tell you that at Central High? Irish-Americans. 
African-Americans, Jewish-Americans; there are even Arab-Americans” 
(301). Alas, it seems Ahmed wasn’t properly instructed at Central High. 
This alone becomes sufficient reason for him to go on to college. Again, 
the narrative of college stands in stark opposition to the narrative of ter-
rorism, which withholds the democratic hyphen to ethnic groups and 
instead enforces a separatist logic that leads to a righteous war of poten-
tially all against all.
Two
In his history of terrorism in the United States, The Terrorist Trap, Jeffrey 
Simon gives the following “future trend”: “The rank and file of terrorist 
organizations will continue to be filled with the poor, uneducated, and 
alienated youths of the Third World and elsewhere” (353). Thus he en-
forces our most common comprehension. Terrorists are ignorant and 
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stupid. Education would benefit, if not disabuse them. Like Updike’s 
Ahmed, they ought in fact to attend college, which is conceived as the 
antithesis of terrorist “knowledge.” Indeed, as Slajov Žižek remarks in his 
recent study, Violence, “terrorist attacks are carried out on behalf of that 
absolute meaning provided by religion. Their ultimate target is the entire 
Western godless way of life based on modern science” (81).
Of course it is more complicated than this. Writing in 2001, Simon 
goes on to note how we might expect “extremists” to become “more 
technologically proficient,” thereby adding “a new dimension” to their 
attacks, notwithstanding the fact that sabotaging telecommunications 
links or international banking networks simply fails to deliver the ‘big 
bang’ or dramatic effect of traditional destructive tactics (352). But this 
complication does not threaten the image of the terrorist as a religious 
fanatic. Simon is careful to designate technological proficiency as a “skill.” 
As such, it does not seriously challenge what he takes to be education, 
or what Žižek takes to comprise science (as an institution—according to 
John Gray—that paradoxically promises both security as well as freedom 
of thought) (81–82).
Once again, the narrative of college—insofar as it exists on the West-
ern model as the favored site for education—not only now stands op-
posed to the narrative of terrorism. This opposition, in turn, stands in 
contrast to American fictional narratives of the previous generation, in 
which political violence of various kinds on the part of extremists, radi-
cals, Weathermen and Black Panthers was typically set on college cam-
puses. In effect, these earlier narratives—let Thomas Pynchon’s Vineland 
stand as a late instance—explored the relation between college itself and 
the radical actions that the knowledge offered there could bring about. 
If potentially radical or destructive—consisting not only of demonstra-
tions but of robberies and bombings—these actions were not widely 
understood as examples of “terrorism.” For one thing, as Simon argues, 
whether because of FBI failure to discover any evidence of a conspiracy 
among many of political groups or because these groups were so small in 
number, “[t]he foundation to support a political revolutionary terrorist 
campaign in the United States was simply not there” (371).4 For another 
thing, as Pynchon’s narrative makes clear, what was “there” instead at the 
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time was a need to examine possible commonalities between the identi-
ties of student protestors and police.5
Today, there appears to be in our political narratives about student pro-
test no comparable need. Why did it exist at one time? Not only because 
the 60s—now over—was a period for all sorts of strange conjunctions: 
sit-ins and free love, Richard Nixon and Jimmy Hendrix, tie-dyes and 
Ho Chi Min, or the Whole Earth Catalogue, LSD, and Herbert Marcuse. 
Not only because today’s campus is more than half in love with an easeful 
virtual dimension consisting of internet links, on-line courses, and Wiki-
pedia-driven research. What is absent at the present time is some larger 
cultural script in which the college campus could function as a setting for 
a terrorist narrative.
No such script seems any longer to be available. What appears to be 
available instead is a need to preserve the college campus from the po-
litical energies that saturated it not so long ago, and that, in turn, often 
resulted in a destructive potential that can be read today in terms of what 
we now understand as “terrorism.” This is precisely how Philip Roth’s 
American Pastoral (1997) responds to the figure of Merry Levov (who 
sets a bomb in a small post office, causing the incidental death of one 
man), and it is significant, I would argue, that, unlike the real-life figure on 
which she may have in part been modeled, Merry never gets to college.6
She does not for the same reason Updike’s Ahmed does not. By locat-
ing her back in high school, Roth exposes Merry’s “revolutionary” ener-
gies as youthful, while at the same time his narrative implicitly retains an 
ideal of college or university as the site upon which these energies could 
have been developed, matured, or at least made more authentic. Ameri-
can Pastoral can serve, in turn, as a decisive moment in the history of con-
temporary American fictional constructions of the figure of the terrorist, 
insofar as it concerns higher education. He or she now becomes absent 
from, if not foreign to, campus, representing not some strange, provoca-
tive synthesis of fugitive kinds of knowledge or disparate actions but in-
stead simply their antithesis.
In a fascinating discussion of the figure of the terrorist in contempo-
rary American conspiracy fiction, Steffen Hantke argues that “violence, 
and particularly terrorist violence, is first and foremost a coding problem” 
(226–27). Despite the differences among the three postmodern novels 
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upon which he focuses ( Joseph McElroy’s Lookout Cartridge, Don De-
Lillo’s Players and Mao II), what he finds is the depiction of the terrorist 
as “a consistently ambivalent, yet infinitely adaptable trope of conspira-
torial violence” (224). Hantke’s argument was published just ten years 
ago. How much has changed since then! At the present time, we have 
ceased to need such a construal of the terrorist. Now the figure is simply 
inauthentic, which is another way of saying that anything he or she repre-
sents is finally alien to campus. There is no longer any “code” by means of 
which the terrorist can be admitted there—or anywhere else. At the pres-
ent time, we need college to redeem the threat of terrorism, not to host it.
Our willingness to see nothing charismatic about the fictional terrorist 
extends to our inclination to ignore the educational experience of the ac-
tual terrorist. An article in a recent New York Times, for example, inquires 
into precisely what kind of institution is Al-Eman University in Yemen, 
where the young Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, recently studied 
Arabic, before packing his underwear with an explosive charge that failed 
to detonate when his plane neared Detroit on Christmas Day, 2009. Is 
Al-Eman a “university” at all in the Western sense? It appears that its cur-
riculum is heavily weighed to religion, and therefore suspiciously com-
plicit with jihadism. What are we to make of such a campus, whose cen-
tral physical feature is a huge mosque? What has such a campus made of 
the young Nigerian who once studied there?
There is more. Umar Farouk is a graduate of London’s University Col-
lege, where he studied engineering and business finance and earned a de-
gree in mechanical engineering. If his subsequent study in Yemen can be 
questioned, his study in England cannot. Instead, his higher education 
constitutes a sort of hybrid of West and East, engineering and Allah, sci-
ence and religion, so typical of al Qaeda recruits. Just so, the 9/11 ter-
rorists were enrolled in a bewildering array of educational institutions, 
here and abroad, including language schools, technical universities, and 
especially flight schools. If anything, they were too ardent of education 
rather than scornful of it.
“My only son, without a Ph.D,” laments the Egyptian father of Mu-
hammed Atta in the recent HBO-financed movie The Hamburg Cell, 
about the formation into a group of many of the 9/11 terrorists. By the 
time he voices this complaint, his son is ready for martyrdom, for which 
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his own formal study—in architecture—has become a cover. Or at least, 
this is the easiest way to understand it. How else we might want to under-
stand it is another matter—one our current narratives disdain. A terrorist 
with a PhD?7 Easier to imagine a terrorist without much education at all 
or to admit as mere curiosities the fact that, say, the targets on 9/11 were 
in fact designated by the terrorists in code as “the College of Art” or “the 
College of Applied Science.”
Three
Donald Barthelme’s short fiction “Porcupines at the University” begins 
with a “scout” breaking into the room occupied by the Dean and his 
wife and shouting “porcupines!” It appears there are thousands, only a 
few miles away. “Porcupines what?” asks the Dean. Then he hazards the 
hope, “Maybe they won’t enroll. Maybe they’re just passing through.” 
“You can’t be sure,” cautions his wife. When she asks if he isn’t going to 
“bust” the porcupines, the Dean allows: “I’m tired of busting people…. 
I suppose I’ll have to do something,” he admits nevertheless (131–32). 
The narrative immediately becomes a parable about what to do, or rather 
what can be done, when figures appear at the university who are funda-
mentally inconceivable to it.
Why porcupines? That is, why an example of an animal, rather than 
some human figure? Perhaps because according to a recently-published 
seminar by Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, although the two are in-
dissoluable, “having in common their being both outside-the-law,” this 
being-outside-the-law in the case of the beast “can also situate the place 
where the law does not appear, or is not respected, or gets violated” (17). 
The animal, that is, gives a more shocking, deeper, or at least immediate 
purchase to the provocation posed by a figure who is not so much above 
the law as below it. Yet, if so (and of course there remains much more 
to say simply about the ontological authority of these two figures), why 
these particular animals?8 Possibly because they have quills—the scout 
pulls them out of his ankles while the Dean questions him—and these 
quills suggest the venerable connections between terrorism and writing.
In any case, it quickly develops that there is a “porcupine wrangler,” 
named Griswold, who dreams of the riches that will be his, once he 
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arrives with his herd at “the great porcupine canneries of the East.” As 
he writes new songs and anticipates New York, Griswold forms a polar 
figure to that of the Dean, who prepares for the porcupines by loading 
an old Gatling gun that had formerly sat on a concrete slab in front of the 
ROTC building. “Porcupines at the university, well why not?” his wife 
has said, to which he has objected: “We don’t have facilities for four or five 
thousand porcupines” (133). The wife suggests they could take a course 
entitled, Alternate Life Styles. The Dean replies that there are already too 
many in the course.
At the end, the wrangler and the Dean parlay. The Dean insists that en-
rollment is out of the question. Besides, there has been enough trouble 
on campus. The wrangler seems eager to comply—provided a “deal” can 
be made. Apparently it is, but we never learn what exact demands he 
makes. Instead, a final section of the narrative finds the porcupine herd 
starting onto the Cross Bronx Expressway as the wrangler contemplates a 
bright show-biz future, while “citizens” in cars look out and think: “What 
is wonderful? Are these porcupines wonderful? Are they significant? Are 
they what I need?” (137).
In the last chapter of his recent biography of Barthelme, Tracy Daugh-
erty traces a somewhat surprising context for Barthelme’s fiction, be-
ginning with a criticism of certain American writers that appeared in 
the New York Times two days after 9/11. Typical of their abandonment 
to write about public life, Barthelme, it seemed, had contented himself 
by “performing postmodern experiments with fable, farce, and recycled 
fairy tales” (491). On the contrary, Daugherty argues, postmodernism in 
general is more devious, which is what Barthelme meant in once remark-
ing, “The disorientation in my stories is not mine. It is what is to be per-
ceived around us.”
One example: the south side of St. Vincent’s Hospital near the World 
Trade Center, on the same block as Barthelme’s old apartment, which 
became a post 9/11 wailing wall full of pictures and descriptions of lost 
loved ones. To his biographer, these fragments constituted a particularly 
vivid, grim recall of Barthelme’s well-known aesthetic credo: “Fragments 
are the only forms I trust.” Daugherty is not suggesting, I think, that Bar-
thelme’s stories have anything explicitly to do with terrorism. But they 
do have to do with the disorientation and fragmentation terrorism brings 
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about. Thus, in another sense, how could they not have to do with terror-
ism? This is the way fiction works.
The porcupines are not terrorists. But they are a sort of zero-degree 
species of beings who, like terrorists, threaten the university simply be-
cause they are so completely alien there. Something must be done about 
them when they appear. They can’t be ignored. Since there is no way to 
absorb them into the structure of the university, it might be possible in-
stead to oppose them by violence. But this possibility is not satisfactory. 
Some accommodation—some “deal”—must be reached. And so in Bar-
thelme’s narrative, it is. However, it’s not clear precisely what this is.
Perhaps the nature of the accommodation can’t ever be clear. The need 
for it is one thing. The substance is quite another. Many of Barthelme’s 
stories work this way. There is a formal structure of some kind. Some-
thing foreign appears either within it or alongside it. What to do? Usually 
an incorporation is made by the end, through which the thing is either 
uneasily relocated or else revealed to be not so alien after all. (See, for 
example, “The New Member,” in the same volume.) “Porcupines at the 
University” is not only an example of the formal dynamics of a particular 
author. The story, published in 1977, can be read as an example of the 
continuation of a larger narrative in American fictional narratives about 
nothing less than the meaning of higher education, beginning with way-
ward others who appear not even to belong because they seem to prom-
ise only violence.
But what if they did belong? What if they were already among us? It 
may be too late at the present time to reimagine anew the figure of the 
terrorist as what Hantke terms “a cherished figure of postmodernist 
transgression” (228). (He compares its “conceptual makeup” and “stra-
tegic value” to another cherished icon, Donna Haraway’s cyborg.) And 
yet, if we take place the actual education of known terrorists—in all its 
undifferentiated variety—alongside the education we know as our own, 
at least we have an idea of college less “pure” than that of our present nar-
ratives, maybe even more mysterious, and certainly more useful insofar 
as understanding what terrorism is.
With “Porcupines at the University,” we already have one such idea, 
given along the lines of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s famous injunction in The 
Postmodern Condition that “our business [is] not to supply reality but to 
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invent allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented” (81). 
Porcupines at the university? Porcupines? Perhaps in them we have what 
Lyotard characterizes as “the unpresentable in presentation itself ” (81). 
Their very notion is absurd, although no more so than the imagining of 
the World Trade Center in DeLillo’s novel Players (published in the same 
year as Barthelme’s story) as the location of a firm called the Grief Man-
agement Council and as one whose towers “didn’t seem permanent…no 
less transient for all their bulk than some routine distortion of light” (16).
A final thing about Barthelme’s story: at the end, it is the citizens rath-
er than the Dean and his wife (much less their faculty colleagues) who 
worry about the significance of the porcupines. Is this because the “deal” 
already accomplished back on campus has foreclosed further academic 
attention? Hard to say. But to anybody who proposes the academic study 
of something so alien to the university, there does seem to be a lesson: 
attention will ultimately be established by the terms of the larger society, 
whose sheer wonderment at the utter spectacle of these alien beings may 
never succeed in clarifying anything at all about them.
This is why, in turn, we need academic study, although in this one fic-
tional instance the porcupines actually pass through, or rather by, the 
university too quickly. The fact that they are never admissible does not 
change the fact that they succeed in exerting a certain influence or pres-
sure upon campus, which it is the business of the story to (in Lyotard’s 
idiom) “conceive” if not precisely present. What is this influence? How 
to gauge this pressure? Unpresentable matters both—at least in narrative 
terms. It is left for us to muse about whether or not the Dean returns at 
the end to reciting the lines of a popular song, as he is doing, idly, at the 
story’s outset.
It is also left to us to decide how many political energies we want to 
address directly in our programs. Perhaps those having to do with ter-
rorism can’t really be recuperated, much less even ultimately understood. 
However, at the present time, it seems particularly unfortunate that the 
plots of actual terrorists insofar as they involve college intersect with our 
own fictional narratives about terrorism at these same institutions. The 
result? Campus appears as a site that can be either discarded after being 
used or else as a repository of values that can be protected once idealized. 
At times, it already appears hard to tell the difference, as in the recent case 
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of “The Manchester College of Professional Studies,” a bogus college cre-
ated on the location of a former pub by two Pakistanis, which enrolled 
a number of suspected terrorist suspects among hundreds of other stu-
dents in order for them to obtain work in the UK.
How contemptuous are terrorists of education in so many forms, and 
yet how devoted to its promise, how fascinated by its opportunities! If, 
like Barthelme’s Dean, we must in our turn “do something,” then we 
could well begin by making a full appraisal of educational experience in 
all sorts of unlikely institutions which include students who turn out only 
to study through violence. This appraisal alone might enable stronger, 
more searching narratives for us to fashion simply about our own educa-
tional institutions, poised uneasily as the most respectable of them are at 
the present moment between making some sort of “deal” with terrorism 
(new programs, special conferences) and excluding it entirely.
Notes
1. After quoting Foer on his protagonist’s outrage at finding “all sorts of stuff” 
available on the internet but not available in his own country, David Simpson 
comments: “Is this the therapeutic state at work, protecting us from what it 
knows we cannot bear, or something more sinister, a purposive repression 
of the physicality of death in order that a culture of undying energy can 
maintain itself and continue to avoid facing up to the deaths of those in other 
parts of the world, and in its own enclaves (the inner cities, the prisons, and 
elsewhere), the deaths which its own mighty resources might work to avoid 
rather than continue to perpetuate?” (214).
2. Compare Derrida: “But this very thing, the place and meaning of this ‘event,’ 
remains ineffable, like an intuition without concept, like a unicity with no 
generality on the horizon or with no horizon at all, out of range for a language 
that admits its powerlessness and so it reduced to pronouncing mechanically 
a date, repeating it endlessly, as a kind of ritual incantation, a conjuring poem, 
a journalistic litany or rhetorical refrain that admits to not knowing what it’s 
talking about” (86).
3. Of course I endorse Žižek’s call: “the task is precisely to change the topic, 
to move from the desperate humanitarian SOS call to stop violence to the 
analysis of that other SOS, the complex interaction of the three modes of 
violence: subjective, objective, and symbolic” (11). Cho’s terrible act of 
violence, that is, was purely “subjective,” and leads to no fuller understanding 
of violence itself, much less terrorist violence.
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4. Steffen Hantke notes that German writers, for example, “have generated 
fictional accounts of terrorism that show none of the signs of paranoia that 
is so essential to American fiction from the same period.” Instead, “the 
conspiracy is seen from the inside and appears therefore transparent and 
unthreatening” (241).
5. The following declaration of the narrator of Vineland (about the narrative’s 
official villain) is often cited: “Brock Vrond’s genius was to have seen in the 
activities of the sixties left not threats to order but unacknowledged desires 
for it.” Brock goes on to imagine “the deep…need to stay children forever, safe 
inside some extended national family” (269).
6. See the brief summary of Judith Clark’s life given in Simon (3–4). Unlike 
Merry, she attended college—the University of Chicago—where her 
commitment to radical politics deepened. Of course, the respective lives of 
the fictional character and the real person diverge at several additional points, 
perhaps the other most salient one being that Clark was eventually arrested 
and tried for murder (of a bank guard and two policemen during a robbery).
7. I pass over the special case of the Unabomber (who of course is, or was—for 
better or worse—one of “us”). For an interesting discussion, see Simmons. 
In treating the connection between terrorism and authorship, the article of 
course conforms to the terms set by DeLillo’s novel, Mao II and therefore acts 
to restrict the discussion of terrorism to its “literary” character. See Scanlan, 
however, for a wider history of the long fictional relationship between 
terrorism and writing.
8. A later remark by Derrida seems particular close to the logic of Barthelme’s 
conception (as well as the present argument): “And what if ‘the beast and the 
sovereign’ were primarily an incitement, a provocation not only to know, but 
to know knowledge otherwise or for the first time or, more precisely, to think 
knowledge, to determine it, and thus also to reconnoiter it and so know its 
limits? What could that mean, to know the limits of knowledge” (278)?
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Chapter 3
World Bank University
The War on Terror and the Battles for the Global Commons
David B. Downing
The scene is a hotel meeting room in 1950, Bogota, Colombia, and the 
main characters in the drama are Robert Garner, then Vice President 
of the World Bank, and Lauchlin Currie, director of the Bank’s mission 
to Colombia. Garner has traveled from New York to get Currie’s report 
on what the Bank should be doing in Colombia. He is not happy with 
what he hears. “Damn it, Lauch,” Garner cries out, “We can’t go messing 
around with education and health. We’re a bank!” (Benjamin 67). Garner 
is protesting Currie’s proposal to expand the bank’s capital investments 
in that country into human services such as schools and public health, 
rather than strictly productive resources such as agriculture, industry, and 
energy suitable for profitability. His proposal strikes at the heart of the 
conflict between opposing narratives in the postcolonial reconstruction 
of global geographies. On the one hand, we have the banker’s concern 
to invest in capital-yielding productive resources of industry, transporta-
tion, and wealth finance, and on the other, the political (and social) re-
sponsibility to invest in capital-draining human services such as educa-
tion, healthcare, childcare, sanitation, water, and sustainable living and 
working conditions. Of course, these two domains sometimes seem to 
join hands, and sometimes split far apart, but ideologically separated 
they indeed were, and still are, for that matter, in many people’s eyes.
Garner’s remarks make great sense within the first third of what I will 
describe as a three-part history of the World Bank. I will return to this 
opening scene since I present it as a paradigmatic moment in the battles 
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between private capital and public commons. What I hope to add to 
this general story is a refinement of the more direct links between the 
mutations of the World Bank and the alteration of working conditions 
in higher education. But before I get to that historical sketch, let me set 
the stage with some general reflections that organize my presentation of 
the history.
My basic project is to try to articulate the links between the war on 
terror and the battles for the global commons, especially as they impact 
higher education in the US. In order to do that, we need to translate from 
the vast historical archive of the global economy some simplified frames 
with which to comprehend the relations between the mutations of the 
World Bank-IMF-WTO complex and the alteration of working condi-
tions in higher education. I have coined the term “World Bank Univer-
sity” (WBU) as a play on Evan Watkins’ term, “World Bank literacy,” 
and Amitava Kumar’s term, “World Bank Literature” (WBL), a term Ku-
mar refers to as a “provocation” rather than as having any distinct refer-
ent. In short, rather than a definitive definition, “the phrase is intended 
to prompt questions about each of the words in that constellation” so as 
“to invite inquiry into globalization, the economy, and the role of literary 
and cultural studies” (xvii), or in my use, the role of higher education. 
Kumar’s point is that literary production in the post-war period of neo-
colonialism often directly confronts circumstances determined by literal 
policies of the World Bank. But in a figurative way, the World Bank also 
serves as a kind of synechdoche for all the various International Finan-
cial Organizations (IFI) that have shaped the geopolitical world since the 
1940s. As a provocation, World Bank University configures the relations 
between education, knowledge, and the geopolitical economy.
As a general story, we all recognize that capitalism and militarism work 
to enclose the public commons serving many in order to expand private 
profit for the few.1 The current “War on Terror” has its roots in the post-
WWII “climate of fear” and the “permanent war economy” (Mills) estab-
lished by the international financial policies for the organizing of capital. 
This paper offers three historical frames as a simplified narrative within 
which to describe the global orchestration of the links between state mili-
tarism and private capitalism, on the one hand, and, on the other, the dis-
possession, enclosure, and shrinking of the global commons represented 
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by human services such as housing, water supply, sanitation, electricity, 
health care, and education. Regardless of our disciplinary position with-
in the many sectors of higher education, we are all caught within these 
frames, and we can no longer avoid translating between the global geo-
political arena and the local effects of our academic work. What can, or 
should, we do in these circumstances?
I organize my story by focusing on the tension between the often op-
posing domains of productive economic resources and necessary hu-
man services. I will try to make these conflicts clear by borrowing David 
Harvey’s description of the organically linked but “dual character” (New 
Imperialism 137), or Janus-faced processes of late capitalism. On the one 
hand, in the mode of capital accumulation by expanded reproduction, as-
sets are directly invested in industrial and agricultural productivity, or in 
debt financing itself as a mode of wealth production. On the other hand, 
the mode of accumulation by dispossession takes over when over-accu-
mulated capital can only find new markets by breaking into the public 
commons of otherwise relatively protected, state-operated (or socialized) 
domains of basic human services. Even democratically installed protec-
tions of such services can be forced open under the rubric of deregula-
tion and structural adjustment which are really just names for regulations 
that favor capital rather than human beings. These modes of neoliberal 
production combine violent economic and military operations that sus-
tain and create terror; but they also sustain antagonism and resistance.
The virtue of Harvey’s formulation is that it takes account of both pro-
cesses, production and dispossession, as they determine who gets access 
to both domains, resources and services. Of course, the mix of domains 
and processes can get pretty interdependent and complex, and that com-
plexity is part of the message. Nevertheless, my sense is that conceptually 
distinguishing their operation in each of the three historical frames can 
help us to better describe the links between the World Bank economy 
and the restructuring of higher education.
Phase I: 1944–60
In July, 1944, the World Bank (officially, the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development) was founded as a mediating agency in 
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the historical transition between directly managed colonial rule by nation 
states and globalized market management through transnational agencies. 
As Michael Denning has explained in Culture in the Age of Three Worlds, 
the newly emerging terms of the First, Second, and Third Worlds became 
descriptors of the geo-political landscape of the rapidly expanding global 
economy partly because of the actions and mission of the World Bank to 
control development and its partner, the IMF, to control global monetary 
funds. The main thing to be managed was global productive resources, 
which referred primarily to tangible kinds of industrial, agricultural, and 
infrastructure projects suitable for capital accumulation. Productive re-
sources were therefore intended to be distinctly separate from “human 
resources,” the “soft sector,” the “social welfare” domain championed by 
the New Deal. Accordingly, these educational, cultural, and service inter-
ests were strategically channeled off to the United Nations, a body that in 
1946 founded UNESCO as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization. Economic development would thus be han-
dled by the World Bank, IMF, and GATT; cultural development could be 
left to the United Nations, and all of these organizations were under the 
effective control of the United States.
The Bank certainly felt that its mission as a bank meant that it could 
not be seen as a social benefactor, or an extender of the principles of the 
New Deal to the rest of the world, but as an orchestrator of capitalist de-
velopment of the Third World. The Bank’s strictly economistic mission 
was ideologically to distance itself from any social, cultural, political, or 
military mission. Ironically, higher education supplied exactly the ideo-
logical backbone for this plan. The university produced the discourse 
adapted by the World Bank founders: the division between economics 
and politics reflects the modern discourse separating knowledge from 
power, the scientific laboratory from the political state, the literary from 
the social, and this discourse was conveniently incorporated right into 
the founding documents. By focusing on objectifiable economic com-
modities rather than subjectively (and collectively) experienced condi-
tions of human labor, the Bank could effectively obscure class struggle 
and power relations. All of this university-originating discourse produced 
the grounds for American exceptionalism: US interventions were on the 
side of knowledge, science, and development, not politics. John Harriss 
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calls this a process of “depoliticizing development” as worked out by “the 
anti-politics machine,” the cruel irony being that the anti-politics rhetoric 
produced some devastating political realities. Political history is white-
washed with the myth of a well-worn scientific rationalism now operat-
ing in the social arena of global development. As Wendy Brown explains, 
“Depoliticization involves removing a political phenomenon from com-
prehension of its historical emergence and from a recognition of the pow-
ers that produce and contour it” (15).
Indeed, the World Bank archives are replete with recurrent arguments 
and tropes guiding policy decisions according to the idealized discourse 
of science as objective neutrality: knowledge, research, scholarship, all 
of these activities are to be fundamentally carried out as nonhistorical, 
nonpolitical, nonideological procedures (while, of course, exactly the op-
posite is really happening). The disciplinary double-vision produced by 
higher education is carried over, one might say, by the college-educated 
economists who took the lesson to heart in drafting the World Bank’s 
charter in 1944. It was called “nonpolitical lending,” and this rhetoric and 
practice begins at the beginning.
Consider, for example, Article 3, Section 5 of the World Bank Charter, 
which reads that all loans are to be made “without regard to political or 
other non-economic influences or considerations” (qtd. in Benjamin 35). 
Or even more expressly, we find in Article 4, Section 10 a heading called 
“Political Activity Prohibited,” and under that heading, the following 
policy delimitation: “‘The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the 
political affairs of any member…. Only economic considerations shall be 
relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed im-
partially” (35). Sound familiar? From our perspective, no doubt, these 
ideological mystifications are spurious, to say the least, but there they are, 
right in the language of the founding charter.
Now, these formulations of the charter help, in part, to explain why 
in 1950, Robert Garner was so upset at Lauchlin Currie. Among other 
things, it meant that the Bank was deeply concerned about its public rep-
resentation as a manager of capital with the free market as the panacea for 
the economic ills of the world, not an extender of a kind of global New 
Deal concerned with social, historical, and political projects. It was as if 
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private capital had nothing to do with public commons, however they 
might be conceived.
On an equally significant and parallel footing, the de-political myth 
was carried over explicitly in military training. In The Power Elite, C. 
Wright Mills quotes from a 1952 article, “The U.S. Military Mind,” pub-
lished in Fortune magazine: “It is drummed into every military manager 
in the course of his not-inconsiderable education, from the day he enters 
West Point to the day death makes him eligible for an Arlington burial 
with honors, that he is to back away from anything resembling a political 
decision” (Mills 200).
Likewise, since education was the main producer of disinterested 
knowledge, there was good reason within the nation (even if not in the 
Third World) to provide considerable public funding for higher educa-
tion, as represented by the 1944 GI Bill. Vannevar Bush’s influential 1945 
book, Science: The Endless Frontier, had set the stage for translating the 
dwindling frontiers of US geographical colonialism into the socio-polit-
ical landscape of “Big Science” with a nationalist fervor and World Bank 
assistance. And in order to have science, you had to have more education. 
So the 1947 Truman Commission on Higher Education for American 
Democracy (which later spurred the 1958 NDEA) provided the politi-
cal discourse to translate these events into US funding for science educa-
tion. These federal resources would propel me (and my generation) right 
through grade school and on into college. Indeed, all of higher educa-
tion in the US began to ride the wave of the postwar boom—the GI Bill, 
NDEA, and deep investments in public education—even if it was driven 
by aggressive government favoring of science education so we could get 
to the moon first. Of course, the Cold War expansion of education had 
its backlash during the 1950s in the witch-hunting era of McCarthy. This 
period witnessed a large-scale purging of dissent in both public and aca-
demic life in the midst of a new synergy between American business in-
terests, government policies, and university research (Schrecker; Harvey, 
A Brief History 8). Despite this ugly period of political purging, the na-
tionalist project of investing in competitive science and thus the growth 
of higher education carried along with it a surplus: the “soft” fields ex-
panded right along with the “hard” disciplines. The growth of public 
higher education became a huge experiment as a growing majority of an 
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emerging generation was allowed to be college and university students 
for a prolonged period before they became workers. One unintended 
consequence of this investment was that in the end it produced a lot of 
dissent. But that’s a story that will have to wait for the next phase.
During the 1950s, none of the geopolitical events ever got publically 
translated into simple terms other than as Manichean views of us versus 
them. None of the imperialist features of US history got translated into 
any meaningful venue in my (or most anybody else’s) primary and sec-
ondary education in the 1950s and 60s. Most of us white, middle-class 
baby boomers growing up in the shadows of the Second World War nev-
er learned an intelligent word about socialism or Marxism in our formal 
schooling, and what we did learn about communism was a congeries of 
evil, fear, and inhumanity. Understandably, of course, because all this 
rhetoric about the “apolitical” educational, economic, and military opera-
tions was being orchestrated by the emerging Cold War agenda. Thus in 
his 1947 speech that launched the “Truman Doctrine,” Truman himself 
“said the world ‘must choose between alternative ways of life.’ One was 
based on ‘the will of the majority…distinguished by free institutions’; the 
other was based on ‘the will of a minority…terror and oppression’” (qtd. 
in Zinn 426). Thus begins the post-war version of the War on Terror that 
established a “climate of fear,” a hysteria about Communism that fueled 
an escalating military budget for the “Good” (the “free world”) to battle 
the “Bad” (the terrorists). Thus, terror was external and from the “other.”
There was, of course, resistance to this agenda, even though it was often 
hidden from public view. For example, in 1956, C. Wright Mills exposed 
the depolitical myth because, as he explains, “the economic and the mili-
tary have become structurally and deeply interrelated, as the economy 
has become a seemingly permanent war economy; and military men and 
policies have increasingly penetrated the corporate economy” (215). 
Moreover, even if the Establishment could bolster the myth of ideological 
disinterestedness for educational institutions, the rhetorical education of 
the general public demanded by the permanent war economy needed no 
such myths, and so it was well funded: in the early 1950s, the US engaged 
in a massive public relations effort whereby millions of dollars and thou-
sands of publicists were employed to “define the reality of international 
relations in a military way” (220). And the reality was the opposite of the 
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apolitical myth because higher education contributed deeply to that mis-
sion. As Mills argues: “some universities, in fact, are financial branches of 
the military establishment, receiving three or four times as much money 
from military as from all other sources combined” (217).
Let me provide one specific example exposing the myth about the 
separation of the economic and the political. The IMF would not lend 
money to Cuba because it would not “stabilize” conditions for private 
capital even though Castro had expanded the public commons through 
a nationalized system of education, housing, and land redistribution for 
peasants (Zinn 439–40). And listen to one official’s representation of 
that ideological agenda from Lester D. Mallory, Deputy Undersecretary 
of State for Inter-American Affairs in an April 6, 1960 memorandum to 
Roy R. Rubottom Jr., then Under-secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs: “Most Cubans support Castro. There’s no effective political op-
position…the only foreseeable means to alienate internal support is by 
creating disillusionment and discouragement based on lack of satisfac-
tion and economical difficulties…. We should immediately use any pos-
sible measure to…cause hunger, desperation and the overthrow of the 
Government” (Lamrani par. 8). When an official threatens hunger and 
desperation as an economic means to execute the political goal of desta-
bilizing a so-called “terrorist” threat of Castro’s Cuba, it’s pretty clear who 
is producing the terror. Nevertheless, those rationales were, and still are, 
extended throughout US interventions in Latin America.
Mallory’s comments reflected the troubling circumstances emanating 
from the World Bank/IMF global reconstruction and development story. 
The main problem was that the pressure for human resources kept build-
ing during the 1950s, in part, because the development project showed 
too many signs of not doing so well. Indeed, despite the overall growth 
in world productivity, the gap between developed, First World nations 
of the North Atlantic, and the undeveloped, Third World nations of the 
southern hemisphere kept widening rather than narrowing. What could 
one expect when, despite the apparent consumerist glut in the developed 
countries, 85% of the world population consumption is limited to food 
and essential goods for survival (Chossudovsky 77)? The pressure was 
building towards a major shift in bank policy, a literal need to invest in 
poverty alleviation and human services. The sixties were about to happen.
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Phase 2: 1960–79
I use 1960 as a turning point to the second phase because it marks the 
election of John F. Kennedy, the beginning of the Vietnam War, the for-
mation of the IDA (International Development Agency), and the modifi-
cation of World Bank rhetoric and practices as now shaped by the liberal 
interventionist strategies for the reduction of poverty. In 1961, Robert 
McNamara is appointed Secretary of Defense for 7 years, until he then 
takes over as President of the World Bank in 1968, a post he holds un-
til 1981. In this second phase, capital can be extended, but in rigorously 
determined and circumscribed ways, to the human services area. Given 
the rapid expansion in world productivity, the World Bank works to both 
rhetorically and politically control the kind of investment in human ser-
vices so that they can be scripted into the domain of productivity and 
wealth. In Harvey’s terms, the mode of accumulation by reproduction ex-
tends its rationale to cover investment directly into the domain of human 
services, (but now conceived as indirect resources) including education, 
health care, and other necessary services.
The second phase of my narrative begins with a quote from Eugene 
Black, the then President of the World Bank, only now it is 1962, dur-
ing his last year as President, and more than a decade has passed since 
his Vice President Garner protested so loudly against soft sector lending. 
As you will see, the Bank, and its directors, have dramatically changed 
their tune so that now, as Black puts it: “We are forced by our circum-
stances into trying to fashion a whole new orchestra of financial instru-
ments designed specifically…to implant and cultivate in the underdevel-
oped world the many factors that make a society productive” (Benjamin 
67). The key phrases here are “forced by our circumstance” and making 
“a society productive:” the sense of being forced is coming from below, 
which is to say the increasing pressure of many who are now objecting 
to the widening gaps between the wretched of the Earth and the wealthy 
North Atlantic nations. Making a society productive meant that the hu-
man services had to be included in the economic procedures of wealth 
production rather than in a social concern for working conditions and 
citizen’s rights.
As Brett Benjamin argues, the social and cultural had irrupted into the 
discourse of the World Bank just as it irrupted in the turmoil of 1960s 
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protest movements, the changing demographics of higher education, 
and the emergence of cultural studies as an academic field. Under these 
circumstances, the World Bank had to adapt both policy and rhetoric to 
meet the times. It had to find a way of incorporating a changing mission 
that would include human services without abandoning its primary cap-
ital mission in expanding productivity. Robert McNamara was just the 
man for the job: a Harvard MBA business background, a Vietnam era 
hawk, a corporate leader, and, finally, a civilian form of military leader. 
Yet ironically, he became the Bank’s most liberal president. He brought 
human services under the rubric of systems analysis, the term he used at 
Ford and later developed as Secretary of Defense to make the administra-
tion of the military more cost-effective.
Systems analysis was the perfect rhetoric to liberalize investment poli-
cy, all the while avoiding anything smacking of social welfare or soft sec-
tor idealism. Social benefits such as education and health care had to be 
justified exclusively in the language of productivity and development: 
education could be productive if investment in vocational training could 
lead to more highly trained workers; health care could be productive if it 
kept more people on the job longer; sanitation facilities could be produc-
tive if they enabled more people to work for longer hours. For these kinds 
of development to succeed, only certain kinds of education, health care, 
and sanitation were necessary, and the development they contributed to 
was the development of more capital, more productivity. Of course, First 
World corporations and franchises could more “cost-effectively” produce 
the necessary services in the Third World, so most of the capital did not 
go into indigenous forms of public commons and socialized human ser-
vices. Indeed, McNamara did just such scripting of human services into 
the language of capital productivity. For example, McNamara actually 
tripled education lending in the first five years as World Bank President 
(Benjamin 67). But, of course, there was a cost to this investment and 
to the associated rhetoric, because we begin to see the rise of managed 
education and the transformation of higher education into technical as-
sistance and vocational training. As McNamara put it, “we must make 
teachers more productive” (qtd. in Benjamin 67). If we manage them 
successfully, we will produce more freedom for the market. In short, the 
rhetoric of the protestors about freedom, equality, democracy had to be 
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appropriated by the Bank itself as a rhetorical way of silencing the pro-
tests themselves by so insidiously adapting the protest language.
Education had to serve the economic and military agenda and the 
fear of resistance was realized in the counter-cultural movements of the 
1960s. Indeed, while the irruption of the cultural into the economic 
was real enough, higher education continued to serve the World Bank 
agenda. In fact, an interesting pair of surveys (1966 and 1970) by the 
University of Michigan revealed a remarkable inversion of expectations. 
According to Howard Zinn, “This showed that, throughout the Vietnam 
war, Americans with only a grade school education were much stronger 
for withdrawal from the war than Americans with a college education” 
(491).2 In short, it appears that despite all the irruption on campuses, 
Chossudovsky remains correct in his claim that “the universities’ main 
function is to produce a generation of loyal and dependable economists 
who are incapable of unveiling the social foundations of the global mar-
ket economy” (27).
This was particularly the case for the “Chicago Boys.” For that story, 
we have to backtrack a bit before we get to the first “little” 9/11, the 
coup in Chile in 1973. During the 1950s, it was at the University of Chi-
cago under the free-market theories of Milton Friedman and his “Chi-
cago School” that the move from Keynesian to early neoliberal economic 
planning began to coalesce (Harvey, A Brief History 20–24). But it was 
also at the University of Chicago where the “group of economists known 
as the ‘Chicago Boys’” were trained and funded by the US government 
“in a Cold War programme to counteract left-wing tendencies in Latin 
America” (8). This dynamic link from the Chicago School to the Chicago 
Boys was an academic experiment of a kind to test economic theory in 
political practice, one that prepared the way for the “little September 11” 
of 1973 when Chile became one of the first US neoliberal state projects 
(Puerto Rico might be the first). The consequences of this economic re-
structuring under Pinochet were devastating: food prices skyrocketed, 
wages were frozen, and “an entire country was precipitated into abysmal 
poverty: in less than a year the price of bread in Chile increased thirty-six 
times and eighty-five percent of the Chilean population had been driven 
below the poverty line” (Chossudovsky xxi).
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The effects of the Chicago Boys’ plan for free market fundamentalism 
has now been carried out over the past four decades as the global plan 
for privatized, deregulated, neoliberal capital. The results have been fair-
ly devastating in most parts of the world, including the restructuring of 
higher education, and that’s the story for the next phase.
Phase 3: 1979–2010
The third phase of this three-part history of the post-war period begins 
with the Right wing takeover represented by Thatcher and Reagan, a pe-
riod David Harvey marks with the intensified neoliberal re-writing of the 
conditions and possibilities of global lending. Almost overnight, they had 
piloted the re-writing of World Bank and IMF policy along the lines of 
what was called a “structural adjustment program” (SAP), a euphemism 
for orchestrating the violent processes of accumulation by dispossession 
(Henry Giroux calls it the “politics of disposability”). Under the new 
rules for “structural adjustment,” first world, supply-side lenders are pro-
tected, and third world debtors are forced to adapt neoliberal economic 
policies in order to secure the loans, which means that formerly protect-
ed public domains must be open to private takeover. Education now be-
comes a central focus of the combined World Bank-IMF-WTO mission, 
rhetoric, and policy; it is almost as if the market fundamentalists took 
Antonio Gramsci’s famous claim that “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is 
necessarily an educational relationship” (350) and put it to work for their 
agenda so as to produce neoliberal ideology as the accepted norm of con-
sumer culture for all citizens by restructuring education at all levels. This 
third period is also characterized by the sequences of massive debt cri-
ses, corporate bailouts, and increased world-wide resistance to the World 
Bank agenda as exemplified by demonstrations in Seattle (1999), Wash-
ington, DC (2000), Porte Allegre, the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico, the 
organization of the World Social Forum, the anti- and alter-globalization 
movements, and, more recently, the Occupy Wall Street movement. In 
short, the third phase clearly begins the shift to the primacy of the mode 
of accumulation by dispossession in which private capital dispossesses 
many citizens of various global, but locally differing, domains of public 
commons and human services. Needless to say, like many citizens around 
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the world, many of us in the humanities have been pretty vulnerable to 
the logic of dispossession. What now gains international and lawful le-
gitimacy is the invasion of private investment capital into domains oth-
erwise protected by democratically elected provisions for a public com-
mons, a domain of human welfare, public education, public health care, 
sanitation, land, air, water, worker’s rights, minimum wages, etc.
According to this agenda, the patterns of dispossession moved right 
into the university, the shift to a part-time, flex labor, cheap teaching core, 
that Marc Bousquet, Cary Nelson, Jeff Williams, and many others have 
described. The World Bank played its part: in its many publications, the 
Bank attacked teacher’s unions around the world and offered a version 
of education at every level modeled according to standardized business 
practices and vocational training divorced from any form of teacher au-
tonomy, critical thinking, or public education models.
Within US higher education, the global policies of the World Bank 
found both legislative and judicial sanction in a new law (Bayh-Dole) 
and a Supreme Court decision (Yeshiva) put into effect in the transition 
year of 1980. Bayh-Dole fueled expanded reproduction through legaliz-
ing of patent rights for profit within higher education even as institutions 
maintained their non-profit status. The Yeshiva Decision restrained the 
right of faculty in private institutions to strike, thus dispossessing them 
of basic workers’ rights to contest their conditions of employment. It 
was, therefore, precisely in tune with the mode of dispossession. As Marc 
Bousquet argues, “the institutions of faculty and staff unionism are the 
survivors of a series of great judicial, executive, and legislative traumas 
after 1980” (109). Here’s where the two modes are organically linked: 
the dispossession of the public knowledge commons associated with the 
traditional functions of the university fueled a dramatic increase in the 
mode of expanded reproduction. In short, it favored certain segments of 
the university: where patents are possible, profits are likely.3 So the class 
structure of higher education is not just full professors versus adjuncts; 
it is also the patent-creating sectors such as fields like bio-engineering, 
chemistry, computer science, botany, business schools, management 
schools, and nursing, as well as the vendors, sports-teams, and luxury 
suite dorms. New rules were put in place to facilitate rapid technology 
transfer in and out of the university, such as the WTO’s TRIPS (Trade 
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Related Intellectual Property rightS). Some segments of the university 
have been deeply funded by private interests working according to the 
mode of expanded reproductivity, while other segments have been dis-
possessed of academic freedom through insecure working conditions.
What has tended to go under the radar in this analysis is the hidden 
reality uncovered by Christopher Newfield, who has demonstrated con-
vincingly that despite all the public and private research money running 
into university science departments, the indirect research costs (IRC) of 
grant funding has meant that the humanities and social sciences actually 
serve to fund the debts incurred by the hard sciences. The myth is that 
scientific research is deeply funded, ergo contributing to public educa-
tion wealth, but the reality is otherwise; IRC mean that the sciences cost 
more in terms of tuition and state appropriations money, mainly because 
the grants never cover all the research costs, so the humanities and so-
cial sciences produce the revenue to support the more costly scientif-
ic disciplines
In any case, Bayh-Dole and Yeshiva are internal to the US, but there’s 
a much larger stage of World Bank intervention in the global stage of 
higher education. Indeed, whereas in its first phase, education was never 
even mentioned in Bank documents and policies, in this third phase, edu-
cation is everywhere formulated, discussed, and administered in online 
and print documents, hypertexts, books, essays, and flyers. Let me just 
give you an example from the book it published in 1994, called Higher 
Education: The Lessons of Experience. From the title alone you might be 
led to think they have a kind of progressive concern for “Education and 
Experience”—that is, until you start reading. What you learn is that one 
of the conditions for borrowing money is that any eligible country must 
also “agree to develop business-university linkages: including business 
investments in higher education programs, business funding of educa-
tional research, the appointment of business professionals as university 
faculty and as university governors” (The World Bank qtd. in Hurlbert 
and Mason, n.p.). The Bank persuades universities to have business lead-
ers “actively define and design new curricula, monitor institutional man-
agement, organize student placement, and arrange for industry person-
nel to be seconded to tertiary institutions.” In addition, The Bank calls 
for “academic staff to have industrial experience,” all with the goal of 
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“aligning education to the country’s needs and to the changing structure 
of the labor market” (75; qtd. in Hurlbert and Mason par. 19). Which is 
to say, manage labor in higher education to the tunes of capital manage-
ment everywhere.
This alignment of business and education comes at a price. The bor-
rowing nation must promote competition—euphemistically called “di-
versification”—in education (Task Force on Higher Education and Soci-
ety 11). According to Bank logic, by breaking state control of education 
through the fostering of for-profit universities, such as the University of 
Phoenix, whose aggressive marketing The Bank praises (31), developing 
nations will improve the quality of the educational experiences of its citi-
zens. But the reality is much different, and it radiates throughout all levels 
of the educational system in the developing countries. As Michel Chos-
sudovsky explains:
Freezing the number of graduates of the teacher training col-
leges and increasing the number of pupils per teacher are 
explicit conditions of World Bank social-sector adjustment 
loans. The educational budget is curtailed, the number of 
contact-hours spent by children in school is cut down and 
a double shift system is installed: one teacher now does the 
work of two, the remaining teachers are laid off and the result-
ing savings to the Treasury are funneled towards the external 
creditors. (61)
For a good specific example of the links between dispossession and 
education, consider Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s account of the horrendous 
destruction of the small, black, Creole pigs indigenous to Haiti. These 
pigs were the mainstay of the rural Haitian peasant economy. Eighty-
five percent of the peasant population owned these pigs, and they served 
many functions in the local economy: they ate garbage and thereby aid-
ed in rural sanitation; they were eaten as food; exchanged as gifts; sold 
to pay for special occasions such as weddings, “baptisms, illnesses and, 
critically, to pay school fees and buy books for the children when school 
opened each year in October” (14). But in 1982, the IFI informed the 
Haitians that their pigs were sick (they were worried that the diseases 
they might sometimes carry could be spread to countries in the North). 
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The peasants were promised that better pigs would be sent to replace 
theirs if they would simply kill all of their own pigs. So the peasants did 
just that within thirteen months “with an efficiency not since seen among 
development projects” (14). Well, it took two years for the new, im-
proved pigs to arrive from Iowa, and when they did, they destroyed the 
local economy: they required clean drinking water (mostly unavailable to 
the Haitian population) and imported feed “costing $90 a year when the 
per capital income was about $130” (14). Besides that, they didn’t taste 
as good as the Creole pigs. It has been estimated that Haitian peasants 
lost about $600 million dollars through this devastating dispossession 
of their pigs. And there were dire educational as well as economic con-
sequences: “There was a 30% drop in enrollment in rural schools” (14), 
and that’s in a country where illiteracy is close to 85%, and only about 
10% of school age children attend school. The Haitians have never fully 
recovered from this debacle with the Iowa pigs, and their poverty and the 
accompanying terror of deprivation is more than ever evident in all the 
images of devastation from the 2010 earthquake.
Despite these setbacks over the Creole pigs, in 1988, Aristide was 
deeply involved in educational projects to create a knowledge commons, 
and he sought “to create a popular university…. An experimental farm 
and environmental study center, a center dedicated to the study and prac-
tice of informal sector economics, a faculty of adult literacy…. A corner-
stone principle of this university is that knowledge is not a commodity—
it is meant to be shared” (59). He created an on-air educational radio 
program (Radyo Timoun) and a televised children’s educational station 
(Tele Timoun) that went on the air in 1999. Since Aristide was deposed 
in 2004, Haiti has been the victim of human rights abuses, increased drug 
trafficking, money laundering, and corruption of the small group (about 
1% of the population) of wealthy elite rulers (Hallward). No wonder 
most people of Haiti were unprepared for the earthquake.
But to return to the World Bank’s instructions in the 1994 book, The 
Lessons of Experience, here’s what happens when we jump twelve years 
later to 2006. George W. Bush’s Education Secretary, Margaret Spellings, 
issues the Commission on Higher Education’s (CHE) report, A Test of 
Leadership: Charting the Future of U.S. Higher Education, and the future is 
charted, all right. In short hand, it is pretty easy to see now that Spellings 
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and the CHE have quite literally taken the 1994 World Bank book on 
higher education and turned it into a model of cost-benefit, “value-add-
ed” basis for US education. Without tracing all the details, which is actu-
ally pretty easy to do, just listen to this line: “Student achievement, which 
is inextricably connected to institutional success, must be measured by 
institutions on a ‘value-added’ basis that takes into account students’ aca-
demic baseline when assessing their results” (4). In short, you test them 
first year, test them final year, subtract the first from the last, and that’s 
the measure of the value you’ve added. Now you can grade every school, 
every university on one scale. As Patricia Williams puts it, “Ostensibly a 
school’s grade would be used like the nutrient labels on tubs of potato 
salad” (10). We’re all so much part of the World Bank-WTO discourse of 
“profit-maximizing” that those areas that don’t yield profits directly, like 
humanities, arts, music, gender studies, race studies, etc., well, they can 
just be dispossessed of both public and private funding.
The twenty-first-century century War on Terror precisely fuels that 
kind of dispossession. The move to enclose the educational commons 
proceeds through the more general attacks on freedom of speech, the PA-
TRIOT Acts, and the hyper-security state. The World Bank University 
represents that phase of higher education where the global financializa-
tion of world debt is carried deep within the nation’s (and the world’s) 
institutions of higher education (Martin). In addition to the overtly po-
litical suppression carried out by the many infringements on academic 
freedom that we have witnessed in recent years, the WBU carries out 
internally to higher education the external IFI policies of market funda-
mentalism by way of massively increasing student debt, casualization, 
and the flex labor teaching force of temporary, non-tenure track faculty, 
retrenchment, and down-sizing. At the same time, during the past de-
cade, we have witnessed the massive accumulation of buildings, grounds, 
endowments, and administrative hires while exploiting students and 
non-tenure track faculty. These systematic financialization processes re-
duce and enclose the knowledge commons, which still remains one form 
of hope for human well-being.4
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Possibilities of Resistance
As my three-part historical sketch reveals, neoliberal capitalism seeks to 
totalize its enclosure of all public commons, but it has never worked: the 
litany of horrors and abuses produces and sustains antagonism and resis-
tance. Karl Polanyi called this the “double movement of society”; Marx 
called it class struggle. If the resistance movements do not produce some 
form of commons, they will be ripped apart by capitalist enclosure (i.e., 
single issue movements are vulnerable). Higher education has long been 
deeply part of the capitalist project, but it has also engaged battles for a 
knowledge commons. The university still offers some social spaces (and 
time) for resistance and dissent that to a limited degree are still in place: 
academic freedom, classroom freedoms, free exchange of ideas—these 
concepts remain part of the discourses about the commons, even as they 
are being enclosed. The struggles and resistances are real and widespread, 
as witnessed by Occupy Wall Street and by student strikes around the 
world speaking out for the educational commons necessary for any imag-
inable version of human flourishing (see Emancipating Education for 
All). The different value practices of such commons emerge within con-
text-specific classrooms, departments, research groups, labor unions, and 
student organizations of various kinds.
Secondly, I share Hardt and Negri’s assessment that “The most signifi-
cant event of the first decade of the new millennium for geopolitics may 
be the definitive failure of unilateralism” (203). The World Bank and the 
other IFI represent the failed efforts of US global unilateralism. The sys-
tem is broken. The recent disastrous economic shocks register the end of 
the project of US unilateral hegemony, and it is unlikely that there will be 
any single successor, whether nation or global body, to take the place of 
US imperialism in the form of military dominance and capital systems 
of unification and control. We are living through a period of transition 
where the old forms of imperial governance are yielding unprecedented 
levels of instability in many parts of the world. What may emerge from 
these struggles remains uncertain. But as educators, these troubled times 
are dense with teachable moments. From my limited experience, the 
troubles are so great that more students than ever are willing to listen 
when we teach about capitalism, socialism, anarchism, and communism. 
All these movements have histories, and they provide us opportunities 
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for re-inserting history into the ahistorical rush of hyper-capitalism. Be-
cause the litany of capitalist aggressions emanates affective resistance, 
these moments are thus also dense with organizing moments, political 
alliances of the left [the peace movement, the anti- and alter-globaliza-
tion movement, the human rights movement, the environmental jus-
tice movement, the feminist movement, etc.]. Conversely, of course, we 
should recognize that these times are also teachable moments for skin-
heads, neo-Nazis, and fundamentalists of all kinds.
Third, many domains and elements of the commons remain invisible to 
the dominant discourse. For instance, in their highly provocative Disori-
entations Guide, the Counter Cartographies Collective (3Cs) offers this 
formulation regarding the unseen labor, often located in what we might 
call the commons: “UNC is a space of multiple and unseen kinds of labor 
made precarious under the pressures of the economic crisis; UNC is a 
site where borders and migration policy are put into effect; UNC is a site 
of historical struggles” (EduFactory par. 2). 3Cs focuses on UNC, but 
their point is that it is only a synecdoche to the broader context of public 
higher education in the US university where these unseen labor practices 
are often the struggles of the contingent teaching force, the free-way fly-
ers, mostly women. But in the context of the World Bank University, the 
point is that these US laborers suffer under the same basic neoliberal, 
global economic policies suffered by the unseen laborers in distant parts 
of the world. We have developed many different but related terms to des-
ignate these others: the unrepresented, the subaltern, the marginalized, 
bare life (as Agamben uses the term), the dispossessed, the disempow-
ered, the wretched of the earth, etc. These terms are not, of course, just 
synonyms, as they do reflect real semantic differences grounded in real 
material differences. They are indeed “multiple and unseen,” but the bio-
power of the unseen is not the same as the administration of biopolitics 
by the IFI. There is, of course, real powerlessness: an inability of the dis-
possessed to magically end the exploitations of global capitalism. Hardt 
and Negri offer the idea of the “multitude” as a name to replace Marx’s 
notion of the proletariat, the workers whom Marx thought would end 
capitalism. The multitude may idealize the commons unless we are ex-
tremely careful to recognize that the material circumstances of various 
groups within the multitude is so different. But a large part of our job 
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as educators is making visible the lost histories, the invisible commons, 
the precarious forms of labor—Gramsci’s “war of position” suggests the 
material struggles registered in the affective task of making them visible 
as part of the alternatives to global capitalism.
Fourth, all our terms, rationales, and struggles for and about the com-
mons share at least three primary ethical concerns: 1) social justice; 2) 
human dignity; and 3) social and collective solidarity with and including 
the dispossessed of the world. The focus on the commons engages the 
multiple histories and possibilities of anarchism/communism/socialism 
as public sharing of resources and services. Let’s work as educators to 
translate our local work into context-specific articulations of these com-
mon goals for a better world. As the alternative higher-education move-
ment represented, among many other organizations, through the work 
of the edu-factory collective puts it, “The commonality of struggles is al-
ways against the empty universality of power” (EduFactory n.p.). Strug-
gles for the commons are struggles to work against the reduction of the 
life world to capital. In short, the battles for the global commons must 
confront and push back against the war on terror and the financializa-
tion and privatization of everyday life as represented by the World Bank 
University. As Massimo De Angelis puts it, “A different understanding of 
commons is re-emerging from the webs and networks of the alter-global-
ization movement” (244).
Fifth, these struggles for and about the commons must integrate three 
phases: 1) direct action (such as strikes, demonstrations, etc.); 2) coali-
tion building (single-issue movements must form alliances with common 
causes); and 3) rigorous critique. With respect to the latter, much of the 
work that needs to be done in this area is, in my mind, less strictly theory-
oriented (although of course we need theory), but history-oriented in the 
sense of retrieving, locating, telling the stories that have been denied by 
dominant education, the hegemony of mystified history that leaves out 
most of the real-world geopolitical history of the contemporary moment. 
Thus, the task of all humanities workers is inevitably an historical task to 
this extent: that each discipline, each worker, now needs more than ever 
a kind of self-reflective assessment of the history of its discipline, the his-
tory of the university, and the history of global capitalism. How we get 
access in different disciplinary spheres to these interwoven historical 
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frames is of course a strategic problem of translating between those dif-
ferences. (This paper is clearly oriented to that phase of the project.)
Sixth, a lot of our work as educators is as translators. Given the huge 
range of cultural, social, educational, ethnic, racial, class, and gender dif-
ferences we confront in and out of our classes, nothing can be more im-
portant than translating between and among teachers, scholars, students, 
parents, public, and private domains. There are lots of people working at 
these tasks, and I list just a few examples: Adolf Reed’s Free Higher Edu-
cation project (www.freehighered.org); Marc Bousquet’s blog (www.
howtheuniversityworks.com/wordpress); UNC graduate students’ 
Counter Cartographies Collective (www.countercartographies.org); and 
EduFactory (www.edu-factory.org).
In fact, I will end with an EduFactory statement: “A network of strug-
gles and resistance has to be a common space of translation…of the 
different languages and practices, that is to say a common place from 
which to dismantle the conditions that support the regime of unilateral 
translation. Only in this way, can a network of struggles and resistance 
answer in a collective way the central question: how to build up a trans-
national politics of the common against the global university?” Or what 
I have been calling, the World Bank University. We should not give up 
these struggles.
Notes
1. I use a capacious sense of the “commons.” Marx used the notion of the 
commons as a reference to only those domains of strictly not-capital: those 
spaces free of any contamination from capitalism, and thus a domain that 
private capital seeks to enclose. Drawing on Marx’s key notion, I nevertheless 
use the “commons” in a somewhat broader sense (see Hardt and Negri, 
Commonwealth). Also, as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri explain, “It is 
important to keep conceptually separate the common—such as common 
knowledge and culture—and the public, institutional arrangements that 
attempt to regulate access to it. It is thus tempting to think of the relationships 
among the private, the public, and the common as triangular, but that too 
easily gives the impression that the three could constitute a closed system 
with the common between the other two. Instead the common exists on 
a different plane from the private and the public, and is fundamentally 
autonomous from both” (282). So by global commons, I refer to all those 
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local spaces of relative autonomy from direct capital appropriation of surplus 
value and from private property as regulated by public law. Such spaces 
occur in very different contexts and in differing relations to and struggles 
with capitalism around the globe. Historically speaking, capitalism seeks to 
enclose and dispossess such global commons, and militarism and terrorism 
have been deeply linked to those processes of dispossession. See Kamola and 
Meyerhoff; De Angelis.
2. To summarize the statistics Zinn reports: in the University of Michigan study, 
in 1966, 27% of college educated people in the study voted for withdrawal, but 
41% of those with grade school education were for immediate withdrawal. By 
1970, the mood of the country meant that antiwar sentiment was greater in 
both groups, but there was more increase in the belief in withdrawal among 
the non-college educated: 47% of college educated were for withdrawal; 61% 
of those who had only a grade school education.
3. See Jennifer Washburn’s University, Inc.
4. For a disturbing example of the deleterious links between neoliberal 
capitalism and US public health, see John Abramson’s account in Overdosed 
America of how pharmaceutical companies’ exclusive focus on profit have 
quite literally increased levels of illness and disease among the population.
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Chapter 4
The Company They Keep
How Apologists for Faith Rationalize Terrorism
Horace L. Fairlamb
Defending Faith in the Age of Terrorism: The 
Evasion of Epistemic Responsibility
In the aftermath of 9/11, theistic faith suffered high-profile criticism from 
the Reason Project, including best-selling books by Sam Harris (The End 
of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason), Richard Dawkins (The 
God Delusion), Daniel Dennett (Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural 
Phenomenon), and Christopher Hitchens (God Is Not Great: How Religion 
Poisons Everything). In defense of faith, book-length responses appeared 
from such respected theologians as Alister McGrath (The Dawkins De-
lusion?: Atheist Fundamentalism and the Denial of the Divine) and Keith 
Ward (Why There Almost Certainly Is a God: Doubting Dawkins). Many 
others have joined in the fray on both sides. Unfortunately, the focus of 
both sides is often so broad (i.e., theistic faith in general, for or against), 
that neither side sheds much light on the crucial links between faith 
and terrorism.1
The need to explore many of the links between religion and violence 
should be obvious. As even faith’s apologists admit, much damage has 
been done in the name of religion. The ancient Israelites exterminated 
Canaanite tribes in the belief that God ordered them to do so; the Cath-
olic Church burned and tortured thousands of Christians who did not 
subscribe to the official version of the Gospel; today’s religious mili-
tants declare war against liberal permissiveness, global materialism, and 
The Company They Keep 91
modernity itself. But theism has also produced millions of pacifists and 
altruists. As faith’s defenders rightly note, religious violence is pathologi-
cal rather than typical. Still, pathologies may be natural even if abnormal, 
which is to say that militancy may be a natural effect of religion under 
certain conditions that are not always as rare as they have been in the 
modern West. Moreover, it is possible that religious violence is the re-
sult of a wider infirmity of faith of which violence is but one symptom. In 
that case, what philosophy and sociology of religion need is not a vote of 
confidence on faith, but an etiology of religious violence that reveals its 
underlying conditions.
The recent debate on faith has often polarized between too weak and 
too strong views of the rationality of religious belief. On the critical side, 
where earlier positivists accused theology of meaninglessness, some of 
today’s atheists accuse it of stupidity or worse. But the fact that theism is 
unprovable does not make it irrational. Nor is it obvious that God ought 
to be easily (or scientifically) understandable. For humanists to assume 
that creatures with finite intelligence should be able to understand a Cre-
ator with infinite intelligence seems to be—to say the least—a non-start-
er. The least presumptuous view is the Kantian one that admits that life is 
ambiguous when it comes to ultimate causes.
On the other hand, apologists for faith are too often reluctant to ad-
mit that even mainstream religion suffers its measure of irrationalities. 
The history of orthodoxy is replete with superstitions, ad hoc rational-
izations, and politically expedient myths, not to mention destructive 
crusades. The more candid theologians acknowledge these blots on the 
history of religion, but they often marginalize such cases, as if the distinc-
tion between reasonable orthodoxy and the lunatic fringe is something 
that everyone can agree upon. To the contrary, blind faith and fanaticism 
have never been confined to the margins, nor is there now a widespread 
consensus among believers on the criteria of reasonable belief. Without 
an uncontroversial criterion of rational faith, apologists face the uneasy 
trilemma of defending faith in general—which includes too much—or 
arguing that only their own faith is rational—which looks like special 
pleading—or avoiding the demarcation issue altogether. Thus, if the 
atheists have not done justice to the rationality of faith, neither have the 
apologists faced up to the potential irrationality of faith.
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Logic aside, the political urgency of the clash of cultures has prompted 
faith’s critics to accuse moderate believers of complicity with the extrem-
ists. Moderates, they argue, too often fail to speak out against extremists, 
i.e., holding their fire in the interest of religious tolerance and the “priva-
cy” of faith. Good intentions or bad, so the accusations go, “the faithful” 
constitute an ideological block when it comes to defending faith. Natu-
rally, moderates respond that benign faith should not be painted with the 
same brush as toxic faith, whose violence they condemn. But the atheists 
have a point that some non-violent defenders are complicit with the mili-
tants whether or not they intend to be. For instance, some mainstream 
apologists defend faith so categorically that they rationalize ignorant and 
toxic faith at once, even as they condemn unhappy consequences.
Moderate believers may not condone fringe cults and violent extrem-
ism, but mainstream theology and academic philosophers of religion are 
often soft on the rational accountability of faith. In particular, those who 
would rationalize the faith of naïve believers seem either oblivious or in-
different to the fact that their attempts to rationalize naïve faith rational-
ize religious terrorism as well. By lowering the bar of rationality down to 
the level of naïve believers, such apologetics lend legitimacy to religious 
terrorists. So while most mainstream believers reject religious militancy, 
they overlook the wider implications of mainstream apologetics for faith, 
which include rationalizing religious violence. It is these links between 
mainstream apologetics and religious terrorism that I will examine below.
I propose four steps toward the rational accountability of faith, three 
points based loosely on C. S. Peirce’s “The Fixation of Belief.” In light of 
Peirce’s argument, an adequate critique of the rationalization of religious 
terrorism requires:
•	 an assessment of rationality through epistemic practices
•	 a modest standard of rationality as inquiry
•	 a practical distinction between inquiry and the belief-
securing practices of tenacity, authority, and apriority
•	 a consideration of how resistance to in-
quiry invites religious fanaticism
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Irrational Beliefs vs. Irrational Practices
Traditional epistemology has often associated rationality with valid in-
ferences from standard forms of evidence. Recently, however, episte-
mologists have shifted attention from inference and argument to other 
epistemic practices. This shift has lent some credence to the view known 
as “reliabilism,” which holds that beliefs are warranted (and therefore ra-
tionally held) if the process that produces the belief is a reliably truth-
conducive process (e.g., sense perception, memory, double blind studies, 
etc.). In the reliabilist view, rationality is tied to the belief-producing pro-
cess first and only then to the belief itself. This practical approach to ra-
tionality recalls Peirce’s classic essay on the fixation of belief. Though the 
precise terms of Peirce’s discussion are a bit dated, the general approach 
is useful for diagnosing irrational faith.
Where epistemology seeks the ideal conditions of knowledge, Peirce’s 
essay considers the variety of practices that are in fact used to fix belief. 
(I choose the term “practices” as some of these ways are not methods in 
any rigorous or structured sense.) The practical approach proves espe-
cially appropriate for religious beliefs, for theology is often motivated by 
non-epistemic motives (e.g., moral consequences), thus inviting a prag-
matic or functional analysis. As Peirce noted, the urge to settle a belief is 
typically prompted by cognitive dissonance or doubt, a tension caused 
by conflicting epistemic elements. For the purpose of removing doubt, 
a variety of practices might serve regardless of their conduciveness to 
truth. Thus, Peirce concluded, the common feature of doxastic practices 
is not the search for truth, but rather the fixation of belief, the relieving 
of doubt. Likewise, a practical view of belief must be as interested in the 
causation of belief as in the truth of belief. As it will become clear, Peirce’s 
pragmatic approach highlights the political and psychological aspects of 
belief as well as epistemological implications.
Tenacity: To arrive at a fixed belief, one need only commit to a particu-
lar belief—chosen for whatever reason—and to stick to it in the face of 
all challenges, “constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which 
may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and ha-
tred from anything that might disturb it[.]” One could say that this solu-
tion to intellectual problems is accomplished simply by force of personal 
will. Not surprisingly, this practice is widespread, especially among less 
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open-minded personalities, among those with limited reflective capacity, 
and among those who crave a feeling of doxastic superiority.
Authority: As with tenacity, the way of authority also appeals to com-
mitments of the will. But the way of authority appeals to a social will, 
some institution on which persons depend for direction. Being a social 
arrangement, the content of belief is secondary to its official sanction, 
whose primary aim is solidarity, unanimity, etc. The price for such soli-
darity is high insofar as it involves the surrender of one’s own judgment, 
but as Peirce remarks: “For the mass of mankind…there is perhaps no 
better method than this. If it is their highest impulse to be intellectual 
slaves, then slaves they ought to remain.”
Apriority: Apriority is the status of necessity conferred by epistemol-
ogy to logically required, immediately known, or foundational beliefs. 
Peirce includes under this rubric, of course, logical necessity, but he also 
includes any candidate for “self-evidence” that traditional epistemology 
might warrant. As Peirce showed at length in his critique of Cartesianism, 
traditional epistemology often mistook certainty for a necessary (and 
sometimes sufficient) condition for knowledge. To the contrary, Peirce 
explained, certainty is not a feature of the belief itself, but rather a subjec-
tive feeling that a belief cannot be doubted. Such feelings of indubitabil-
ity cannot be trusted, however; inability to doubt a belief may be due to 
indoctrination or lack of imagination. Ironically, unimaginative people 
often feel the most certain just because they cannot conceive otherwise. 
In any case, apriority is an unreliable index of truth because it includes 
anything that believers might feel certain about for whatever reason.
Apriority is an incipient epistemic ideal because it looks for justifying 
features of belief, and thus involves some epistemic reflection. So Peirce 
allows that apriority “is far more intellectual and respectable from the 
point of view of reason than either of the others which we have noticed.” 
But it lacks a progressive critical thrust: if one merely conforms to what 
already seems most certain, one is simply encouraged “to think as one is 
inclined to think.” Likewise, “its failure has been the most manifest” inso-
far as it renders belief dependent on feelings or intellectual taste, which is 
“unfortunately…always more or less a matter of fashion.” Thus, various 
metaphysical systems have appealed to opposite principles in the name 
of certainty and “have never come to any fixed agreement.”
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Inquiry: Peirce’s notion of inquiry was heavily influenced by modern 
science, but his critique of positivism shows that his empiricism—like 
William James’—was a broad evidentialism. The crux of his appeal to 
modern science, and what distinguishes it from the first three doxastic 
practices, is its self-correcting character. The very point of tenacity is not 
to change one’s view, so tenacity is inherently opposed to self-correction. 
Authority is open to change should authorities change their minds, but 
that does not constitute an epistemic sense of self-correction since au-
thorities may change their views for non-epistemic reasons (e.g., political 
expediency, changes of taste). Apriority or certainty would only be self-
correcting if it were linked to inquiry or at least open to better epistemic 
grounds. Otherwise, certainty’s openness to change would be arbitrary 
rather than progressive.
Thus, only inquiry is an inherently self-correcting process.2 In a memo-
rable turn of phrase, Peirce concludes that inquiry “is the only one of the 
four [ways] which presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way.” 
One cannot pursue the first three methods wrongly as they are consti-
tutive of the truth in any case; the truth is whatever they seize upon. 
There is no such thing as invalid tenacity or fallacious authority except 
by some other standard. With inquiry, however, “bad reasoning as well as 
good reasoning is possible; and this fact is the foundation of the practical 
side of logic.”
As noted, Peirce is as sensitive to the psychological dynamics of the 
first three ways as he is to their epistemological import. But to discern 
the links between religion and terrorism, one would want to look beyond 
psychology to the political implications of the first three ways. Histori-
cally considered, tenacity, authority, and apriority have proven institu-
tionally useful regardless of their rationality. Perhaps most influentially, 
the Western tendency to elevate revelation above reason has allowed 
defenders of faith to deny doctrinal accountability to reason, thereby in-
sulating their premises from criticism by infidels. Moreover, it is a small 
step from saying that certain sacred truths are beyond reason to saying 
that inquiry and doubt are inappropriate regarding those truths. Below, 
I consider how mainstream Western theists continue to rationalize these 
practices and deny their accountability to reason, thereby rationalizing 
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militant fanaticism along with more benign forms of naïve faith.3 I con-
sider Peirce’s first three ways in reverse order.
Apriorism: Speaking for God
For classical epistemology, apriori truth was attributed to propositions 
that were self-evident, such as logical truths. But when Christian theol-
ogy began to borrow philosophical concepts from the Greeks, apriori 
necessity was attributed to theological dogmas or any beliefs taken to be 
beyond suspicion for theological and institutional reasons. The most typ-
ical rhetorical devices for placing belief beyond the challenge of natural 
reason are such dichotomies as God and reason, natural and supernatural 
power, absolute and relative truth, inerrancy and fallibility. Arguments 
may be used to establish such categories, but the point is typically to place 
privileged beliefs beyond scrutiny, thus granting them apriori status.
One such strategy of rationalization involves appealing to God as a 
starting point. Faith need not depend on reason, Dutch theologian Her-
man Bavinck notes, if we proceed “from God as the starting point.” By as-
suming the truth of the scriptures, God’s Word, we may “behold heaven 
and earth, birds and ants, flowers and lilies, in order that we may see and 
recognize God in them” (qtd. in Plantinga 64). One may know God di-
rectly, Bavinck implies, not merely as a conclusion to the inferences of 
reason, but directly. When God is experienced, arguments for God’s exis-
tence are beside the point.
But what about the credibility of the Bible and religious experiences 
that are supposed to be sources of knowledge of God? For many apolo-
gists for faith, questioning the ultimate sources of faith is an affront to 
piety. To subject God’s word to the standards of reason shows inadequate 
faith, and constitutes “unbelief.” As Alvin Plantinga glosses Karl Barth:
To be in the standpoint of unbelief is to hold that belief in 
God is rationally acceptable only if it is more likely than not 
with respect to the deliverances of reason. One who holds this 
belief, says Barth, is in the standpoint of unbelief; [the unbe-
liever’s] ultimate commitment is to the deliverances of reason 
rather than to God. Such a person “makes reason a judge over 
Christ,” or at any rate over the Christian faith. And to do so, 
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says Barth, is utterly improper for a Christian…[Making ra-
tionality a criterion of belief expresses one’s] ultimate com-
mitment to the deliverances of reason, a posture that is for a 
Christian totally inappropriate, a manifestation of sinful hu-
man pride. (70–71)
Following Bavinck and Barth, Plantinga has rejected the demand for 
rational evidence, preferring instead a more direct commitment to God’s 
Word, which is to “start with God” instead of starting with reason. In this 
view, one can “start with God” because the truth of God can be known 
prior to argument. This view constitutes a kind of empirical apriorism: 
Bavinck, Barth, and Plantinga are not suggesting that God’s existence is 
a self-evident concept, but rather that some experiential sources of reli-
gious truth are prior to the authority of reason. According to Plantinga, 
one can “perceive” God directly due to what Calvin called the “sense of 
divinity” (sensus divinitatis). Though the existence of God is not concep-
tually self-evident, these experiential sources are beyond doubt, and thus 
prior to argument.
Presuppositionalism in apologetics and theology is another form of 
apriorism. But this approach begins with orthodox beliefs rather than 
religious experience (e.g., Cornelius Van Til, Gordon H. Clark). As a 
doxastic strategy, presuppositionalism recognizes that all reasoning de-
pends on presuppositions. If all reasoning is presupposition-relative, pro-
ponents argue, and if one can only argue truly from true premises, then 
Christians must begin by presupposing the truth of the Bible and use the 
biblical starting point to critique all contrary thought.
Critics of presuppositionalism accuse it of begging the question of 
truth, i.e., of merely assuming the truth of its sources rather than justify-
ing belief. As Bertrand Russell once said: “The method of ‘postulating’ 
what we want has many advantages; they are the same as the advantages 
of theft over honest toil” (71). Yet presuppositionalists have the legacy 
of Kantian epistemology on their side, which is also presuppositional. 
Kant’s epistemology of pure reason is a theory of what philosophers must 
presuppose in order to have understanding at all. In fact, one could argue, 
every epistemology begins with some presuppositions, whether Kant’s, 
Augustine’s, or positivism’s. If Kant can presuppose pure reason, why 
shouldn’t Christian presuppositionalists presuppose God’s Word? After 
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all, as presuppositionalists typically ask: “Who are we (or anyone else) to 
doubt God’s Word? Who are we to ‘put God in the dock’?”
As it turns out, however, dogmatic apologetics is liable to the charge of 
question-begging in a way that Kant’s philosophy is not. Kant recognized 
that his epistemology was a hypothesis, and therefore subject to revision 
or abandonment depending on where it led. By contrast, theological pre-
suppositionalists assume that their core beliefs are not only true, but be-
yond criticism, revision, or refutation because they are assumed to be the 
Word of God. That is, presuppositionalists assume the truth of the Bible 
or theological orthodoxy precisely to avoid examining its coherence and 
adequacy in conjunction with other knowledge. In short, philosophi-
cal presuppositionalism may be a form of inquiry, whereas theological 
presuppositionalism aims to insulate its foundations from inquiry. Or in 
Peirce’s terms, Kant was practicing inquiry whereas Van Til and Gordon 
Clark practice authoritarian apologetics.
Another authoritarian tactic appeals to the inerrancy of God’s word. 
This tactic is sometimes guilty of begging the question of truth (is the 
Bible God’s word or not?) and sometimes of changing the subject. When 
believers claim to start from God rather than reason, they are changing 
the question from “how do you know what God has said?” to “Does God 
speak truly?” But these are two distinct questions, and only the first is in-
teresting. Even an agnostic would allow that, if God exists as traditionally 
conceived, God would speak truly. What the agnostic doubts is whether 
anyone can assume that God has spoken to them, or that any evidence 
of divine communication is beyond doubt, and therefore beyond inqui-
ry. By contrast, presuppositionalists assume not only that God’s word is 
true, but also that they know God’s word when they see it. Not only God’s 
truth, but their knowledge of God’s will and God’s word is assumed.
Regarding reliable epistemic practices, perhaps the greatest challenge 
for presuppositionalism is the problem of religious diversity. From the 
inside, presuppositionalism may seem like a reliable method insofar as 
believers often feel that they know God well enough to presuppose their 
knowledge. But what if everyone adopted that approach? How could 
one recommend that method for one’s own religion but deny it to oth-
ers? The relatively isolated nature of traditional societies allowed people 
to believe that their cultures were correct and that alien cultures were 
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mistaken. But in a world of diverse religions, presuppositionalism could 
only be a self-centered privilege, not a universal practice. If it were uni-
versalized, it would lead to a culturally relative theology, and thus to self-
contradiction.
In fact, presuppositionalism is impractical even within a single tradi-
tion with sectarian differences. Presuppositionalists avoid the issue of 
intramural pluralism by assuming more institutional consensus than ac-
tually exists. For instance, though Christians rightly assume that being a 
Christian commits one to believing that God’s word—the Bible—is true 
or that Jesus’ words are God’s words, these commitments prove to be no 
more than a verbal consensus. Even if it were true that the Bible is God’s 
word and that Jesus’ words were God’s words, that fact would only have 
philosophical substance if Christians agreed on their interpretation of 
the Bible and Jesus’ sayings, which is historically not the case. Interpreta-
tions of what “the Gospel” is are as numerous as the Christian denomina-
tions: they differ over whether scripture is literally true or symbolically 
true; they differ over whether the church should be militant or pacifist; 
they differ over whether Christians should be poor or rich; they differ 
over whether they are saved by faith or works. Given such fundamental 
differences, presuppositionalism assumes a unity of belief that goes no 
deeper than verbal membership in a group.
Every dogmatic theology (that does not allow dogmas to be revised) 
constitutes a kind of presuppositionalism in the end, for each treats its 
dogmas as apriori true. But where most theologians do not identify 
themselves as question-beggers, many are explicit about their appeals to 
authority. Indeed, conservative critics of modernity have redoubled their 
appeals to authority as a way of insuring unanimity of belief, even as the 
ideal of inquiry increasingly calls authority into question. But even when 
orthodoxy achieves a robust political hegemony of verbal and behavioral 
compliance, it seldom constitutes a very coherent philosophical unity. 
The modern proliferation of Protestant sects manifests what was always 
the case: that religious orthodoxy ignores the fact that people understand 
religious concepts very differently. The Hindus embraced that fact; the 
“religions of the book” have typically tried to repress it. As history shows, 
authority is a political solution to an epistemological problem.
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Authority: The Politics of Belief
However spiritual their origins, religions only become major religions by 
institutionalizing, and institutionalizing involves establishing authorities. 
Each of the major Western religions was founded on a cultural revolution, 
and each had to become an organized movement in order to survive. The 
sociological character of traditions and their sects is enormously varied, 
as are their political implications.
For lay readers of the history of Christian doctrine, the centuries of 
debate may seem rarified and theoretical. But the political implications 
of the debates were often very close to the surface. When Christians 
threatened to part ways over the meaning of the Incarnation, the em-
peror Constantine refused to choose between the humanity and divinity 
of Jesus and decreed both in full measure, thereby accommodating both 
sides with a mystery. When Augustine debated with the Donatists over 
whether the authority of priest’s services lay in the person or in the office, 
Augustine was not indifferent to the fact that if it lay in the man, then all 
marriages conducted by corrupt priests would be invalid, hardly an ac-
ceptable consequence for the offspring of such marriages. For good prag-
matic reasons, priestly power must reside in the office, not the man, there-
by bureaucratizing the benefits of the Holy Spirit. Likewise, the meaning 
of communion was also decided in favor of the power of the Church. To 
say that the meaning of communion is merely symbolic—which is what 
Jesus implied when he said “Do this in remembrance of me”—would al-
low communion to be served “whenever two or three are gathered in my 
name,” rendering church attendance dispensable. The Church chose the 
more mysterious and less probable alternative, transubstantiation, which 
conferred upon the priesthood a monopoly on the power to change a wa-
fer and wine into the body and blood of Jesus (a form of white magic). 
Over the first millennium of Christian history, one finds that whenever 
the establishment of doctrine requires a choice between common sense 
and Church authority, Church authority wins.
It would be fair to conclude that the extent to which Western faith 
has appealed to authority is the extent to which faith became a political 
ideology reflecting the authority of the Temple, the Church, or the Ca-
liphate. Not surprisingly, however, apologists avoid the connotations of 
intellectual slavery attached to religious authoritarianism by its critics. 
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For instance, defending those who condemn other religions without any 
first hand knowledge, Jerome Gellman denies that blindly following the 
teachings of mainstream religions fits the brainwashing paradigm:
Now, rational people can differ over whether a present case 
is sufficiently similar to brainwashing to be condemned or 
otherwise rejected. The religious case is surely not a case of 
brainwashing, if we think of the paradigms of brainwashing 
from the Korean War, say. Hence, a religious person can be 
perfectly rational to think she has not undergone anything re-
motely akin to brainwashing when she was “educated into” or 
granted the gift of “glimpsing from close-up” the religious life 
of her group. (416)
But Gellman’s defense is beside the point in several respects. To begin 
with, whether a person thinks she has been brainwashed or not is hardly 
the appropriate criterion for whether brainwashing has occurred for the 
simple reason that a successfully brainwashed person would not think 
she had been brainwashed. So that is a pointless objection. Secondly, 
Gellman’s comparison with Korean War brainwashing is pitched at the 
wrong level, i.e., at the level of a particular method rather than a general 
practice with the aim of thought control. Brainwashing is a practical ef-
fect, not a particular method.
If we compare some common religious practices in terms of practi-
cal effects, the charge of brainwashing holds up. Consider St. Ignatius 
Loyola’s first and thirteenth rules for thinking with the Church:
All judgment laid aside, we ought to have our mind ready and 
prompt to obey, in all, the true Spouse of Christ our Lord, 
which is our holy Mother the Church Hierarchical.
To be right in everything, we ought always to hold that 
the white which I see, is black, if the Hierarchical Church 
so decides it, believing that between Christ our Lord, the 
Bridegroom, and the Church, His Bride, there is the same 
Spirit which governs and directs us for the salvation of our 
souls.... (n.p.)
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The crucial factor here is not the method, nor even the willingness of 
the seeker, for a practice does not cease to have the effect of brainwashing 
just because someone consents to the process any more than hypnosis 
ceases to be hypnosis just because someone willingly submits. In fact, it 
would be hard to find a clearer instance of brainwashing or intellectual 
slavery than Loyola’s rules. Yet Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises is one of the 
most respected manuals of Western spiritual practice. It would seem then 
that the practice of authoritarian brainwashing is not so far out on the 
margins after all.
Significantly, while Gellman denies that religion is brainwashing, he 
does admit that his rationalization of religious authoritarianism would 
rationalize the extremities of cult behavior as well: “in principle a person 
could be perfectly rational to hold a Jonestown theology. If this sounds 
outrageous that may be because we tend to put too much importance 
on rationality…. It will be crazy because of its content” (416). In oth-
er words, authoritarianism may be the height of rationality in the right 
hands. It is only irrational when practiced by madmen such as Jim Jones.
Gellman’s emphasis on crazy content obscures the point of reliabilism: 
that some practices are more rational than other regardless of content, a 
point which Gellman ignores or fails to see. To the contrary, he implies, 
religious authoritarianism is fully rational even if it is more likely than in-
quiry to indoctrinate us with crazy content. That is just what reliabilism 
denies: a doxastic practice is only as rational as it is truth-conducive, in 
which case a practice is irrational to the extent that it invites crazy con-
tent. By that standard, authority—because it is a political or sociological 
expedient rather than a self-correcting epistemic practice—is a less ratio-
nal practice than inquiry.
Rather than judge by the higher standard of inquiry, Gellman would ra-
tionalize the more extremist cults in the interest of rationalizing authori-
tarian belief. As he admits, he is more concerned to defend faith than to 
respect rationality. The result, however, is that he trivializes rationality. 
Like other religious epistemologists striving to rationalize faith, he low-
ers the bar of rationality to where it no longer means anything more than 
a modicum of inferential validity (regardless of content). This trivializes 
rationality because it is possible to find a glimmer of reason in almost all 
thought, even beliefs motivated only by obedience to authority without 
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any real understanding of content (i.e., even brainwashed beliefs). But 
then “full rationality” reduces to any rationality rather than being an ideal 
toward which thought strives in a more or less adequate way. True, there 
are useful senses of “rationality” that are quite narrow (e.g., logical valid-
ity, appropriate choice of means to an end, etc.), but the philosophical 
ideal of rationality is broader than that, and that broader sense of epis-
temic responsibility is lost when rationality is dumbed down to accom-
modate any sort of faith, no matter how blind, ignorant, or pernicious.
One rhetorical strategy for lowering the bar of rationality involves forc-
ing a false dichotomy by asking whether someone is fully rational or irra-
tional rather than asking what level of rationality the person has achieved. 
Thus, when some liberals have impugned the rationality naïve believers 
with prejudices against other religions, Alvin Plantinga asks,
What about the 14-year-old theist brought up to believe in 
God in a community where everyone believes? This 14-year-
old theist, we may suppose, does not believe in God on the 
basis of evidence. He has never heard of the cosmological, te-
leological, or ontological arguments, in fact, no one has ever 
presented him with any evidence at all. And although he has 
often been told about God, he does not take that testimony as 
evidence; he does not reason thus: everyone around here says 
God loves us and cares for us; most of what everyone around 
here says is true; so probably that is true. Instead, he simply 
believes what he is taught. Is he violating an all-things-consid-
ered intellectual duty? Surely not. (33)
Plantinga implies that if a naïve believer commits no fallacies in blindly 
following the authority of his family and community, his blind faith is 
epistemically and rationally impeccable. The all-or-nothing dichotomy 
implies that someone with any shred of rationality qualifies for full ratio-
nality because they are not irrational.
Plantinga’s language focuses on epistemic duties where Gellman’s fo-
cused on form, although they have the same effect of weakening rational-
ity by lowering the bar for both epistemic warrant and epistemic respon-
sibility. In regard to duty, defenders of naïve faith sometimes play off the 
ought-implies-can principle to diminish epistemic responsibility. In those 
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cases, a naïve believer is rationally impeccable if he is doing whatever he 
can do to make a correct decision, and cannot be faulted for not doing 
what he cannot do (e.g., for not knowing what he does not know). Plant-
inga can say that that the 14-year-old believer is making the best of his 
modest resources, so no duties are neglected.
This view trivializes epistemic duty by reducing it to no more than 
what a naïve believer can attain. For most people, however, rationality in 
its fullest sense involves more than naive faith. Full rationality would be 
an ideal by which a naïve believer may be judged to be deficient even if 
his ignorance of that higher level of rationality is not due to willful ne-
glect of epistemic duties.
Efforts to defend the moral integrity of simple faith are well inten-
tioned, but they are more appropriately directed at the moral require-
ments for salvation than the epistemic requirements of rationality. The 
ultimate effect of rationalizing naïve faith and faith with crazy content is 
not to demonstrate that they are rationally impeccable, but merely to de-
prive the common sense notion of rationality of its critical substance. The 
cost of this diminished view of rationality is too high: it suggests that full 
rationality requires nothing more than blind faith in an authority whose 
limitations are as yet unknown and unquestioned. By contrast, Peirce’s 
reliabilist distinctions between the four ways helps clarify how rational-
ity is a matter of degree, the fullness of which is only achieved by inquiry.
The choice between inquiry and authority is not merely a matter of 
comparative rationality; there is an institutional conflict of interest be-
tween authority and inquiry. To acknowledge that authority is an infe-
rior practice to inquiry would imply that faith is accountable to reason, 
which would undermine the sufficiency of authority for “full rationality.” 
Authority means dogma, and the defense of dogma—as Gellman’s and 
Plantinga’s examples show—needs apologetics rather than inquiry. The 
fact that authority is an inferior epistemic practice to inquiry must be 
dismissed if apologetics is to be effective. Because the point of authori-
tarian dogmatism is obedience rather than knowledge, authoritarianism 
elevates ecclesiastical politics above knowledge.
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Tenacity: The Blessed Rage of Ignorance
Authority is a social form of tenacity. But it leads to individual tenacity 
when successful, as in the case of Loyola’s faithful believer who says that 
what he sees as black is white because the Church says so. In his defense 
of “contented exclusivism,” Gellman joins Plantinga in denying that na-
ïve believers have a duty to inquire into the credibility of their beliefs, no 
matter how pernicious. In that view, loyalty to authority is the highest 
duty there is. Thus, Gellman rationalizes ignorant judgments of others’ 
faiths, claiming that the condemnation of other religions based on sec-
ond hand authority does not “fall short of full rationality” (401). More-
over, there is no epistemic obligation on the ignorant bigot even to look 
into the matter:
An exclusivist need not necessarily reflect on the rival claims 
of religions other than her own. She need not try to adjudicate 
between the home and the ‘visiting’ religious traditions…. A 
believer may rationally invoke her unreflective religious be-
liefs to defeat opposing religious claims, without having to 
consider the question any further. (403)
According to Gellman and Plantinga, the impression that rationality 
imposes a duty to inquire is an illusion; rationality is adequately secured 
by authority and tenacity, even in cases of virulent ignorance.
Ironically, Gellman grants the superiority of inquiry when he admits 
that “critical scrutiny enhances a person’s chances of achieving truth rath-
er than chancing error,” which suggests that perhaps ignorant prejudice 
is not fully rational after all. Here Gellman undermines his attribution 
of full rationality to obedient illiterates. If critical scrutiny is a more re-
liable practice than blind faith, then practitioners of blind faith are not 
as rational as inquirers, in which case full rationality carries with it the 
epistemic duty to know what one is talking about, even if that requires a 
bit of inquiry.
Committed to rationalizing authoritarian obedience, Gellman and 
Plantinga have embraced a logic of cultural and personal relativism that 
Gellman spells out quite explicitly:
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1. If one has no problems with one’s current beliefs, one need not 
question them. “My grandmother used to say: ‘If the wheel 
does not squeak, don’t oil it’” (403).
2. If one has been pleased with one’s current beliefs, there is no 
reason not to accept them as a foundation for judgment of oth-
er systems of belief (403–04).
3. Even if there were a common framework for the adjudication 
of different religions, a contented believer need not “enter that 
common intellectual space to try to adjudicate matters, in order 
to preserve her rationality” (404).
4. A theist who believes in a “jealous” God might believe that it 
would be “a serious violation of her relationship to God for her 
to consider for a moment that some other religion might be 
true rather than the one God encourages her in daily” (405).
5. Believers who believe in a Chosen People or Chosen Faith may 
expect that some religion must be true, that all others are false, 
and that theirs is the true one (407, 413).
6. Rationality underdetermines the final reconciliation of all 
epistemic principles. It can only tell us to find the best equi-
librium among competing beliefs, not what that equilibrium 
looks like (409).
7. All reasoning begins from prejudicial background assumptions 
(in Gadamer’s sense of prejudice). The contented exclusivist 
has the right to begin from hers (409).
In other words, no matter how ignorant, misinformed, prejudiced, and 
pernicious one’s existing beliefs, if one is comfortable with them—as far 
as one knows—one is not only fully rational to hold fast to them, but one 
is exempted from the duty to look farther into their credibility. Ignorance 
is an exemption from critical epistemic duty. Authoritarian ignorance is 
epistemic bliss.
Notice, however, that the sixth premise in the argument is exactly 
what Peirce’s essay denies. The sixth premise suggests that rationality 
is nothing but balancing one’s beliefs by one’s best lights. But Gellman 
The Company They Keep 107
already conceded that that view is too weak. If “critical scrutiny enhances 
a person’s chances of achieving truth,” then the most rational equilib-
rium is likely to have more inquiry and less authoritarian belief. Ratio-
nality, in short, prefers inquiry to authority, which is what Plantinga and 
Gellman deny when they attribute full rationality to beliefs based only 
on authority.
Having abandoned hope for any transpersonal measures of rationality, 
Gellman and Plantinga retreat into the language of piety and morality. 
The 14-year-old believer acquits his duty to reason if he sincerely consid-
ers only what he already believes. Rationality is no more than thinking 
earnestly, so that anyone who can think can be pronounced rational if, by 
thinking at all, they are doing the best they can. Thus rationality becomes 
more reflective of good intentions than of truth-conducive practices.
Unfortunately, substituting sincerity for knowledge not only rationaliz-
es the most militant terrorist but also exonerates him from the epistemic 
duty to understand the nature of his acts and the identities of his victims. 
Indeed, this subordination of rationality to earnest effort has the perverse 
implication that the more ignorant, anti-intellectual, and closed-minded 
a person’s faith is, the less he is obliged by reason to inquire just because 
he has been taught that inquiry into his sacred beliefs is blasphemous.
If he has worked out a satisfactory equilibrium in a criteria-
belief complex, is true to the weights he perceives to be ap-
propriately assigned to beliefs in this complex, finds that his 
religious beliefs simply do not squeak in the face of religious 
diversity, and [is logical], then he is fully rational to be a con-
tented exclusivist if that is what his epistemic situation yields. 
So, a contented exclusivist can be fully rational. (414)
If a believer has arrived at a stable equilibrium of epistemic principles 
by her own standards, then she is pronounced fully rational. Radical rela-
tivism in a nutshell.
Plantinga’s and Gellman’s views of rationality rehearse all the weak-
nesses Peirce discovers in the first three practices for fixing belief: being 
wholly self-constituting, the practices of tenacity, authority, and apriority 
have no right or wrong application. If the simple believer sincerely be-
lieves whatever she was taught, she warrants full rationality by Gellman’s 
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standard. But by the standards of reliable epistemic practices, such beliefs 
must be judged less rational than more informed beliefs.
Terrorism and Collateral Rationalization
It may not be surprising that contemporary religious terrorism has 
prompted more polemics than sober assessments.4 On the one side, anti-
metaphysical atheists have been fixated on the epistemic blindness and 
irrational excesses to which religion sometimes leads. On the other side, 
religious apologists, though better informed on metaphysics and theolo-
gy, minimize faith’s liability to fanaticism and violence, putting blame on 
the minority of extremists. But while it may be only the extremists who 
commit terrorist acts, mainstream academic philosophers have defended 
their moral legitimacy by attributing full rationality to ideological obedi-
ence, whether benign or fanatical, informed or ignorant.
One might expect that academic philosophers would consider inquiry 
a prerequisite for full rationality. But the gold standard of inquiry is of-
ten sacrificed to the pragmatic aim of apologetics, and de facto cultural 
relativism is the result. That is, the contextualizing tactics of cultural rela-
tivism—which theologians usually condemn as morally bankrupt—are 
selectively invoked to show that naïve believers with good intentions (be-
cause they cannot do better) are fully rational in their blind obedience to 
indoctrination, even when dangerously misinformed. On the one hand, 
this willingness on the part of professional philosophers to attribute full 
rationality to tenacity, authority, and apriority is a testament to the power 
of those same practices among people who should recognize their unreli-
ability. On the other hand, many of those same apologists are guilty of a 
double epistemic standard when they use cultural relativism against the 
duties of rationality while failing to draw the logical conclusion that if 
mere obedience to authority is fully rational, then God has cursed most 
of humanity with fully rational faiths that—by exclusivist standards—in-
hibit salvation.
When apologists defend tenacity and authority against inquiry, inquir-
ers are not condemned because inquiry is epistemically inferior to faith, 
but because inquiry is not sufficiently presumptuous. Inquirers insult 
God by not assuming that their religious beliefs are beyond question. But 
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this moral critique of inquiry leads to an epistemological double standard 
insofar as the same ideal of piety cannot consistently be demanded of 
other faiths. Yes, believers of other faiths are equally convinced of their 
own truth, but dogmatists must reserve authoritarianism and presup-
positionalism for themselves, while demanding inquiry of other faiths. 
Assuming a monopoly on truth, the critics of other faiths must assume 
without question that their beliefs are true and the others’ are false, their
savior is genuine and the others’ are pretenders, their sacred texts contain 
the sum of wisdom while the others’ see throught a glass darkly, and their 
leaders channel inspired truths while the leaders of other faiths mislead. 
Dogmatists must be closed-minded to other faiths, whereas other faiths 
must inquire into theirs. Reason is relativized asymmetrically in their fa-
vor: truth does not depend on method, but strictly on having the right 
revelation. Rational critique of their revelation is impossible because 
truth is revelation-relative, although that allows them to condemn other 
faiths as deficient, if not corrupt. Tenacity for their members is the sign of 
piety; tenacity for other faiths is the sign of a perverse will.
These apologetic strategies shift the question of truth from epistemo-
logical to moral grounds, from truth to piety, from ignorance to sincerity. 
For Gellman, for instance, the risk of naïve obedience is not that some-
one will believe falsely, but that someone may exploit his own ignorance. 
The risk, in other words, is that contented naïve exclusivism might be-
come “an insincere protective strategy” (416). But for epistemologists, 
sincerity is beside the point: ignorance is not compensated by sincerity.
The rationalization of ignorant sincerity has obvious consequences for 
the clash of cultures. When willful narrow-mindedness is rendered fully 
rational, all faiths are insulated from self-correction at once, removing all 
moral leverage against the worst excesses of fanaticism. Indeed, on the 
question of sincerity, the fanatics are sure to win because that is where 
they excel. Thus Gellman’s liberal caveat is to no avail:
…True enough, my contented exclusivist may rationally be-
lieve that all religions other than the home religion are works 
of the devil, and that the devil tricks others into believing 
them…. I realize that the contented exclusivist position might 
be unjustifiably used to slide into positions I would want to re-
ject. Hence, I close with an appeal that philosophical defences 
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of contented religious exclusivism always be accompanied by 
declarations of religious tolerance. (416–17)
Unhappily, if one is fully rational to believe whatever one has been 
taught, that would include those indoctrinated with militant intolerance. 
Indeed, fanatics would turn Plantinga’s and Gellman’s defenses of exclu-
sivism against liberal sincerity: non-militants disdain not only the errors 
of liberal infidels, but also their unwillingness to fight for their faith. The 
non-militant commitment (i.e., faith) is weak. When faith is understood 
as unwavering commitment to absolute truth, then there may be little to 
be said for the virtue of tolerance.
In the interest of defending simple believers, apologists have made na-
ïve obedience to authority a content-indifferent exemption from the duty 
to inquire into the grounds of one’s beliefs. But once inquiry is rendered 
dispensable for full rationality, then tenacity, authority, and apriority may 
flourish unaccountable to more informed perspectives. Not all theists un-
derstand faith that way; many open their faith to inquiry at all points. But 
there is nothing intrinsic to faith to distinguish good faith from bad. If 
faith is to be disciplined, it must come from the outside, i.e., from inquiry. 
By equating tenacity, authority, and apriority with full rationality, apolo-
gists insulate faith from the only practice that would impose epistemic 
discipline. By removing that check, apologists underwrite the rationality 
of terrorists as well as the rationality of their grandmothers.
Members of the Reason Project have been rebuked for accusing even 
moderate and liberal theists of complicity with militant extremists whose 
militancy they may reject. Their concerns are not groundless. The defens-
es of naïve faith discussed here justify those who do not feel the need to 
dialogue. They rationalize the monologues of the self-righteous. Peirce’s 
essay shows the epistemic limitations of such exercises in tenacity, au-
thority, and apriority, but recent culture clashes show the danger of their 
ecclesiastical politics.
Notes
1. There are exceptions, such as Charles Kimball’s When Religion Becomes Evil: 
Five Warning Signs, which examines the pernicious effects of religious beliefs 
in chosen peoples, inerrant scriptures, apocalyptic times, and holy wars.
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2. At first, it may seem as if all these practices intend to be progressive. But that 
impression fades when one realizes that the first three practices merely fix 
belief rather than correct it. Of course, it is possible that a better belief could 
be fixed by tenacity, authority, or apriority; but it is not those practices that 
constitute its progressive character. Inquiry aims at epistemic progress, not 
mere fixation.
3. Not surprisingly, the ways of tenacity, authority, and apriority have been 
practiced in the East as well as in the West. Hinduism’s cult of the guru, for 
instance, involves a loyalty no less tenacious and authoritarian than anything 
in the West. But nowhere in the East have tenacity, authority, and apriority 
been so expansively politicized as in the mainstream lineages of Western 
religion. What has been the exception in the East became the rule in the West. 
This historical contrast has made Western theism notably more suspicious of 
inquiry than either Hinduism or Buddhism in the East, and therefore more 
open to the political benefits of apriorism, authority, and tenacity.
4. The recent polemics all postdate the arguments examined here by Plantinga 
and Gellman. That Gellman’s piece appeared shortly before 9/11 is 
painfully ironic.
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Chapter 5
Terror, Aesthetics, and the Humanities 
in the Public Sphere
Emory Elliott
In a 1991 interview for the New York Times Magazine, Don DeLillo ex-
pressed his views on the place of literature in our times in a statement 
that he has echoed many times since and developed most fully in his 
novel Mao II:
In a repressive society, a writer can be deeply influential, but 
in a society that’s ﬁlled with glut and endless consumption, 
the act of terror may be the only meaningful act. People who 
are in power make their arrangements in secret, largely as a 
way of maintaining and furthering that power. People who 
are powerless make an open theater of violence. True terror 
is a language and a vision. There is a deep narrative structure 
to terrorist acts, and they infiltrate and alter consciousness in 
ways that writers used to aspire to. (qtd. in DePietro 84)
The implications of DeLillo’s statement are that we are all engaged in 
national, international, transnational, and global conflicts in which acts 
of representation, including those of terrorism and spectacular physical 
violence as well as those of language, performance, and art compete for 
the attention of audiences and for influence in the public sphere.
In the early days of the Iraq War, the United States used the power 
of images, such as those of the “mother of all bombs” and a wide array 
of weapons, as well as aesthetic techniques to influence and shape the 
consciousness of millions and to generate strong support for the war. 
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The shock, fear, and nationalism aroused in those days after 9/11 have 
enabled the Bush administration to pursue a military agenda that it had 
planned before 9/11. Since then, the extraordinary death and destruc-
tion, scandals and illegalities, and domestic and international demon-
strations and criticisms have been unable to alter the direction of this 
agenda. Those of us in the humanities who are trained as critical readers 
of political and social texts, as well as of complex artistically constructed 
texts, are needed now more urgently than ever to analyze the relation-
ships between political power and the wide range of rhetorical methods 
being employed by politicians and others to further their destructive ef-
fects in the world.
If humanities scholars can create conscious awareness of how such aes-
thetic devices such as we see in those photos achieve their affective ap-
peal, citizens may begin to understand how they are being manipulated 
and motivated by emotion rather than by reason and logic. In spite of our 
ability to expose some of these verbal and visual constructions as devices 
of propaganda that function to enflame passions and stifle reasonable dis-
cussion, we humanities scholars find ourselves marginalized and on the 
defensive in our institutions of higher learning where our numbers have 
been diminished and where we are frequently being asked to justify the 
significance of our research and teaching. While we know the basic truth 
that the most serious threats to our societies today are more likely to re-
sult from cultural differences and failures of communication than from 
inadequate scientific information or technological inadequacies, we have 
been given no voice in this debate. With the strong tendency toward po-
larized thinking and opinion and the evangelical and fundamentalist re-
ligious positions in the US today and in other parts of the world, leaders 
continue to abandon diplomacy and resort to military actions. Most gov-
ernment leaders find the cultural and social explanations of the problems 
we face to be vague, and they are frustrated by complex human issues. 
That is not reason enough, however, for us to abandon our efforts to in-
fluence and perhaps even alter the current course of events. In spite of the 
discouragements that we as scholars of the humanities are experiencing 
in these times, it seems to me that we have no option but to continue 
to pursue our research and our teaching and hope to influence others to 
question the meaning and motives of what they see and hear.
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In these dark times, I take my inspiration from those writers past and 
present whose works have served as a counter-force to the misdirection 
of our politics and foreign policies and who have employed the aesthetic 
to address the political. In a paper that I delivered in Berlin in April 2004, 
entitled “Aesthetics and Politics in the American Novel,” I presented an 
argument regarding several nineteenth-century American writers who 
employed what I call an aesthetics of astonishment—the use of language 
and imagery to jolt readers into recognizing some of the ways that gov-
ernments use rhetorical strategies to justify decisions to which many citi-
zens are fundamentally opposed.
Using Melville’s “Benito Cereno” and Twain’s Connecticut Yankee in 
King Arthur’s Court as my main texts, I argued that these texts raise ques-
tions about the effectiveness of US leaders in negotiating in other cul-
tures or in understanding people different from themselves. Hank Mor-
gan and Amasa Delano fail in their missions abroad for reasons having 
to do with pride, arrogance, a sense of racial and cultural superiority, and 
indifference and blindness toward other cultures and cultural others. As 
a result, they leave death and devastation in their wakes. Because of the 
fundamental resistance of American publishers and average readers to 
accept such criticisms of the United States, however, both writers pre-
sented their critiques in coded language and through insinuation. Both 
works gradually reveal the negative features of their protagonists so sub-
tly that many readers will fail to perceive the racism of Delano and the 
despotism of Morgan. But as a way of prompting perceptive readers to 
recognize that more is being suggested than what first meets the eye, 
both writers also employed an aesthetics of astonishment to startle some 
readers into questioning their own assumptions. In “Benito Cereno,” it 
is the shock of awareness that occurs when Delano, and most likely the 
reader as well, discovers that the San Dominick is under the command 
of the African, Babo. In Connecticut Yankee, it is Hank’s brutal execution 
of twenty-five thousand knights in a confrontation in which Hank and 
his small army have no chance of escape, but in which Hank nevertheless 
chooses to massacre as many as possible anyway in a display of his supe-
rior technology.1
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Today, I want to look at some of the ways that more recent writers of 
fiction have employed a similar aesthetics of astonishment to prompt 
readers to examine the realities of their society and the failures of their 
leaders. Of those contemporary writers who are attempting to engage 
what many consider to be the most disturbing tendencies in American 
domestic politics and international policies today, two are Don DeLillo 
and Philip Roth. With his breakthrough book White Noise, DeLillo ef-
fectively exposed so many of the aspects of the rhetoric of advertising, 
bureaucracies, and government with his parodies of formulations such as 
the “airborne toxic event.” For those who may not know White Noise by 
DeLillo, one of the funniest and most memorable passages of White Noise 
describes what goes on inside a jetliner that falls from thirty-four thou-
sand to twelve thousand feet. Instead of the expected formulaic calming 
voice of the Captain assuring the passengers that they all will be safe and 
that the plane will recover, passengers hear from the flight deck: “We’re 
falling out of the sky! We’re going down! We’re a silver gleaming death 
machine!” (90). But then, the narrator reports that soon “certain mem-
bers of the crew had decided to pretend that it was not a crash but a crash 
landing that was seconds away. After all, the difference between the two 
is only one word.” He goes on: “The basic difference between a crash and 
a crash landing seemed to be that you could sensibly prepare for a crash 
landing…. The news spread through the plane, the term was repeated in 
row after row. ‘Crash landing, crash landing.’ They saw how easy it was, 
by adding one word, to maintain a grip on the future, to extend it in con-
sciousness if not about actual fact” (91). Throughout this work, DeLillo 
exposed and critiqued the ways that official rhetoric and manipulations 
of language can create versions of reality in ways in which people are 
most often unconscious.
In Libra, his novel on the Kennedy assassination that focuses on Lee 
Harvey Oswald, DeLillo went even further in his effort to enlighten his 
readers about the function of official accounts of history and his own fic-
tional account. While clearly suggesting in the novel that there are many 
people in the US and Cuban governments who had wanted to kill the 
President and that there are good reasons for suspecting a conspiracy was 
involved, he also self-reflectively raises questions about his own motives 
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and purposes as a writer to write a novel that explores this subject. He 
integrates literary criticism into the text and repeatedly draws the readers’ 
attention to the conventions of fiction he employs, while he questions 
the tendency of some readers to believe that a novel about an historical 
event is more likely to present the truth than official accounts or histo-
ries. Thus, the reader of Libra is more likely to conclude the work as an 
even more skeptical reader of all historical and fictional accounts than he 
or she was at the beginning.
Although his epic on cultural American memory, Underworld, ap-
peared in 1997, DeLillo chose for the dust jacket a photo of the World 
Trade Center buildings as seen through a ghostly haze. The text suggests 
the ways that grand illusions, manipulations of the truth, and distractions 
such as sports and popular culture, enable people to endure the waste, 
violence, aimlessness, and emptiness of contemporary life that lead to 
misplaced values and tragic failures.2 It is a black comedy in which the 
Cold War, with its nuclear threat looming over the lives of millions for 
fifty years, is recounted, and while there is a sense of anticipation of some 
tragic event yet to come, there are no clear suggestions about what the 
source of such a global catastrophe might be.
DeLillo’s 2003 Cosmopolis is his first novel since 9/11. Highly contro-
versial and severely criticized by some, this work is something of a de-
parture from what readers have come to expect from him. While many 
reviewers praised the work for its aesthetic qualities such as “the vibrancy 
of his verbal and scenic imagination” (Wolfe), many found the issues 
it raises unresolved and the ending inconclusive. As in Joyce’s Ulysses 
and Woolf ’s Mrs. Dalloway, the action occurs on a single day in April 
2000, just as the stock market is about to collapse. Two other modern-
ist texts are clearly at play in important ways in DeLillo’s text—Eliot’s 
Wasteland and “Prufrock.” Cosmopolis forecasts the social and economic 
plunge that would soon follow the bursting of the dot-com bubble and 
the consequences of the collapse of Worldcom, Enron, and the World 
Trade Center.
The protagonist is Eric Packer, a twenty-eight year old billionaire ven-
ture capitalist whose deals are of such impact that they have put many 
companies out of business and caused the loss of millions of jobs; thus, 
aware that many hate him, he is paranoid and lives in fear for his life. 
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On this particular day, he is gambling everything on the collapse of the 
Japanese yen which, in spite of all expectations, inexplicably continues 
to rise. Eric leaves his multimillion dollar apartment on Manhattan’s east 
side and takes his custom-designed thirty-five-foot armored limo across 
town to get a haircut. But the President of the United States is visiting 
New York, and with the traffic jams that result, it takes him all day to get 
across town.
Inside his limo, Eric works in front of several computer screens and 
TV monitors while surrounded by armed bodyguards. Throughout the 
day, he has visits from several employees and business associates, some 
of whom are also his lovers, has a medical exam, and he has three chance 
encounters with his wealthy socialite wife of three weeks with whom 
he has not consummated his marriage. During the last meeting, they 
do so on the street. While Eric’s limo crawls across 47th Street on his 
journey through the twenty-first-century wasteland of New York from 
the wealthy east side to the poor west side, a series of astonishing, often 
violent, events occur: a burst water-main floods the theater district with 
mud and debris; angry, anti-globalization protestors set ﬁre to cars, at-
tack his limo, and wave and carry images of rats to symbolize their disgust 
for capitalists; a huge, celebrity-packed funeral procession for a young 
rap star stops traffic; a bomb explodes near an investment bank; a man 
sets himself on fire; moviemakers film three hundred extras lying naked 
in a street, whom Eric joins on a lark (and where one of his coincidental 
meetings with his wife takes place); and a serial cream pie assassin who 
travels the world attacking famous leaders makes Eric his mark.
Meanwhile, on the televisions inside Packer’s limo, the director of the 
International Monetary Fund is shot and killed while appearing live on 
the Money Channel, and the owner of Russia’s largest media corpora-
tion dies of gunfire. Eric’s chief of security alerts him that there is also a 
credible threat against his own life. In the midst of all of this chaos, the 
regular appearances of rats on the streets is a constant reminder of the 
decay of the natural and social support systems resulting in disease, high 
unemployment, diminishing medical services, shrinking school budgets, 
and the dangerously inflated stock market, not to mention a recurring rat 
metaphor for a tycoon like Eric himself.
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Scenes of shocking violence are typical in much of DeLillo’s works and 
usually appear aimed at calling attention to the bizarre chaos of contem-
porary life where it is difficult to distinguish criminals, insane murder-
ers, and terrorists from leaders who direct state and corporate-generat-
ed violence. In Libra and Underworld, for example, the CIA, FBI, KGB, 
organized crime, and the White House appear to be in regular dialogue. 
In Cosmopolis, however, the enemy is not so evident, and the direction 
in which to point the finger of blame for the collapse of the economy is 
never clearly determined. At first, Eric appears to be the likely villain, but 
while his life and actions may contribute to the impending disaster, he is 
just one of many culprits and is himself a victim at several levels, not the 
least being his financial collapse.
Furthermore, DeLillo has given his assassin a chapter early in the novel 
in which he speaks to Eric’s corpse, thus defusing any suspense about Er-
ic’s murder and invoking a degree of sympathy for him as well as evoking 
a desire in the reader to understand Eric’s tragedy.
The question then is what is the point of all this shock and awe and 
what does the novel have to contribute to our perceptions and under-
standing of American society and the world in which everything since 
9/11 (as is commonly repeated) has supposedly changed? Is the text ask-
ing the reader to question any prior assumptions or values?
To answer these questions, we must recall that even within all of this 
gloom, DeLillo remains a very humorous writer whose wit, satire, and 
dark comedy are keys to the connections between the aesthetic and the 
political, psychological, and the philosophical spheres of knowing found 
in his works.
Central to the novel is the collapse of the system, the market, and the 
society, but it is upon the fragmentation and dissolution of Eric’s frag-
ile ego that DeLillo focuses the reader’s attention because, in spite of the 
media, the courts, and the corporations that may make it appear that 
forces and uncontrollable economic shifts are to blame, DeLillo forces 
the reader to acknowledge that disastrous consequences finally result 
from the decisions and acts of the individuals who have the power to act. 
Eric fancies himself a scholar of science, history, and philosophy; he has 
knowledge of many random facts. But much of his success has hinged 
upon luck. He has taken chances that wiser investors would not take and 
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has won, until today when his luck is running out. Because of arrogance 
and self-destructive tendencies, he ignores the advice of his top advisors 
to stop investing in the fall of the yen. On this day, he is losing his grip 
and regressing into childhood. His desire to return to the barbershop in 
his old neighborhood to have his hair cut by the barber who gave him his 
first cut when he was four reveals a nostalgic yearning to return to the 
womb and to abandon control—the control that he has carefully culti-
vated during his rise to power.
It seems that the turn that DeLillo has taken in this work is away from 
the satiric critic of the culture of glut and waste mindlessly digging its 
own mass grave and toward the issue of leadership. In Eric Packer, DeL-
illo gives us a contemporary Captain Ahab, Hank Morgan, Tom Sawyer, 
or Jay Gatsby—a man of aesthetic and sexual appeal who represents the 
United States on a global stage and who appears to possess confidence 
and talent, who is charming, and who acts decisively, but who is finally 
just another Wizard of Oz: a confidence man, a shrunken man hiding be-
hind a computer screen and a grandiose reputation. Eric relies more upon 
appearances and rote information than upon human qualities tradition-
ally associated with leadership—such as wisdom, maturity, compassion, 
integrity, and an ability to identify with and understand the nature of oth-
er people. His new wife, Elise, is an established poet (whose writing he 
refers to as “shit”). Elise says to him early in the day: “You know things. 
I think this is what you do. I think you’re dedicated to knowing. I think 
you acquire information and turn it into something stupendous and aw-
ful. You’re a dangerous person. Do you agree? A visionary” (8). Indeed, 
an arrogant, egotistical visionary for our times. During the day, she learns 
that he is having affairs with several other women, three of whom he has 
had sex with on that day. She tells him that the only way she can remain 
married to him would be if she were able to be indifferent to his callous 
disregard of her feelings, which she cannot be: “I think we’re done, aren’t 
we? You speak of being free. This is your lucky day” (122). Perhaps, be-
cause of his rhetorical force and bravado, commentators have, in my view, 
taken Eric far too seriously. Rather than a symbol or stereotype of the 
worst of cyber-age robber barons, Eric is a comic figure, a spoiled bully 
who is out of control, self-destructive, and is begging to be punished—a 
child who needs limits. Some critics have scolded DeLillo for the often 
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pompous, pretentious, and sometimes nonsensical pronouncements that 
Eric makes throughout. But I believe that his hollow expression signals 
that he is not the brilliant analyst but is more like Prufrock—a lonesome 
man, pushing beyond all the limits, wandering the city streets, dwelling 
on the past, and anticipating death. An early alert to readers that there is 
less to Eric than meets the eye occurs in the second paragraph, where De-
Lillo has him expound upon how important poetry is to him: “He read 
science and Poetry. He liked spare poems sited minutely in white space, 
ranks of alphabetic strokes burnt into paper. Poems make him conscious 
of his breathing. A poem bared a moment to things he was not normally 
prepared to notice. This was the nuance of every poem, at least for him, at 
night, these long weeks, one breath after another in the rotating room at 
the top of the triplex” (5). The rest of this opening section is packed with 
such banalities: “Nothing existed around him. There was only the noise 
in his head, the mind in time. When he died he would not end. The world 
would end” (6).
Another example of Eric’s vacuous responses to literature occurs when 
he visits Gotham Book Mart, and the narrator observers: “He browsed 
lean books always, half a fingerbreadth or less, choosing poems of four, 
five, or six lines. He scrutinized such poems, thinking into every intima-
tion, and his feelings seemed to float in the white space around the lines. 
There were marks on the page and there was the page. The white was vital 
to the sound of the poem” (67). Not knowing how to translate the words 
of the poems into meaningful ideas, Eric remains fascinated by the blank 
white spaces that make no demands upon his interpretive abilities. Ear-
lier, he says that he likes all “white paintings because they are unknow-
able—knife-applied slabs of mucoid color” (8).
The noise in Eric’s head is discordant and incoherent, and he appears 
to have attention deficit syndrome as his mind leaps from one image and 
idea to another just as he rushes from one appointment and one lover to 
the next, never finding satisfaction or rest. In place of reflection, ideas, 
and conceptualization, he has his delusions of grandeur and desire for 
the next acquisition; on this day, he will next triumph in the market or 
die a broken ignominious failure, which he does. Eric’s monomania is 
like that of Melville’s Ahab and thus raises the question of whether his all 
white, thirty-five foot limo is really a version of Moby Dick in which Eric 
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is an unwitting victim, already entombed.3 As with Ahab, in his failure 
and death, he is overreaching in the worlds of finance, sex, and human 
relationships. In his failure and death, he will take his crew and the invest-
ments of millions down with him.
During his visit to one of his lovers, Didi Francher, she tells him that 
once he had “all this talent and drive. Utilized. Consistently put to good 
use.” “But,” she says, “that’s not true any more…. Not since an element 
of doubt began to enter your life…. You’re beginning to think it’s more 
interesting to doubt than to act” (32). Like Ahab who never doubted that 
he would kill Moby Dick, Eric has had complete faith in his own calcula-
tions. Confident in his security systems, his limo, and his bodyguards, he 
has thought himself invulnerable, but what he ignores is the complexity 
and unpredictability of human nature. Throughout the day, he has been 
fixated on his doctor’s observation that his prostate is asymmetrical, 
and although he has no idea if that is a health risk, he takes it to be an 
ominous sign.
When he introduces Benno Levin, DeLillo alludes to the humor of El-
lison’s Invisible Man when the outcast Benno says that he steals electric-
ity from a lamppost and lives in an abandoned warehouse. In a lengthy 
dialogue with his assassin, Eric learns that Benno also has an asymmet-
rical prostate and that it is “a harmless variation” (199; and earlier on 8 
and 54). But Benno, who has studied Eric intensely from his many TV 
and magazine interviews and the articles about him, tells him that he has 
failed because he “forgot something along the way. The importance of the 
lopsided, the thing that’s skewed a little. You were looking for balance, 
beautiful balance, equal parts, equal sides. I know this. I know you. But 
you should have been tracking the yen in its tics and quirks. The little 
quirk. The misshape. That’s where the answer was, in your body, in your 
prostate” (200). This is ironic given his preoccupation with his geni-
tals throughout.
What has led many critics and readers to find this novel disappoint-
ing is that it seems to provide no resolution. We may come to recognize 
Eric to be a shallow, selfish, insensitive egomaniac who is deeply insecure, 
lonely, homicidal, self-destructive, and suicidal, but the death that he ap-
pears to welcome at the hands of a disgruntled former employee seems to 
tell us nothing. However, DeLillo’s references to earlier lonely American 
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searchers like Ahab, the narrator of Invisible Man, and Gatsby suggest that 
Eric is a grotesque twenty-first-century incarnation in a series of failed 
American visionaries. Cosmopolis is a dark comedy that reminds us that 
all too often the so-called “best and the brightest,” like those who con-
fidently advised escalating the war in Vietnam forty years ago and those 
who assured Congress that an invasion of Iraq would achieve peace in a 
matter of months, are most often people like Eric, amoral egotists who 
base their advice on their computer models and gross statistics, blithely 
dismissing cultural complexity and badly misjudging the power of the in-
telligence and the will of the other and their own limits.
Two
“Inflammatory,” “shocking,” “in your face to the max”—these are a few 
of the phrases used by reviewers to describe Philip Roth’s novel The 
Plot Against America, published late in 2004. Quite different in style and 
structure from DeLillo’s Cosmopolis, Roth’s text employs a first-person 
linear narrative in the form of social realism to recount historical events 
that occurred between June, 1940 and October, 1942, when he was be-
tween seven and nine years old. The setting is the Jewish neighborhood 
in Newark, New Jersey where he grew up, and the characters include his 
own family members and many public figures of the time, including Wal-
ter Winchell, Fiorello La Guardia, Franklin Roosevelt, Charles Lindberg, 
and Henry Ford. Because he wants his readers to understand that most of 
the events he reports are historically accurate, Roth adds a “Postscript” 
that contains “A True Chronology of the Major Figures” and other his-
torical documentation. To make the point that history can take very un-
expected turns, however, Roth hypothesizes what might have happened 
had Lindbergh become President in 1940. One of the fascinating things 
about the book is that Roth shows us how easily it could have happened 
once you consider the political turmoil of the 1930s, the motives of those 
who hated Roosevelt and the New Deal, and the magnetic power of Lind-
bergh’s celebrity. Even reviewers who find some problems with the book 
admit that “it could happen anywhere, at any time if the right people and 
circumstances come together” (Ryan).
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Roth’s nightmare goes like this: from May, 1927, when he made the 
first solo transatlantic flight, Lindbergh was a beloved American hero—
seen as a brave, modest, handsome patriot. When his young son was kid-
napped and murdered in 1932, there was an enormous outpouring of 
sympathy for him and his wife Anne. While some scholars and journal-
ists who followed Lindbergh’s activities knew him to be an anti-Semitic 
isolationist, ordinary Americans had little or no knowledge of his politics.
On September 11, 1941, he delivered a speech at a rally of the Ameri-
ca First organization that opposed entering the war. Lindbergh said that 
the United States should not succumb to the will of foreign powers and 
should pursue “an independent destiny.” He charged that “the British, the 
Jewish, and the Roosevelt administration” were supporting intervention 
and that “behind these groups…are a number of capitalists, Anglophiles, 
and intellectuals who believe that the future of mankind depends upon 
the domination of the British empire” (15). In Roth’s novel, when the 
Republican convention becomes deadlocked between the nominations 
of Dewey and Willkie, those supporting Lindbergh arrange for him to ar-
rive unexpectedly at 3:18. “The lean, tall, handsome hero, a lithe, athlet-
ic-looking man not yet forty years old, arrived in his flying attire, having 
landed his own plane at the Philadelphia airport only minutes earlier, and 
at the sight of him, a surge of redemptive excitement brought the wilted 
conventioneers up onto their feet to cry ‘Lindy! Lindy! Lindy!’ for thirty 
glorious minutes, and without interruption from the chair” (15).
Imagining Lindbergh as an unconventional campaigner, Roth depicts 
him as having powerful charismatic appeal: “His [acceptance] speech 
was unadorned and to the point, delivered in a high-pitched, flat, Mid-
western, decidedly un-Rooseveltian American voice. His flight outfit of 
high boots and jodhpurs and a light-weight jumper worn over a shirt 
and tie was a replica of the one in which he’d crossed the Atlantic, and 
he spoke without removing his leather headgear or flight goggles which 
were pushed up on his forehead” (29–30). Landing his own plane at air-
ports around the country, he would climb out and speak a short and sim-
ple message: “My intention in running for the Presidency is to preserve 
American democracy by preventing America from taking part in another 
world war. Your choice is simple…Lindbergh or war” (30). In contrast 
to Lindbergh, Roosevelt appears to say too much, to be too complicated, 
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and to sound effete: “It was straight-talking Lindy who never had to look 
or to sound superior, who simply was superior—fearless Lindy, at once 
youthful and gravely mature, the rugged individualist, the legendary 
American man’s man who gets the impossible done by relying solely on 
himself ” (30).
In spite of all that Roosevelt has done for the poor and working peo-
ple, the power of Lindbergh’s charm and simple message leads to a solid 
victory. Roth’s attribution of the reasons for Lindbergh’s victory are so 
typical and familiar that it is hard to believe that they are, in this case, fic-
tional. “The experts concluded that twentieth-century Americans, weary 
of confronting a new crisis in every decade, were starving for normalcy 
raised to heroic proportions, a decent man with an honest face and an 
undistinguished voice who had resoundingly demonstrated to the entire 
planet the courage to take charge and the fortitude to shape history, and 
of course, the power to transcend personal tragedy. If Lindbergh prom-
ised no war, then there would be no war—for the great majority it was as 
simple as that” (53).
Those in Jewish communities, like members of the Roth family, are ter-
rified by Lindbergh’s openly anti-Semitic statements and by the possible 
consequences that could result from the rumored connections between 
Lindbergh and Hitler, and it is hard for them to understand the adulation 
that the majority of the people feel toward their President. Roth’s father, 
a patriot who strongly believes in the American system, is shocked at the 
overwhelming support Lindbergh receives and makes a statement that 
sounds very similar to ones we’ve heard since the last election: “We knew 
things were bad but not like this…. They live in a dream, and we live in a 
nightmare” (76).
Within months, the government creates new programs under the Of-
fice of American Absorption, the goal of which is to unify the country 
by making Jews and other members of minority groups part of the main-
stream. For teenagers, there is the “Just Folks” project that sends teens 
from eastern cities to spend the summer on farms in the west (84). Roth’s 
brother goes to Kentucky and returns a strong advocate of the program, 
thereby dividing the family. Soon, Roth’s father’s insurance firm notifies 
Jewish employees that they must accept transfers to branches in other 
parts of the country if they wish to remain employed. It becomes clear 
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that the government intends to break up Jewish communities and isolate 
Jewish families in predominantly Christian towns. Roth’s father realizes 
that he had been mistaken not to join others who had already moved 
to Canada because he believed that no such thing could happen in the 
United States. Roth says that he “watched my father fall apart…crying 
like a baby and a man being tortured—because he was powerless to stop 
the unforeseen” (113). It is in this context that Roth presents a powerful 
statement about the precariousness of the present and the possibility that 
the future may take a direction that perhaps no one would have predict-
ed: “As Lindbergh’s election couldn’t have made clearer to me, the un-
folding of the unforeseen was everything. Turned wrong way round, the 
relentless unforeseen was what we schoolchildren studied as “History,” 
harmless history, where everything unexpected in its own time is chron-
icled on the pages as inevitable. The terror of the unforeseen is what the 
science of history hides, turning a disaster into an epic” (113–14).
Having moved from actual history to fictional history, Roth needs to 
shift back to the historical record, and he does so by creating a deus ex 
machina. Suddenly, Lindbergh and his plane disappear, never to be seen 
again. Amid rumors that there is a plot against America, a reactionary 
Vice President takes over and orders the FBI to take many prominent 
people into protective custody, including the first lady. Fearing a surprise 
attack by Canada, they seal the borders. After a week of terror for many, 
Mrs. Lindbergh manages to get access to radio and gives a national speech 
condemning the Vice President and his allies: She says: “I declare that in-
jurious history of usurpation to be ended. Our enemies’ plot has failed, 
liberty and justice are restored” (319). One of the democrats christens 
her “Our Lady of the White House,” and things go back to normal. A new 
election is called, Roosevelt wins, and the United States enters the war.
I believe that Roth’s work succeeds in linking the aesthetic and the po-
litical and in affecting the political climate of the country. The many very 
public, positive reviews of this novel and its status as a best seller have 
already gone a long way toward getting people to think of the parallels 
to the current threats upon free speech and democracy. Of course, those 
who voted for Gore, which was nearly half of those who voted, embrace 
the book as a tour de force that excoriates the current administration. 
Bush supporters are not reading the book but labeling it as unpatriotic 
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and even treasonous. The “what if ” satire enables Roth to connect pow-
erful historical associations to the current techniques of bureaucratic 
rhetoric and legal maneuvering that unfortunately are thriving in our new 
political context.
Three
Let me now turn to the current plight of the humanities in American 
education. On my campus, I direct a humanities center called The Cen-
ter for Ideas and Society. The faculty in our College of Arts, Humanities, 
and Social Sciences consider it crucial to sustaining the intellectual life 
of the college, supporting faculty and graduate student research, and for 
articulating to the campus and the community the importance of the hu-
manities to the society at large. We have been quite successful over the 
last ﬁve years in obtaining institutional grants from the Ford and Rock-
efeller Foundations, we have international exchange programs with the 
University of Utrecht and a research group in Paris, and have had twenty-
six international scholars in residence since 1995. In 2001, the Center’s 
core budget was severely cut, and for the last four years, the activities of 
the Center, apart from those funded by outside grants, was drastically 
reduced. This reduction was not limited to our campus but to research 
programs in general in the University of California system, but what has 
been most disturbing is a general attitude among administrators nation-
wide that the humanities are a luxury that we can no longer afford. We all 
know for a fact that over the last fifteen years, the number of faculty po-
sitions for literature professors has dropped drastically as administrators 
have chosen to hire part-time lectures and instructors instead of replacing 
retiring tenure-track professors. Repeatedly, we are asked to justify the 
“use-value” of our work and give evidence of our impact on the public at 
large outside the academy. A recent letter from the Rockefeller Founda-
tion indicated that they are in the process of deciding whether to fund 
humanities projects at all in the future.
I have read over the last several months many reports and statements 
from around the country, in which colleagues struggle mightily to make 
the case for the humanities by pointing to the relationship to new tech-
nologies, to the formation of cultural policies, to bringing ethical and 
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moral questions to the work of science, and to making the community, 
state, and nation more humane places. But when it comes down to ques-
tions such as why should institutions and foundations be willing to fund 
humanities departments to have relatively small classes for majors and 
graduate students, we find ourselves saying something like “because 
what we do matters.” We need to find more effective ways to answer these 
questions, and to do so we need bolder approaches.
I want to close by giving a recent example of the kind of bold approach 
that we might emulate. On May 15, Mark Danner, a longtime staff writer 
for The New Yorker and Professor of Journalism at Berkeley and Bard Col-
lege delivered a powerful commencement address to the graduating Eng-
lish majors at Berkeley, the class that began college in the fall of 2001. It 
will appear in the June 23rd issue of the New York Review of Books. He 
gave his talk the title “What Are you Going to Do with That?”—the ques-
tion that every English major and graduate student is repeatedly asked by 
parents, relatives, and friends about why they study literature. As a Col-
lege Master at Princeton, I often had to debate parents who threatened to 
stop paying tuition for their children who wanted to switch majors from 
science to humanities. Danner says that in the United States, with “all 
its vulgar, grotesque power,” it should not be surprising that those who 
choose to study literature would be scorned because they seek to devel-
op the moral imagination instead of seeking economic self-justification. 
Such an idea, he says, has never been popular in the U.S. and “became 
downright suspect after September 11, 2001.” He says that by declaring 
themselves to be questioners—humanists—they are already outsiders. 
They have doomed themselves by “learning how to read, learning how 
to question, learning how to doubt,” and thereby being forced to see the 
“gulf between what you are told about the world” and “what you yourself 
cannot help but understand about that world.”
When Danner became a journalist, he began to write about wars, mas-
sacres, and violence, and he gives several examples of horrors he has cov-
ered in such places as Salvador, Haiti, Bosnia, and Iraq, and of the per-
petrators of crimes of enormous evil he has interviewed. In a statement 
that goes very much to the core of DeLillo’s Cosmopolis, Danner explains 
that these evil doers all believe that what they are doing is right and good. 
He describes an interview with a Serb leader in Bosnia who had killed 
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sixty-eight people the day before: “I was writing a profile of him and he of 
course did not want to talk about bodies or death. He preferred to speak 
of his vision for the nation. For me, the problem in depicting this man 
was simple: the level of his crimes dwarfed the interest of his character. 
His motivations were paltry, in no way commensurate with the pain he 
had caused. It is often a problem with evil and that is why, in my experi-
ence, talking with mass murderers is invariably a disappointment. Great 
acts of evil so rarely call forth powerful character that the relation be-
tween the two seems nearly random. Put another way, that relation is not 
defined by melodrama, as popular fiction would have it. To understand 
this mass murderer, you need Dostoevsky, or Conrad.”
On the current situation in the United States, Danner makes the fol-
lowing observations: among government officials, he finds “unprec-
edented frankness in explaining the relation between power and truth.” 
Indeed, our officials believe that power can determine truth. He quotes 
an unnamed advisor to the President: “We’re an empire now, and when 
we act, we create our own reality.” Danner’s recent book is called Torture 
and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror.4
Danner recounts a press conference of a few weeks ago with Donald 
Rumsfeld and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Pe-
ter Pace, in which a reporter presented a very well-informed statement 
summarizing several reports stating that the events at Abu Ghraib were 
systematic and ordered by higher commanders. He mentioned a memo 
by the commanding general in Iraq that approved twelve interrogation 
techniques that “far exceed the limits established by the Army’s own field 
manual.” He also described a process called “rendition,” which authorizes 
that people who are suspected of having information can be kidnapped 
off the streets by US intelligence agents and taken to third-world counties 
to be tortured, and quotes a military report estimating that 85–90% of 
those held in Abu Ghraib had no intelligence value.
The reporter asks of Rumsfeld: “I wonder if you would just respond 
to the suggestion that there is a systematic problem rather than the kind 
of individual abuses we’ve heard of before?” Rumsfeld and Pace both re-
spond by saying that there have been many reports on the scandal, but 
that they cannot think of any that “characterized it [the torture] as sys-
temic or systematic.” When the reporter tried to ask a follow-up question, 
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Rumsfeld ignored him and turned to another questioner as other report-
ers laughed. Danner quotes from several reports that the reporter might 
have wanted to mention, which speak of the “systemic,” “sadistic, blatant, 
and wanton criminal abuses” and point to the “vast gulf of lies” that can 
be traced to the Departments of Justice and Defense and to the White 
House. Danner says: “What is interesting about this fact is that it is not 
hidden but that it is revealed. We know this—at least those who are will-
ing to read know it. Those who can see the gulf between what officials say 
and what the facts are. And we, as I have said, are fairly few…. In the U.S., 
there is a divide between those who simply agree to believe and those 
who are determined to read and think.” As English majors, he concludes, 
“you have taken a step along the road to being Empiricists of the Word.”
It is clear to me that in the years ahead the work of scholars and teach-
ers of languages, linguistics, literature, film, philosophy, history, and re-
ligious and culture studies will be more important than ever before in 
addressing mankind’s most critical problems and guiding students every-
where, and especially in the United States, to respect and, humbly, to try 
to understand the peoples of every culture.
Notes
1. Twain’s visionary satire A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court seems to 
suggest that the central hubris of US power lies in its terrific ability to achieve 
maximum damage for the sheer sake of spectacle, even if this means that no 
certain endgame is possible. Hank’s warmongering depravity at the siege is 
no more prescient as an allegory of US imperialism in the nineteenth century 
than it is for our own global stance in the twenty-first century. We need to 
look no farther back than in the military ﬁ reworks during the opening hours 
of the Iraq war in 2003. As with the first Persian Gulf war, CNN was there to 
broadcast the artillery light show, which didn’t disclose the whereabouts of 
Saddam Hussein or serve any other practical purpose than to offer a sideshow 
attraction to tax payers wondering where their military budget goes.
2. Images of the WTC before 9/11 seem all the more foreboding if we look at 
the cover art of DJ Spooky’s 1998 album Riddim Warfare (Atari-like image 
of buildings in collapse), the cover art of Modest Mouse’s Lonesome Crowded 
West (also of two identical towers in ’97), and the photograph of William 
Burroughs pointing his shotgun at the Twin Towers back in 1977.
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3. In Terry Southern’s Magic Christian, Guy Grand—a jaded multimillionaire 
with a foppish sense of humor—decides to produce a fleet of fifty-foot 
luxury sedans as a comic send-up to America’s gross desire for power and 
consumption. Once bought, many of the sedans create traffic jams due to 
their inability to make left turns on the streets of New York City. Eric Packer’s 
car is a Moby Dick spectacle of garish proportions that seems to suggest a 
continuing trend in U.S. value systems (i.e., the SUV).
4. Mark Danner’s UC-Berkeley address, as well as his other writings, can be 
found at his website: http://www.markdanner.com/nyreview/061004_
Torture_Truth.htm.
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II
Terror, Film, and Exceptionalism

Chapter 6
Films about Terrorism, Cinema 
Studies and the Academy
Elaine Martin
There is no doubt that 9/11 has had a significant impact on film studies. 
Thousands of people linked catastrophic trauma with the cinema in say-
ing of 9/11 that “it looked just like a movie”—although in this reversed 
linkage the genre of disaster films precedes the historical event. Ruby 
Rich, in an essay somewhat ambiguously entitled “After the Fall: Cinema 
Studies Post-9/11,” summarized this impact succinctly:
the events of 9/11 (and the chain of retaliations, bombings, 
invasions, demonstrations, court decisions, political cam-
paigns, and so on that have transpired since then…) have 
rendered inadequate the theoretical approaches and analyt-
ic habits on which film studies as a discipline has relied for 
the past several decades. Readings in successive schools of 
scholarly engagement (postcolonial, multicultural, feminist, 
postfeminist, multiculturalist, queer, anticolonial, antiracist, 
Marxist, subaltern poststructuralist, genre-based, Lacanian, 
semiotic, and structuralist) and close textual readings in gen-
eral can yield points of synthesis and arenas of relevance for 
fresh approaches in this time of critical destabilization of cat-
egories. The deep shift in global power structures, our own 
unprecedented anxieties as a nation, and the altered nature 
of cinematic/digital representation, however, demand new 
methodological tools and significant critical reinvention from 
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any who claim to be cultural theorists of the post-9/11 image 
universe. (110)
Some teachers have responded by creating courses that directly con-
front traumatic events and the hegemony of mainstream cinema—cours-
es with titles such as “Critically Reading the War on Terrorism” (Long 
Island University), “Post-9/11 Cinema: A Cultural History of the Pres-
ent” (University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign), and “Alienation, Revolt 
and Terrorism” (University of Alabama). New methodologies are appar-
ent already in the titles: critical questioning of the “political, economic, 
historical, cultural, and personal aspects of the terrorist attacks” (Brady 
96), a cultural embedding of the texts and films, and a challenge to “con-
venient binaries: cowards and heroes, terrorists and freedom fighters, evil 
and godliness, us and them,” which has been called by Benjamin Barber 
“Jihad vs. McWorld” (qtd. in Brady 96). A special issue of Cinema Jour-
nal, published in the winter of 2004, focuses on pedagogy and terrorism. 
Several of the essays indicate students’ reluctance to discuss 9/11 or to 
transcend emotional responses and consider it analytically. Sarah Projan-
sky, who taught “Post-9/11 Cinema: A Cultural History of the Present” 
in spring 2003 at the University of Illinois suggests that her students’ un-
willingness or inability to consider 9/11 critically arose from their deep 
investment in the socio-cultural context of the events (106). In her essay 
in the same issue, Ruby Rich refers to “the terrible flattening of complex-
ity in U.S. attitudes toward the rest of the world and its own history” and 
argues for courses on terrorism that would provide analytical models for 
addressing these potentially dangerous simplifications (113).1 In an es-
say that appeared four years later, Karen Espiritu and Donald Moore, still 
dealing with 9/11 and pedagogy, inquire whether 9/11 might, in fact, be 
“unteachable” (202). Noting a post-9/11 resurgence of anti-intellectual-
ism in the U.S., the authors consider unteachable as a synonym for prohi-
bition and cite the example of the conservative watchdog ACTA (Ameri-
can Council of Trustees and Alumni), which blacklisted academics who 
called for “analysis and education” following the events of 9/11 (203). 
Given the strong visual orientation of many (American) students as well 
as the continued popularity of film courses, one might look to cinema 
studies as a site where the socio-political agenda of Third Cinema and the 
need to approach terrorism analytically converge.
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One of the major shifts in cinema studies since 9/11 has been the fore-
grounding of Third Cinema films within the discipline in terms of Third 
Cinema films in general and terrorism films in specific. Not all Third Cin-
ema films deal with terrorism, but a large number of films about terror-
ism falls under the rubric Third Cinema. As British film critic and teacher 
Mike Wayne has noted, Third Cinema first emerged in the 1960s and 
1970s and became an official part of the film studies curriculum in the 
1980s (1). In their now-famous essay “Towards a Third Cinema” written 
in 1969, Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino, two Argentinian film-
makers/scholars, wrote:
Just a short time ago it would have seemed like a Quixotic 
adventure in the colonialized, neocolonialized, or even the 
imperialist nations themselves to make any attempt to create 
films of decolonization that turned their back on or actively op-
posed the System. Until recently, film had been synonymous 
with show or amusement: in a word, it was one more consumer 
good. At best, films succeeded in bearing witness to the decay 
of bourgeois values and testifying to social injustice. As a rule, 
films only dealt with effect, never with cause; it was cinema of 
mystification or anti-historicism. It was surplus value cinema. 
Caught up in these conditions, films, the most valuable tool 
of communication of our times, were destined to satisfy only 
the ideological and economic interests of the owners of the film 
industry, the lords of the world film market, the great majority 
of whom were from the United States. (44)
In further comments, they reveal an acute understanding of the obsta-
cles faced by the new cinema:
Was it possible to overcome this situation? How could the 
problem of turning out liberation films be approached when 
costs came to several thousand dollars and the distribution 
and exhibition channels were in the hands of the enemy? 
How could the continuity of work be guaranteed? How could 
the public be reached? How could System-imposed repres-
sion and censorship be vanquished? (45)
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The subsequent worldwide production of a body of Third Cinema films 
at least partially answers these questions posed by Solanas and Getino. It 
is true that the most salient examples developed in the Third World, but 
Third Cinema, which is a socio-political designation, should not be con-
flated with Third World (or Third World Cinema), which is a geographi-
cal designation. Third Cinema, irrespective of the country in which it is 
produced or which country it takes as its subject, is considered a cinema 
of socio-political and cultural critique. Its modes of production and the 
avenues of its distribution and reception are also singular. As Mike Wayne 
points out in Political Film: The Dialectics of Third Cinema “Third Cinema 
has pioneered collective and democratic working practices. In particu-
lar, it has sought to foster the participation of the people who constitute 
the subject matter of the films” (3). Wayne also refers to the “constraints 
within which Third Cinema works, squeezed as it is between monopoly 
capital which dominates production, distribution and exhibition, and/or 
state interference. In extreme instances of danger or crisis, Third Cine-
ma…has pioneered ‘guerrilla filmmaking’” (3). Third Cinema, which has 
also been called imperfect cinema (Espinosa),2 has also taken a proactive 
role vis-à-vis First Cinema (dominant, mainstream) and Second Cinema 
(art, authorial/auteur); rather than rejecting these precursors, it seeks 
to transform them and develop their sublimated potentialities (Wayne 
10). The result is that one rarely finds a film that belongs solely to one 
of the three types of cinema; most are hybrids. Some even change their 
genres as the contexts change. Ruby Rich asks for example: “What does 
it mean that in today’s context The Battle of Algiers has begun to look like 
a recruiting film for Al-Qaeda?” (111). Finally, Third Cinema seeks to 
create, in Brechtian fashion, engaged spectators. Comparing Third Cin-
ema films, which display an activist function with news reportage, film 
theorist Bill Nichols notes that the latter “urges us to look but not care, 
see but not act, know but not change. The news exists less to orient us 
toward action than to perpetuate itself as commodity, something to be 
fetishized and consumed” (Bill Nichols, qtd. in Bennett 113). Third Cin-
ema films on the other hand, reflect Lukács’s idea that “the social world is 
in process and that realist art must ‘uncover the deeper, hidden, mediat-
ed, not immediately perceptible network of relationships that go to make 
up society’” (qtd. in Wayne 35). This anticipates Julio Espinosa’s call for 
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Third Cinema to “show the process which generates the problems” (81). 
Žižek’s distinction among three types of violence: subjective, symbolic 
(as in language), and systemic helps clarify the Third Cinema project 
(1–3). Third Cinema films’ raison d’être is the exposure and indictment 
of the underlying economic framework and socio-political system, the 
“network of relationships” that enable violence. It thus becomes obvious 
that independent or non-mainstream directors who seek to make films 
about terrorism might well turn to the ethical practices, methodologies, 
and tools of Third Cinema.3
These Third Cinema directors have, in their films, effectively chal-
lenged the production values, Weltanschauung, and cinematic narratives 
of Hollywood. The result has been an iconoclastic cinema that developed 
independently in different parts of the world, for example in South Asia, 
Latin America, and the Middle East. This apparent challenge has, how-
ever, been tempered by a simultaneous incorporation and reformulation 
of Hollywood cinematic conventions themselves. The resultant films 
thus exhibit an interesting tension that centers on factors such as narra-
tive perspective, casting, genre fusing, linguistic authenticity, anti-anti-
terrorist rhetoric, and realistic endings. In his 1988 essay “The Essential 
Terrorist,” Edward Said provided a critique of the ideological and cultural 
battle against terrorism, citing two problems with this battle: “first, its 
selectivity (‘we’ are never terrorists no matter what we may have done; 
‘they’ always are and always will be), and second, its wholesale attempt 
to obliterate history, and indeed temporality itself. For the main thing is 
to isolate your enemy from time, from causality, from prior action, and 
thereby to portray him or her as ontologically and gratuitously interested 
in wreaking havoc for its own sake” (154). Third Cinema films about ter-
rorism have broken all of Said’s taboos, subtly shifting concepts of “we” 
and “they” while stressing causality, history and temporality.
To illustrate these points I look more closely at three films from dif-
ferent regions of the world: Four Days in September (Brazil, 1997), The 
Terrorist (India, 1999), and Paradise Now (Palestine, 2005), demonstrat-
ing how, thematically and cinematically, these works challenge the status 
quo. For example: they tend to merge distinctive genres (such as docu-
mentary, drama, thriller, and romance), even incorporating humor and 
irony; they are filmed on location and in native languages (Portuguese, 
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Tamil, and Arabic respectively); the terrorist roles are cast with very ap-
pealing actors—a fact emphasized by the pronounced use of extreme 
close-up shots; the films’ narrative perspective is that of the terrorists 
(which problematizes “we” and ‘they”); and the process of becoming a 
terrorist is delineated logically and rationally, and in one case is linked 
to earlier abuse and betrayal through flashbacks. In all three examples, 
history and causality are emphasized, and the roles of victim and per-
petrator are interestingly confounded. In two of the films, both belong-
ing to the subgenre of suicide bomber films, the role of the handlers also 
becomes paramount in the associative process. Unlike Hollywood films 
about terrorism such as Syriana (2006),4 which adopt an anti-terrorist 
heroism approach, the Third Cinema films stress the perspective of the 
terrorist(s) and are replete with doubts, debates, and questionings. Their 
open-endedness also challenges the Hollywood films’ typical closure. 
Edward Said wrote in “The Essential Terrorist”: since terrorism “has dis-
placed Communism as public enemy number one the concept has been 
used to institutionalize the denial and avoidance of history. If we are terri-
fied enough, the argument goes, we do not ask questions about the pub-
lic causes of terrorism or about the measures our government adopts for 
stamping it out.” Films from the world of Third Cinema, by humanizing 
terrorists and by revealing causal relationships, have undercut these feel-
ings of being “terrified” and have thus helped foster a questioning both of 
the causes of terrorism and of the government’s anti-terrorist response.
My choice of these three films as examples was to some extent arbi-
trary since the number of films that center on terrorism seems to grow 
from day to day. I want, through my selection, to suggest the breadth 
of the genre as well as the depth of particular films. I hope by choosing 
films from countries as diverse as Brazil, India and Palestine to suggest 
the ubiquity of the phenomenon I am describing. I also want to indicate 
the diversity within the category of Third Cinema terrorist films: one 
centers on a hostage taking, one follows a guerrilla fighter turned suicide 
bomber, and the other pursues two volunteer suicide bombers, one of 
whom carries out his mission while the other does not.5 In an aside on 
suicide attack narratives, I would note that my students have found this 
subgenre of terrorist works more compelling than say lyrical responses to 
terrorism, hostage-taking narratives or more general terrorism narratives 
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that might include bank robberies, torture, shoot outs, even chase scenes 
(I think here in particular of works about the Baader Meinhof group in 
Germany).6 Several factors may be operative. Suicide is taboo in some re-
ligions and may therefore carry the allure of the forbidden. Suicide-for-a-
cause may also be exotic in its politicized foreignness to many American 
teenagers. Suicide bomber films (this is a shorthand term since not all 
political suicides are bombings, and suicide bombers would use different 
language to name themselves—perhaps martyrs, warriors, or jihadists) 
may also represent for many students the fascination-with-evil-phenom-
enon characteristically associated with high enrollments in Holocaust 
courses.7 My “Terrorism in Literature and Film” course (taught four 
times between 2003 and 2010) has had substantial enrollments.
All three films I have selected are perhaps unusual in that they feature 
strong, revolutionary female figures, which reopens the debate about 
Third Cinema and the representation of gender issues. It is characteristic 
of Third Cinema works that they engage issues of sexism, racism and clas-
sism within revolutionary movements as well as their manifestations in 
colonialism. Two of the three films are based on actual historical events 
which are fictionalized in the screen retellings. In summary then, I hope 
to illustrate, through my three examples, how these films about terrorism 
embrace and explore Third Cinema production values and themes.
Bruno Barreto’s 1997 film Four Days in September is based on Rio de 
Janeiro journalist Fernando Gabeira’s political memoir O Que E Isso, 
Companheiro? Which is also the title of the original Brazilian version 
of the film (English translation: Oh what is this, comrade?). The origi-
nal title has been purged of its ambiguity and provocativeness in the in-
nocuous sounding “four days in September.” The film follows Fernando 
as he joins a group of revolutionaries, the MR-8 group, which is fight-
ing governmental oppression and censorship. They rob a bank and then 
successfully kidnap the American ambassador to Brazil, Charles Burke 
Elbrick. Their demands for the release of fifteen political prisoners are fi-
nally met by the military government, but they are ultimately captured 
themselves. The concluding scene shows them being released from 
prison in exchange for the German ambassador to Brazil, who has been 
kidnapped. This film which has been called a “political thriller” (Davis), 
does indeed exhibit elements of that genre, but it is considerably more 
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complex due to its borrowings from other genres. It is a thriller plus ro-
mance plus Bildungsroman plus docudrama, at the very least, with some 
noir elements thrown in as well. As a literary adaptation of a memoir with 
extensive documentary footage and Brechtian-style informational ban-
ners throughout, Four Days in September leans heavily toward an infor-
mational kind of authenticity. The NY Times reviewer, Stephen Holden, 
has called the film “an uneasy hybrid of political thriller and high-minded 
meditation on terrorism, its psychology and its consequences.” Holden’s 
use of the word “hybrid” underlines the film’s formal challenge to First 
Cinema types of films. And “uneasy” suggests one of the effects the film 
has on viewers. Other elements contribute to the creation of this uneasi-
ness as well.
Undercutting Hollywood’s tendency to separate types of characters 
into immutable good and bad categories, Four Days in September seems 
to call almost everyone and everything into question: the revolutionaries 
fight among themselves both ideologically and otherwise; the hostage, 
the American ambassador, superbly played by Alan Arkin, is portrayed 
both negatively and sympathetically; some of the kidnappers develop a 
relationship with the hostage and oppose executing him; and one of the 
secret service agents, Henrique, who specializes in torturing the dissi-
dents, feels remorse for his actions, which he expresses both to his wife 
and to his colleague. Rather than as hardened criminals, the kidnappers 
are repeatedly described as a bunch of kids or as amateurs. Henrique tells 
his wife “Most are kids with big dreams.” And one of the more experi-
enced revolutionaries tells his colleague that “They are middle-class kids 
seeking adventure.” This ethical ambiguity and ideological wrangling di-
rectly contradict the official anti-terrorist discourse current in Western 
countries in the 21st century. The scenes of torture cast a negative light 
on the government agents as does the concluding scene. Barreto filmed 
a soccer match at the Maracana stadium in Rio which demonstrated 
growing Brazilian patriotism through the wild enthusiasm of the fans; 
this scene stands in stark contrast to the governmental repression in 
the streets.
The first five minutes of the film set the tone both formally and themati-
cally. Four Days in September opens with an informational banner or inter-
title: Rio de Janeiro. Early 1960s. The viewer then sees a sequence of black 
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and white stills as The Girl from Ipanema plays in the background (but a 
jazz band version, not a Latin band version). The informational banners 
revealingly use present tense verbs. The black and white images fade into 
footage of a student demonstration with the actors superimposed. As the 
demonstration turns violent, police arrive with horses, shields and clubs. 
The next banner says: July 20, 1969; we see an astronaut landing on the 
moon. This neutral event is politicized by the anti-American commentar-
ies of the three young men who are slowly revealed watching the televi-
sion broadcast. Applause is used as an auditory segue from the apartment 
to a reception at the residence of the American ambassador where guests 
are watching the same television broadcast, but express quite different re-
actions. This difference reminds me of the question posed by Teshome 
Gabriel in an essay on Third Cinema: “Have you ever watched a Third 
World film with native viewers of that culture?” (“Colonialism” 42). The 
socio-political oppositions and the government’s ruthlessness are thus 
established early on. The ending in which nothing seems to have been 
accomplished but at a very high cost—for example Maria has been in-
jured in police custody and is in a wheelchair—lends even more ambi-
guity to a film that seems to want us to root for the underdog. Stephen 
Holden writes:
Made nearly three decades after the events it describes, this 
gripping but often clumsy film presents a disturbingly am-
biguous and unromantic portrait of retaliation against oppres-
sion. While the film admires the bravery and idealism of its 
naive student terrorists, whose kidnapping of the ambassador 
forced the dictatorship to free a group of political prisoners, 
it also suggests that their short-term victory may have been 
counterproductive…. After the kidnapping, the military gov-
ernment intensified its suppression of dissent. The military 
didn’t begin to relax its grip on Brazil until the late 1970’s, and 
democracy would not return until 1989. (para. 2)
To give a slightly different perspective on the film’s message, Clare 
Norton-Smith, in a BBC review of the film, had the following to say:
The son of Brazilian film producers, Barreto claims, “I did not 
make a film about politics but about human beings. I did not 
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make a film about ideas but about the fears, desires and ten-
sions involved in a specific episode.” Barreto has achieved just 
this although in doing so he reportedly alienated many left-
wingers, angered by his balanced portrayal which highlighted 
the moral dilemma of fighting a dictatorship with targeted 
violence…. Four Days in September is a measured, dramatic 
account of events. Barreto takes pains to explore the back-
ground to his characters, providing a sense of their motivation 
and developing psychology. By avoiding shock tactics, Bar-
reto has shown the human face of political conflict. (para. 3)
In probing deeply into the motivations and psychological profile of his 
characters, Barreto exhibits a characteristic that, I would argue, is com-
mon to all contemporary terrorist narratives.
Indian director Santosh Sivan, in his 1999 film The Terrorist, docu-
ments throughout the 95 minute film the slow evolution of the protago-
nist Malli from guerrilla fighter to suicide bomber to mission aborter. She 
encounters a succession of people who make her question her mission 
and ultimately decide to renege. Sivan has said that he wanted to under-
stand how someone could commit such an incomprehensible act. Like 
Four Days in September, The Terrorist was based on an actual event, in 
this case the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian prime minister, in 
1991. Just as Norton-Smith observed about Bruno Barreto’s film—and in 
almost the same words—the NY Times reviewer of Sivan’s film concludes 
that the director has focused on humanizing the story: “In spite of the po-
litical volatility of its subject matter, the film is less interested in politics 
than in psychology. It seems to have been inspired by a basic, exquisitely 
difficult question: what kind of a person would do something like that? 
And by choosing to answer the question as literally and painstakingly 
as possible, Mr. Sivan has accomplished something extraordinary: he 
has given political extremism a human face.” (Scott para. 3). The precise 
political conflict, the identity of the leader of the guerrillas, the target of 
the suicide bombing—all are left unspecified in the film—although we 
know events occur in a jungle somewhere. These factors combine with 
the director’s fondness for extreme close-up shots of the protagonist’s 
“unforgettable face, with her wide, full mouth and enormous dark eyes…
often filling most of the screen, as if we might be able to find our way 
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into Malli’s mind through her pores” as one critic has noted (Scott para. 
4). The result is an emphasis on the protagonist’s psychological devel-
opment. In this regard, The Terrorist might appear to be a less political 
film than Four Days in September. However through repeated use of flash-
backs, viewers are introduced to government troops’ atrocities against 
the revolutionaries, including torture. Through flashbacks we also relive 
the death of Malli’s older brother, also a guerrilla fighter, and the murder 
of her guide Lotus’s entire family. Sivan’s interest in the psychological ele-
ments along with the political serves to make the film more complex in 
terms of genre but also as an example of a “terrorist” film.
Typical of Third Cinema films, according to definitions put forward by 
Solanas and Getino as well as Teshome Gabriel, would be The Terrorist’s 
production conditions. It was the first feature film directed by Santosh Si-
van, and it was shot in just 17 days (on locations in Kerala and Madras—
not in a studio) with a budget of only $50,000. In addition, the cast was 
entirely made up of nonprofessional actors. While Four Days in September 
enjoyed more substantial funding, and the actors were professional, the 
make-up was done in a way to make them look like ordinary people. Fer-
nando is represented, with unkempt hair and thick black-plastic glasses, 
as a stereotypical intellectual-bordering-on-nerd. In a non-Hollywood 
move, Sivan works openly with symbols, particularly with water. This 
is a very wet film, filled with streams, lakes, rivers, tears, showers and 
rainstorms. In another such move, Sivan lets the screen go black in in-
stances of psychic distress. Sivan comments on the cultural influence of 
the West when Malli preens in front of a mirror, striking poses like the 
Western movie stars in posters on the wall. This scene occurs just before 
she decides not to go through with the bombing. Distribution is also an 
important issue for Third Cinema films, and The Terrorist, has an inter-
esting history. John Malkovich discovered it at the Cairo International 
Film Festival in 1998 and undertook to find the film a distributor. It took 
producer Mark Burton and Malkovich several months to locate Phaedra 
Cinema to distribute the film in North America. Malkovich introduced 
the film in a lengthy New York Times article in January 2000, thus ensur-
ing the film some exposure.8 In summary, The Terrorist, like Four Days in 
September, challenges the status quo of First Cinema both thematically 
and cinematographically.
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In our final example we move to Palestine, which already marks a chal-
lenge geographically. Palestine is an occupied land and its film directors 
have little access to resources under the unstable conditions. Despite this, 
director Hany Abu-Assad managed not only to film on location—despite 
the kidnapping of his location manager and the near hit of an Israeli mis-
sile that caused five German technicians to return home—but also to 
create a work with fairly high production values. The hybridity of which 
we have spoken is exemplified already in the director’s identity: he was 
born in Nazareth and carries an Israeli passport, but identifies himself 
as a Palestinian. Like The Terrorist, filming was relatively fast: a total of 
about 40 days. In the spirit of revolutionary filmmaking “collectives” as 
discussed by numerous Third Cinema critics (Solanas/Getino; Anthony 
Guneratne; Teshone Gabriel), this film, Paradise Now, was co-produced 
by a number of European firms, and the film crew of seventy people came 
from seven different countries. Like the other two films, Paradise Now is 
interested in both personal psychology and politics. It traces two boy-
hood friends in Palestine who are asked to make good on their promise 
to carry out a suicide mission in Israel. After a failed initial attempt, one 
of the friends returns to complete the mission. Hany Abu-Assad said in a 
2005 Cinéaste interview: “the majority of people have one of two views on 
the suicide bombers: either the bombers are criminals or super-heroes. 
My film is about destroying those prevailing perceptions, those images, 
to build a new perception…. We are disturbing their established percep-
tions” (17). Abu-Assad reflects in this observation Bakhtin’s important 
“argument for disruption as a method of intellectual advancement” (qtd. 
in Rich 112). Like the preceding two films, the director claims to be tell-
ing the story “from a human point of view” (17). Abu-Assad rightly notes 
that he allows viewers “to experience things they will never experience 
in their own lives” (17). Rather than showing difficulties of everyday life 
in the West Bank, the director decided to shed light on a dark place, as 
he explained: “What we don’t know is the experience of the last twenty-
four hours before people blow themselves up. So I wanted to light up that 
place” (18). Paradise Now is ideologically as fraught as Four Days in Sep-
tember. Different political opinions and attitudes toward violence, includ-
ing suicide bombing, emerge from discussions between the two friends, 
between them and a moderate woman named Suha who has returned 
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from abroad with a different perspective, and between the two friends 
and their handlers. Abu-Assad said that he did not necessarily want to 
change people’s opinions but he wanted them to be affected. When asked 
what he hoped Israelis would see in the film, he responded: “Israeli or 
not, I hope they come out with a shock. This is what I wanted…. I want 
people to leave speechless…. Every human should be shocked watching 
a movie that lights dark places” (18). In Brechtian fashion, the director 
appears to hope that viewers will go straight from the movie theater to 
the barricades.
One area in which all three films challenge not only First Cinema but 
also Third Cinema itself, is the role of women. In writing about the com-
bination in world cinema of two transnational genres, the melodrama 
and the action picture, Annette Kuhn mentions that sometimes the twist 
is that the action ‘hero’ is female. This same twist has been appearing in 
films about terrorism recently. We had the early example of three women 
bombers in Pontecorvo’s Battle in Algiers, but that was merely one epi-
sode in the film. Recent films have centered on women revolutionaries 
and terrorists. In Four Days in September, the leader of the MR-8 terrorist 
cell is a strong woman named comrade Maria. Late in the film, she is hu-
manized and breaks down crying and tells Fernando that she is afraid of 
dying. The Terrorist opens with a violent scene in which Malli executes a 
traitor followed immediately by a second violent scene in which she kills 
a government soldier. The humanization and feminization occur slowly 
throughout the film. And finally, in Paradise Now, a key role is played by 
Suha, who appears to be very worldly because of her time spent outside 
the country. She lives independently instead of with her family and de-
fends her political beliefs in an articulate manner. Hany Abu-Assad said 
in the Cinéaste interview that he intentionally cast Suha’s character as 
someone from outside and as a woman: “I believe women, in general, 
have more reasonable thoughts about killing. In matters of life and death, 
they are more compassionate. They care about life more than men do” 
(18). One cannot overlook the reductionist, even essentialist nature of 
Abu-Assad’s comment, and yet these female figures expand the very defi-
nition of Third Cinema by taking on gender issues once considered extra-
neous to social conflicts.
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In his forward to Part II of Rethinking Third Cinema, Anthony Guen-
eratne refers to the “symbolic use of women’s bodies as signifiers of na-
tion and of national intergrity and fecundity,” a topic pursued at greater 
length in one of the essays in that section. This topic invites us to look 
afresh at Third Cinema films but also at terrorist films. For example, the 
suicide bomber, Malli, in The Terrorist, becomes pregnant in the course of 
the film, a fact that assumes growing importance (pun intended) in her 
decision whether to carry out the mission. Instead of killing the Indian 
VIP, she gives life to the next generation of Tamil guerrillas—a choice 
that heralds a new political agenda in Third Cinema films.
In summary, terrorism, because it is an inherently fraught subject mat-
ter, offers a space in which third Cinema films can challenge the official 
“we/they” discourse of Western governments. The films’ iconoclastic 
function rests on the following four strategies: 1) presenting terrorism 
from the terrorists’ point of view, 2) portraying terrorists themselves 
sympathetically, 3) demonstrating causality in terrorist acts, and 4) rep-
resenting the worldview of the oppressed. Importantly, this group of ter-
rorist films is iconoclastic not only in its alternative way of understanding 
terrorism. The films also challenge current definitions of Third Cinema 
by moving beyond the ideas of Solanas and Getino and others in ways 
that both question and expand on the core characteristics (and inherent 
limitations). First, let me enumerate the factors that identify this group 
of terrorist films as works of Third Cinema, and then conclude with the 
ways in which I think they transcend Third Cinema. The films all ex-
hibit at least some of the following characteristics—both thematic and 
cinematographic: low budgets, rapid filming, filming on location (non-
studio productions), non-professional actors, use of documentary foot-
age, genre hybridity, renunciation of a non-diegetic sound track, use of 
intertitles, and a basis in actual historical events. The films transcend 
Third Cinema in the following ways: 1) instead of choosing a political 
focus over a psychological one, they merge the two, using psychological 
interest for political ends; 2) they present a non-monolithic political po-
sition, opting rather to expose internal dissension and reflect arguments, 
debates, and doubts; 3) as mentioned above, they often present women 
as equal or even primary figures, and they expose gender issues; and, 
to end on a note of greater levity given the grim nature of terrorism in 
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general, 4) a number of the films use humor, including two of my exam-
ples: Paradise Now and Four Days in September. During the kidnapping in 
the latter work, one of the hostage-takers has trouble driving the getaway 
car, and the protagonist Fernando is not allowed to participate in the ab-
duction because he can neither shoot nor drive—hardly the marks of a 
hardened revolutionary. In the Palestinian film, the handlers incongru-
ously eat sandwiches in the background as one of the two suicide bomb-
ers, Khaled, tapes his martyr video. When he is finished, they discover 
there was no film in the video camera. And finally, at the end of his mar-
tyr video, he gives his mother advice on where to buy the least expensive 
water filters, which adds a poignant twist—a revealing zeugma—to the 
taping. The use of humor appears to humanize the terrorists at the same 
time as it problematizes the purely political agenda of both Third Cinema 
and terrorist films. In sum then, and in light of all the aforementioned 
factors, I would like—at the very least—to suggest that the two genres of 
Third Cinema films and terrorist films intersect in a way that is mutually 
elucidating. Both are contributing to the revitalization and politicization 
of film studies.
As terrorism studies or terrorology—as I have heard our research 
called—become more institutionalized, and as terrorism increasingly 
pervades popular culture, we can expect more Third Cinema style films 
about terrorism to be created. “On the political significance of film” Wal-
ter Benjamin wrote,
[a]t no point in time, no matter how utopian, will anyone win 
the masses over to a higher art; they can be won over only to 
one that is nearer to them. And the difficulty consists precise-
ly in finding a form for art such that, with the best conscience 
in the world, one could hold that it is a higher art. This will 
never happen with most of what is propagated by the avant-
garde of the bourgeoisie. (qtd. in Wayne vi)
Thus we have the means to reach not only our students but also the 
masses of which Benjamin speaks; it remains to find the right methodol-
ogy. I close with a kind of “call to arms” by Ruby Rich, which I partly cit-
ed earlier and which suggests some aspects of just such a methodology:
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The terrible flattening of complexity in U.S. attitudes toward 
the rest of the world and its own history makes it imperative 
that teachers offer models of how to conduct analysis while 
the ground shifts underfoot, how to craft political arguments, 
how to apply past histories to current circumstances, and how 
to think through film without sacrificing the subtlety of cin-
ematic inflections, vernacular or formal. Granted, academic 
scholarship does not move with the speed of journalism. 
Nonetheless, political paradigms are being set in place with 
astonishing speed, so much so that scholars would do well to 
accelerate the normally cautious pace of theoretical revision 
and invention. We need to weigh in with new approaches to 
representations (past, present, future) in a world that is irre-
vocably altered. (113)
While the nexus that connects terrorism and film studies is Third 
Cinema, that which links terrorism to our students might be called, to 
paraphrase Kant, the pedagogical imperative. Third Cinema films are 
postmodern in Lyotard’s sense of questioning the existence of a single, 
monolithic meta-narrative. We owe it to ourselves, our students, and to 
Benjamin’s “masses” to pursue this skepticism rigorously.
Notes
1. See Steinbrink and Cook for their detailed and provocative “Why Do They 
Hate Us? Lesson Plan” (286).
2. In a follow-up essay published in 1985, Espinosa revisits his original 
comments of 1969 on the “imperfect cinema” and clarifies: “if art is 
substantially a disinterested activity and we’re obliged to do it in an interested 
way, it becomes an imperfect art. In essence, this is how I use the word 
imperfect. And this I think isn’t just an ethical matter, but also aesthetic” (94).
3. In a review of the film The Baader Meinhof Complex, provocatively entitled 
“Terrorism as an Aesthetic Choice,” Brian M. Carney writes: “The picture that 
the movie paints is of a group that has chosen terrorism as a kind of aesthetic, 
a lifestyle in which sex and shooting are an expression of antibourgeois 
authenticity” (D9). If members of the Baader Meinhof group had made films, 
they clearly would have fallen under the rubric of Third Cinema, although the 
political movement was European. On the topic of European cinema as Third 
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Cinema, see especially the 2005 essay by Thomas Elsaesser: “Hyper-, Retro, 
or Counter-. European Cinema as the Third Cinema between Hollywood and 
Art Cinema.”
4. See also Flight 93, World Trade Center, and 9/11 for further examples of this 
type of film, although the film 9/11 is partly documentary.
5. Feature-length films focused on the perspective of the terrorist(s) would 
include: The Battle of Algiers, Good Morning, Night, The Terrorist, The War 
Within, Paradise Now, Four Days in September, My Son the Fanatic, Hey Ram, and 
The Legend of Rita.
6. Films about the Baader Meinhof group and the Rote Armee Fraktion, 
as well as the West German state’s response to left-wing violence in the 
1970s include: The Legend of Rita (Die Stille nach dem Schuss), Marianne und 
Juliane (Die bleierne Zeit), The Baader Meinhof Complex, Germany in Autumn 
(Deutschland im Herbst), The Lost Honor of Katharina Blum (Die verlorene Ehre 
der Katharina Blum), and The Second Awakening of Christa Klages (Das zweite 
Erwachen der Christa Klages).
7. See Tania Modleski’s essay “The Terror of Pleasure: The Contemporary 
Horror Film and Postmodern Theory” for interpretations of the titillation 
factor that potentially inheres in violence. In her essay “Reel Violence,” Nouri 
Gana refers to “the aestheticization and consumption of atrocity, horror, 
violence” and suggests a way of transcending spectacle: “If film is unthinkable 
outside the conscripts of an economy of the spectacle—or without the 
mediatory interposition of the screen…—it becomes critically incumbent to 
discern the threshold beyond which film ceases indeed to be reducible to a 
spectacle, pandering, as it were, to audiences’ unwitting lust for melodramas, 
intrigues, kinesthetic thrills, and technically sophisticated stunts, dazzles, or 
visual gags. Not that film can evacuate its spectacular entertainment principle 
or be redeemed from it, but that it can surely, or so I contend, be redeemed 
through it…” (20).
8. For details of this involved and largely serendipitous distribution process, see 
Kamath, A.P. “How John Malkovich God-Fathered Sivan’s The Terrorist.”
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Chapter 7
Shaherazad On-Line
Women’s Work and Technologies of War
Robin Truth Goodman
In this paper, I compare Donna Haraway’s views on the technological 
public sphere with Herbert Marcuse’s. According to Donna Haraway, new 
political visions and identity formations for the neoliberal, post-national 
age assume a surpassing of the private/public split of industrial capital-
ism, while Marcuse believes that the private sphere’s temporal, spatial, 
and conceptual ”outsidedness” gives it the symbolic force of a radical al-
ternative. The comparison between Haraway and Marcuse indicates that 
the private sphere, as a relic of nation-state-centered productive practices 
and development, must be read as an autonomous space of opposition 
or transcendence to the totally administered society, an autonomous 
space of opposition that Haraway believes has disappeared: for Haraway, 
politics in neoliberalism has to do with arranging and rearranging codes 
rather than with conflict, contradiction, or struggle. Marcuse’s vision of 
the relation between technology and labor is limited by the context of 
the nation-state, while Haraway’s internationalism disrupts the private/
public binary in such a way as to make invisible the emergence of an op-
positional public sphere that Marcuse identified in the forms and tempo-
ralities of women’s work.
Rather than understanding neoliberalism as an age which no lon-
ger sees its identity in the public/private split, as does Haraway, I argue 
here that the relationship between the public and the private has been 
reversed: while the private gains decisive power in its avoidance of 
state control and regulation, the public is pushed off to the outskirts of 
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economic and political activity. I call this “re-privatization” and see it as 
relating to an emergent formation of gendered labor where women’s work 
is still subordinated, but this time in its contingency to the public while 
the private is the intensified site of capitalization. These new forms are 
not utopic, science-fictiony suggestions of new networks of alliance that 
are no longer identified solely through affectivities produced in private 
and familial life, as Haraway predicts. Rather, the public/private divide 
of industrialism that seems to be destroyed in the violence of the new 
economic age is, actually, functionally turned over: the public is now the 
“outside” and, in this, symbolically is represented through new identities 
of women working. Within the symbolic structure of the endangered in-
dustrial private sphere can be discerned the marginality of a future public 
sphere unfolding.
This comparison also suggests that, often, the remnants of communi-
cative public functions can be attributed now only to the margins of the 
post-national technological takeover of the national public sphere, in such 
margins as the private sphere formerly resided in under industrialization. 
This public communicative/educative function is what is being leveled in 
the leveling of the public/private difference. The shrinking of the public 
sphere, in a very broad sense, is currently leading to a shrinking of the au-
tonomy of consciousness and critique. Though current media communi-
cations, as well as institutions of education, are increasingly falling under 
private hands in various ways—through, for example, voucher schemes, 
corporate professorial hiring, coffee companies taking over study-space 
in college libraries, charter school expansion, standardized testing, teach-
er merit pay proposals, and the like—this paper suggests that new spac-
es of learning, social criticism, and informational exchange are opening 
up, linked to private production on the internet, specifically related to 
women and their work. In the context analyzed in this paper, the private 
work of women to distribute new knowledge through international in-
ternet communities is opposed to the work of corporate privatization of 
women’s work in that it serves as a block against the universalization of 
imperialist exploitation, the terror it inflicts, and its forms of work.
For Marcuse, the “past-ness” of the private sphere, its reflectiveness 
and alienation, forms into the limit of the totally administered society, 
to its state-focused production and to its technologies, and gives rise to 
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a new society founded through new technologies and reoriented uses. 
Haraway, on the other hand, sees technology as the post-national, non-
transcendent unity of private interest and public life, with no limit or out-
side. She understands Marcuse’s continued embrace of “outsidedness” as 
an outgrowth of dualistic thinking, where technology is defined through 
domination and redemption is imagined as a return to an originary or-
ganicism.1 Though I see how such a conclusion can be reached, I am 
reading Marcuse a bit differently here: rather than a “return to nature” 
thesis, I read Marcuse as positing the private sphere as an empty signifier 
of difference that is always on the move, always an opening, and always 
oppositional. Its referential allusions to a sphere of women’s labor do not 
stagnate its meanings and ground them down but rather suggest a broad-
ening of this sphere’s communicational and educational potentials that its 
technological use foreshadows. This paper shows how the idea of the out-
side, critical detachment or the negative difference that Marcuse works 
through the national private sphere needs to be identified within a post-
national, public analytic. Writing from a country whose public sphere has 
been transformed into a technological display of the present’s total and 
endless destructiveness with its demolition of the public/private divide, 
Riverbend takes on this project in her now famous two-volume witness 
to war, Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog from Iraq. Unlike Haraway, Riverbend 
does not believe that future identity-formations will make invisible the 
public/private divide but understands the incipient construction of a 
public sphere outside of the privatizations and appropriations of imperi-
alism depends on a defense of the public realm revealed through domes-
tic practices. In opposition to a technological public culture extending 
imperialist investments, work privatization, and endless administration, 
Riverbend envisions an internationalized private sphere constructed 
through technology as an embryonic pedagogical public culture—that is, 
as a form of production for knowledge and critique.
Baghdad Burning
Baghdad Burning can be read as two books in one. On the immediate lev-
el, it is vitally present. Starting in August 2003 and moving through May 
2006, Riverbend presents her impressions of the historical events of the 
Shaherazad On-Line 157
war as they unfold around her, as she watches and lives them, sometimes 
in short snippets and observations, at other times in sarcastic rejoinders 
to the news and grandstanding on TV. Riverbend puts a “real” “human 
face” on a tragedy that most of us are learning about through impersonal 
statistics and distanced reports. On another level, Baghdad Burning exists 
as a two-volume collection that tells a story of war, with stable charac-
ters, sustained narratives, identifiable settings, linked chronologies, and 
moments that seem to resist and challenge realist convention, pushing at 
the edges of believability or recognizable logic. The war unwinds, on the 
one hand, as a series of stills, each one framed and distinct, each one dis-
appearing as another comes into view, without connection, and, on the 
other, as a moving sequence in which each shot is opened out as it disap-
pears into the surrounding whole.
These two forms are in constant tension. Each dated entry tells of an 
event or a set of events which is happening at the same moment as or 
in close temporal proximity to the writing, is being covered on TV, or 
has entered fervently as an item of discussion among the neighbors or 
on the web, perhaps obsessively so. As well, each dated entry tells of a 
moment in a trajectory of the war that might reveal itself within some 
historical significance or contribute a note to an unfolding understand-
ing of a geopolitical formation, giving a fresh perspective on a very fa-
miliar thematic setting where we all identify our moving historical mo-
ment. Responses may oscillate from total recall—e.g., “I remember that 
as how we got from here to there”—to a wonder at forgetting—e.g., “that 
seemed so significant at the time, why did it fall out of the war’s story, will 
people in the future still recognize this as part of the history?” The en-
tries appear as both an eternal present without memory and as a memory 
without present.
Certainly, the narrative voice in Baghdad Burning appears as a modern-
day recurrence of Shaherazad of The Arabian Nights, who has to keep tell-
ing her tale to survive (even the back cover admits this), or as in an epis-
tolary romance like Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther, where a single 
letter writer is posed pouring his heart out in response to unprinted in-
coming correspondence from absent personages. But the best analogy 
for Baghdad Burning would be a possible merging of Don Quixote and The 
Diary of Anne Frank as the same book. Though it is just a raw, day-to-day, 
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personal and emotional response that brings to life a “civilian tragedy” as 
the yet-untold, empirical part of a story about the large, powerful forces, 
energies, and interests through which we generally confront history and 
war, at the same time, it can look back at itself, reflect on its past, revise, 
and comment in response to the hindsight of its future, the separation of 
its imagination, and the distance of other places. The difference with The 
Diary of Anne Frank is that in Baghdad Burning, the war is as much in-
side the hidden refuge as outside, brought inside through connecting to 
vast communications’ networks that call from the future or from a non-
nationalized territory of participating voices: radio, television, telephone, 
neighborhood gossip, internet correspondence, other blogs, internation-
al websites, and, of course, the new technologies of warfare constantly 
exploding, endangering and interrupting day-to-day life processes. The 
private-inside is saturated and defined by its electronic, public outside.
Marcuse on Technology
Like Riverbend, Marcuse gives a sense that technology’s absorption in 
its present gives rise to a positive possibility that is different or autono-
mous from the meanings bestowed on it by its present use in production: 
the actuality of technological production reveals its potential to give itself 
over to alternative social relations. Marcuse’s reading of technology bor-
rows from Heidegger’s. Heidegger made a distinction between the techne
of classical Greece and modern technology. Techne would reveal the in-
ner essence of the object—or the relation of the artist, the object, and the 
world—through its use, while modern technology denied the object’s es-
sence by instrumentalizing the object.2
On the one hand, Marcuse understands technology as locking in the 
present by buying out the possibility of the present’s negation, particu-
larly in the form of oppositional consciousness. Modern technology 
grants workers a comfortable standard of living that invites them to iden-
tify their interests in the growth of the technological systems. Technol-
ogy satisfies immediate human needs and so erases the impulse to revolt, 
but only by creating new needs, mostly based on fear, that demand an 
ever-larger technological base, an expansion of labor, and a permanent 
mobilization. What results is a reduction of thought, a collapse of ideals 
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into facts and of possibilities into actualities: “Today’s fight against this 
historical alternative,” he laments,
finds a firm mass basis in the underlying population, and finds 
its ideology in the rigid orientation of thought and behavior to 
the given universe of facts. Validated by the accomplishments 
of science and technology, justified by its growing productiv-
ity, the status quo defies all transcendence. Faced with the 
possibility of pacification on the grounds of its technical and 
intellectual achievements, the mature industrial society closes 
itself against this alternative. (One-Dimensional Man 17)
As in Baghdad Burning, where the very daily-ness of the war extends 
the war as infinitely part of the present of production and the dailiness of 
its private lives, the present for Marcuse’s technological society becomes 
an automated repetition, standardized and routine, an integrated totality 
where human life is but an extension of the workings of the machine.
On the other hand, by expanding labor, by increasing needs—through 
its cultures of consumption—which it ultimately cannot satisfy, by free-
ing up free time, technology gives rise to “the historical transcendence 
towards a new civilization” (One-Dimensional Man 37). That is, technol-
ogy reveals “the consciousness of the discrepancy between the real and 
the possible” (229)—technology expresses the universal, the not-yet-re-
alized potential revealed in the actual present moment and for which the 
present moment eventually is negated and replaced. In technology, the 
universal bursts out of the walled-in frame of the present, demolishing 
the present’s facticity.
Riverbend and the Technologization of the Private Sphere
In the 1960’s, Marcuse worries that technology has already translated 
universals and essences into concrete realities and facts so that ideals and 
contemplation can no longer reveal the present’s limits: the one-dimen-
sional, technological society “tends to reduce, and even absorb opposi-
tion (the qualitative difference!) in the realm of politics and higher cul-
ture…. The result is the atrophy of the mental organs for grasping the 
contradictions and the alternatives” (One-Dimensional Man 79). This 
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“inauthenticity”3 or absence of alternatives, this technological absorp-
tion, characterizes all walks of modern life and infiltrates private spaces 
as well. Such a technologization informs the narration of Riverbend’s 
return to her home as a computer expert, blending the inside into the 
outside, the housewife into the worker, showing the fusion of opposites. 
Computers, however, also serve as the pedagogical break in the private 
sphere’s circularities—as politics, global news, and commentary flicker in 
and wire up the home. The war might be endless and everywhere without 
break, but technology reveals itself as embedded in social relations that 
exceed the war.
This section presents Baghdad Burning as privatizing the public by 
“re-privatizing” women’s work: by “re-privatization,” I mean the return 
of women’s work to the private sphere in a neoliberal age. “Re-privatiza-
tion” is an appropriation, by the ideologies of neoliberalism, of the sym-
bolic structure of women’s labor under industrialization. That is, under 
industrialization, the private sphere figured the “outside” to the public 
of production, civil society, and the state. The ideologies of neoliberal-
ism capitalize on these symbolic and moral meanings of domestic labor 
for the purposes of bypassing the authority of the nation-state in regu-
lative and governing processes. In this case, the return of women to the 
private sphere comes to replace the state as the main social organization 
in the wake of the national public sector’s total destruction by imperial-
ist forces. Like technology, the private sphere in Baghdad Burning affirms 
the present by restoring its ordering and thereby shows the present in its 
temporal and spatial entirety as absorbed in the war. In a future section, I 
explore Baghdad Burning as revealing the private as excessive, its potential 
as already public. Technologized, the private sphere becomes the science 
fiction of the present, what affirms the present by repeating it, but what 
at the same time proves the impossibility of its repetition: the imperialist 
present’s fragility.
At the same time as Baghdad Burning is an experiential panorama of 
a war without end, it is also a story of a professional woman who loses 
her job, and whose life then gets consumed in endless household chores: 
Riverbend gets “re-privatized.” At the age of twenty-four, Riverbend be-
comes a host of the private sphere, not permitted to leave without at least 
two male chaperones, and this restriction she shares, not only because 
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of the lack of public security, kidnappings, assassinations, street explo-
sions, and militias,4 but also because of a cultural transformation induced 
by the occupation: modern identities were remade into the primitive, the 
savage, the backward, the private, and the irrational. “Before the war,” she 
notes in her entry of August 23, 2003, “around 50% of the college stu-
dents were females, and over 50% of the working force was composed of 
women. Not so anymore. We are seeing an increase of fundamentalism 
in Iraq which is terrifying” (17).5 Writing in English, addressing herself 
often to a US audience, part of Riverbend’s mission is to disassociate Iraq 
from Western fantasies of its technological archaism6 and to debunk par-
allel mythologies of Middle Eastern exoticism, particularly in the form 
of a backward-looking indigenous cultural abuse of women. Riverbend 
makes clear that the war is not the defeat of sexism and the exclusion of 
women but rather the catalyst to new forms of sexism connected to the 
privatization of women’s work.
Before the war, Riverbend worked as a programmer/network adminis-
trator for an Iraqi database/software company. After the invasion, when 
she gets word that the company has continued operations, she insists on 
returning. Accompanied by two male bodyguards, she braves the streets, 
cracked under the weight of US tanks, and enters her old office—whose 
electricity had been cut—with great anticipation, only to discover that 
“I was one of the only females” (23). Approaching her department di-
rector, she reads on his face an expression that tells her “females weren’t 
welcome right now” (24), and he sends her home. “I’m one of the lucky 
ones” (24), she concludes, as she tells of Henna Aziz, an electrical engi-
neer who was assassinated in front of her family because she refused to 
stop working when her country needed her expertise. “How are females 
supposed to be out there helping to build society or even make a decent 
contribution,” she remarks, “when they suddenly seem to be the #1 tar-
get?” (68). The privatization of women’s work serves to extend the war 
into the home, erasing the distinction between them.
In “re-privatizing” women’s work, Riverbend’s private use of technol-
ogy also privatizes the public sphere. The conflating of public and private 
life in the “re-privatization” of women’s work affects, as well, any national 
public engagement. As Riverbend’s neighbor tells her, “I don’t have time 
or patience to read [the draft constitution]. We’re not getting water—the 
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electricity has been terrible and Abu F. [her husband] hasn’t been able 
to get gasoline for three days…. And you want me to read the constitu-
tion?” (Baghdad Burning II 129). She emphasizes this by grabbing the 
paper out of Riverbend’s hands and washing the wall with her copy of 
the Constitution: the most basic political acts have been re-privatized as 
women’s work.
Baghdad Burning depicts the private sphere as a site of technologi-
cal breakdown. The constant failures of technology make Riverbend’s 
house seem like a workshop, as the day-to-day repetitions of family ritual 
are impeded and then work begins in order to put them back in order. 
The private sphere has the function of restoring routine and modernity 
against the crises to the everyday that the war continually inflicts: the wa-
ter stops coming through the tap, so they fill the water tank on the roof, 
carrying pails of cold hose water up the stairs; or the electricity gets cut, 
and they wake up at 2 a.m. to wash the clothes, during the brief return of 
the current—“reality is a washer, clanging away at 2:30 a.m. because you 
don’t know when there’ll be electricity again” (Baghdad Burning 197). 
To restore the (modern) present, Riverbend portrays daily life during 
war and occupation as a constant attempt to make household technolo-
gies functional despite their constant crashing, or to substitute human 
acts for technological automation, so that human acts take on the auto-
mation of the failed technologies: the human is but an extension of the 
technological.
The repetitions of daily routine life in the private sphere, as well, reflect 
the temporal repetitions of rituals: the continuance of the yearly cultur-
al rituals, from Ramadan to Eid and back, with their family visitations, 
phonecalls, and traditional dishes (at one point, Riverbend starts to ex-
change recipes over her blog [Baghdad Burning 130–31]): these practic-
es get disrupted by curfews, road detours, gasoline rationing (in a coun-
try, Riverbend points out, that is rich with oil), car bombings, and threats 
of violence. “Houses are no longer sacred… We can’t sleep… We can’t 
live… If you can’t be safe in your own house, where can you be safe?” 
(Baghdad Burning II 175). The private sphere, as the common space of 
ritual re-enactment, is endangered by the deprivations of war but, more 
fundamentally, also by the incursions of public life: the kidnappings, 
killings, street explosions, and security raids, both US and Iraqi, where 
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family members are removed or disappeared, the rituals are suspended, 
and all semblance of order breaks down as everyone searches for them: 
a traumatized young woman’s mother and three brothers are captured by 
authorities, interrogated, beaten, and held in custody, and a customary 
visit to a sick friend’s house then turns into a conversation about what 
interventions need to be made to bring back the family (Baghdad Burning 
234–35). A cousin’s husband disappears while driving his parents back 
home after the feast of Eid, and, with “[g]oing home no longer an option” 
(204), the family stops its daily routine to search for him, pay ransom for 
him, and await for his return. The purpose now is to re-establish the ritu-
alistic order of time by re-establishing the private sphere as foundation, 
as protected against the outside. The present of nation and culture can 
only be repaired through a return to habitual, repetitive, and mechanical 
practices of everyday and private family life, the rituals of women’s work 
in the private sphere.
The technologization of the private sphere extends the private sphere 
indeterminately, blending it into the outside from which it is meant, in 
liberalism, to be separated. As the inside is constantly barraged in electri-
cal failings, dry faucets, and the consequent risks to the continuation of 
everyday family, religious, and national life, the outside is similarly seeped 
in wreckage, blasting bombs, falling buildings, car explosions, and infra-
structural collapse. Like the private sphere as well, the technological dev-
astation is met with a staunch effort to repair things by privatizing them. 
In fact, repairing things means their privatization. Riverbend recounts 
how her cousin, a bridge specialist working for an Iraqi firm, was asked to 
calculate the cost of rebuilding the New Diyala Bridge in Baghdad; while 
his estimate came to $300,000, the contract was granted to an American 
company who made the estimate of $50,000,000 (Baghdad Burning 35). 
(Riverbend compares this negatively to the successful reconstruction ef-
forts of Iraqi engineers after the 1991 Gulf War). “A few rich contractors 
are going to get richer,” she laments, “Iraqi workers are going to be given a 
pittance and the unemployed Iraqi public can stand on the sidelines and 
look at the glamorous buildings being built by foreign companies…. This 
war is…about huge corporations that are going to make billions off of 
reconstructing what was damaged during this war” (37). The “re-privati-
zation” of women’s work, the production of unemployment, runs parallel 
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to the effort by the multinationals to grab jobs, productive forces, territo-
ries, and profits.
Haraway and the End of Dialectics
Twenty-seven years after Marcuse wrote One-Dimensional Man, his clas-
sic study of technology, Donna Haraway in “The Cyborg Manifesto” de-
scribes a vastly altered technological universe. The world of technology 
is no longer organized along nation-state lines or bordered territories. 
Instead, it fuses along on electronic circuitries and informational nodes 
tied to corporate productivities, networks, and codes.7 Technology has 
penetrated even into biology and consciousness and can no longer be 
discerned from them. There is no longer a firm separation between the 
worker and the machine, or the possibility of identifying the workers’ 
interests against those of the machine. Time has flattened out, fiction 
has collapsed into fact, imagination into experience, public into private, 
idealism into materialism, man and woman into the post-gendered body 
of the cyborg.
Instead of the negative, in whatever form, ushering in a qualitative his-
torical difference because it makes no sense in the present—as in Mar-
cuse’s private sphere, technological essence, idealist potential, or prole-
teriate consciousness—Haraway’s present, like Riverbend’s, solidifies 
around blasphemy, or irony: in contrast to the ultimate resolving of con-
tradictions that she identifies with dialectics,8 irony for Haraway main-
tains “the tension of holding incompatible things together because both 
or all are necessary and true” (Simians, Cyborgs, and Women 148). Simi-
larly, Riverbend’s dominant tone, even when ranting, is ironic: one of her 
favorite targets, for example, is Ahmed Chalabi9 , whom she frequently 
depicts as a clown or a circus animal: “A circus-themed gala, perhaps, 
where Bremer can play the ring-master and Chalabi can jump through 
red, white, and blue hoops to mark this historical day” (Baghdad Burn-
ing 45). Or when Donald Rumsfeld compares Baghdad to Chicago, she 
retorts, “Wow. This guy is funny…. What he actually should have said 
was, ‘It’s like Chicago, during the 1920s, when Al Capone was running 
it’” (52). Spoofing on the Oscars, she nominates George W. Bush for 
“Best Actor” “for his convincing portrayal as the world’s first mentally 
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challenged president” (Baghdad Burning II 180) and Condoleezza Rice 
for her performance in “Viva Iran!”, giving honorable mention to Bush’s 
speech writers for “writing scripts to make George W. Bush sound/look 
not great, not even good—but passable” and writing “speeches using 
words with a maximum of two syllables” (Baghdad Burning II 182). In 
post after post, she continues to expose the leaders’ decisions as tragi-
cally ridiculous. Such irony works not as critique—that is, as showing the 
limits of the applied logic, overturning it, using reason to make visible 
argumentative and factual mistakes or alternatives—but rather through 
pushing a statement to its extreme, affirming its content by extending its 
sense. Rather than posing an opposing possibility, irony melds opposites 
together through superimposition, over-the-top affirmation, and mock-
ing agreement, or pastiche.
Haraway’s cyborg theory extends the present infinitely, and it does 
this—just as Baghdad Burning does this—through the extension of 
women’s work. “The actual situation of women is their integration/ex-
ploitation into a world system of production/reproduction and com-
munication called the informatics of domination. The home, workplace, 
market, public arena, the body itself—all can be dispersed and interfaced 
in nearly infinite, polymorphous ways” (Simians, Cyborgs, and Women 
163). Instead of the private sphere appearing as obsolete and abandoned 
as a historical form, a break from the present, as it is for Marcuse, it is 
absorbed and integrated in the total structure, where “the factory, home, 
and market are integrated on a new scale and…the places of women are 
crucial” (166). There is no longer an outside to work or working-time. 
The end of the public/private distinction underlies descriptions of the 
present in her later work where private and public have merged togeth-
er into a new and productive corporate combination that is also the site 
of oppression. In Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan_
Meets_OncoMouse: Feminism and Technoscience, for example, biotech-
nological research has made markets that trade in human or animal cell 
tissue, patenting laboratory animals like OncoMouse that are used to tar-
get disease. Haraway compares this to slavery even while she extols it for 
creating fruitful new capacities for interconnectedness, geneaology, and 
category fusion, including mixing insides with outsides, natural origins 
with corporate productions, state and corporation: “From conception 
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to fruition…these millennial offspring required massive public spend-
ing, insulated from market forces, and major corporations’ innovations 
in their previous practice” (Modest_Witness 83). For Haraway, there is no 
alternative to the technologized body, the public/private partnership: it 
is everywhere simultaneously, hopeful in its despairing. The cyborg is the 
possibility of everything as it already exists, as it can be discovered and 
then affirmed as what we already have and have had all along: the present 
has always existed, even if arranged or ordered variously.
Marcuse’s Technologized Private Sphere
Unlike in Haraway, Riverbend’s assimilation into a technological society 
does not mean that the possibilities of technology have been exhausted in 
its present facticity. The privatization of production is not the final word: 
Riverbend’s private use of technology sets in motion a technological op-
tion that cannot be confined within the present, its controls, its violence, 
and its repetitions. Unlike Haraway, who figures that the disappearance 
of the private sphere has already been completed, Marcuse, like River-
bend, wants to tell a story about modern technology as a story about how 
the disappearance of the private sphere as an alternative within the pres-
ent is still in process. Marcuse takes the controversial Marxian line that 
the present use of technology, once it is freed from its restrictions within 
the irrationality of the capitalist present, “sustains and consummates it-
self in the new society” (One-Dimensional Man 22). As the present’s dif-
ference with itself, Marcuse believes, with Marx, that technology, even if 
developed in a profit-based society, is itself neutral, and once embedded 
in different relations of production, the technological apparatus would 
unleash new possibilities already inside of it. Once embedded in differ-
ent relations of production, the technological apparatus would also alter, 
unleashing the new essences and possibilities that were already inside of 
it. Rousing the possibility of a technology that would out-survive its own 
performative profit-principle, Marcuse proclaims that “the completion of 
the technological reality would be not only the prerequisite, but also the 
rationale for transcending the technological reality” (231): the techno-
logical imagination, when internalized and alienated, fashions a world be-
yond technology’s mechanizations in repressive power and resistant to it.
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With their connection within the private sphere, free time, and the 
post-work society, such historical alternatives are, according to Marcuse, 
“feminized”: “inasmuch as the ‘male principle’ has been the ruling mental 
and physical force, a free society would be the ‘definite negation’ of this 
principle—it would be a female society” (Counterrevolution and Revolt 
74–75). Women’s link to the private sphere and its productive technol-
ogies forms into the public of the future. This happens because society 
under capitalism is irrational, forcing its potential into alienated private 
enclaves outside of the direction of production and divorced from social 
reality, reserving its energies for later use.
For Marcuse, the absorption of the domestic sphere into the field of 
productivity is a symptom of the “convergence of opposites” that un-
derlies the one-dimensional society, denying its essence. Along with the 
proleteriate and other manifestations of the negative, technology has 
been invading and absorbing the private sphere, cracking down on the 
development of historical alternatives that its private use, according to 
Marcuse, would discover. Marcuse worries that technology has “invad-
ed the inner space of privacy and practically eliminated the possibility 
of that isolation in which the individual, thrown back on himself alone, 
can think and question and find” (One-Dimensional Man 244). The grad-
ual disappearance of the proleteriate matches up—lamentably, for Mar-
cuse—with the gradual disappearance of domesticity and the division of 
labor. Marcuse’s private sphere is thus “ghosted”: always disappearing but 
continually present.
Of all the Frankfurt School thinkers, Herbert Marcuse took the most 
definitive stand in favor of the feminist movement. “I believe,” he an-
nounced in a 1974 lecture at Stanford University, “the Women’s Libera-
tion Movement today is, perhaps, the most important and potentially the 
most radical political movement that we have, even if the consciousness 
of this fact has not yet penetrated the Movement as a whole” (“Marxism 
and Feminism” 147). Earlier in 1972, he also asserted, “[T]he Women’s 
Liberation Movement becomes a radical force to the degree to which 
it transcends the entire sphere of aggressive needs and performances, 
the entire social organization and division of functions” (Counterrevo-
lution and Revolt 75). Marcuse saw that the values of the private sphere 
would reformulate sociologically as the destructive force of imminent 
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qualitative change still linked to workers’ liberation: women symbolized 
for Marcuse the freedom from work and the reclaiming of time in the 
working-day that Marx predicted the socialist future would usher in. The 
“feminine characteristics” of the emergent socialism would reduce “alien-
ated labor and labor time” for the “emancipation of the senses” (“Marx-
ism and Feminism” 154). For Marcuse, the essence of man—his Being 
and his potential—is woman.
The Spectre Haunting Riverbend’s Private Sphere
Whereas Haraway has constructed a vision of the world in which the dis-
tinction between public and private—between autonomous and social 
will—plays no part, Marcuse understands the private sphere as a site of 
contention and struggle with the social, with a similar role to autonomy 
and freedom as in idealist philosophies. Haraway abandons the inner, 
private freedom that idealism poses against social unfreedom for a social 
vision where the socialized individual is infused with the totality of so-
cial relations, without borders between them. On the other hand, adopt-
ing Marx’s observation that struggle in a capitalist system is rooted in 
the struggle between technologization and the working day, the private 
sphere—for Marcuse—represents a reduction in the time of work—at 
least, of remunerated work—that Marcuse understands as man’s histori-
cal essence, his autonomy.
Riverbend’s private sphere resembles Marcuse’s only in its bare out-
lines: in fact, in some senses, Riverbend’s situation reverses the situation 
described through Marcuse’s private sphere without necessarily counter-
ing Marcuse’s idea that the private sphere’s resistance to conceptualiza-
tion and the social gives it historical force. Rather than a separation from 
work, Riverbend’s private sphere is a place where pre-war work continues. 
In Baghdad Burning, non-work is more exploitative than work, because 
non-work indicates a world and a temporality owned and controlled by 
others elsewhere, in their own spheres of private appropriation. In River-
bend’s view, her continued work in the private sphere refutes colonialist 
exploitation-through-privatization. The private sphere is a site for prac-
tices of public sovereignty.
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The idea that work linked to technology can be creative and therefore 
lead to fulfillment has been elaborated within strands of German femi-
nism influenced by Marcuse and the Frankfurt School thinkers: tech-
nology in advanced capitalist societies, feminist social critic Frigg Haug 
ethnographically details (for example), can finally allow for a type of 
work that resembles what Marcuse means by non-work. For Haug, post-
Marxism projects that any form of work is a form of exploitation and 
only a form of exploitation, leading to the conclusion that liberation can 
only happen outside of social productivity and can only therefore ever 
be partial. Haug thinks, in contrast to post-Marxism, that frameworks 
for non-alienated and non-marketed labor currently restricted to the pri-
vate sphere could be blended back into working life.10 Additionally, Haug 
finds that Marx’s sense of a proleteriate consciousness developing from 
work—especially independent, creative work as the kind technology can 
foreground—means creating the potential for action through work in the 
world rather than conceiving work as just a mechanism for extending ex-
ploitation, dehumanization, or dispossession.
With Haug, Riverbend believes that exploitation in work takes a par-
ticular form: undermining contributions of the national populace, un-
dermining the possibilities of creating a purpose or destination outside 
of the determinations of rationalized, privatizing capital to which the na-
tional heritage is being sold off. Riverbend asserts claims over her own 
time as self-determination in the cultural and familial routines of the pri-
vate sphere. The occupation has its own time: “You get to the point dur-
ing extended air raids where you lose track of the days…. The week stops 
being Friday, Saturday, Sunday, etc.…. You begin to measure time with 
the number of bombs that fell, the number of minutes the terror lasted 
and the number of times you wake up in the middle of the night to the 
sound of gunfire and explosions” (Baghdad Burning II 68). The war’s 
claim to set its own time gives it also the authority to grant its own titles 
onto its narratives of certain events, like on April 9, 2004, Riverbend re-
members that day a year before, when Bush announced the triumphant 
end of the war, unleashing a torrent of violence, massacres, looting, bomb 
blasts, and a refugee crisis.
Repeating the rituals of the family, its circularities, and its regularities 
blocks out the others’ appropriation of time. Dinner or a TV show might 
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be interrupted, for example, by an electricity outage or a threat of a raid; 
everybody gets up to hide the inherited jewelry, or to check to see that 
others are accounted for as the family tries to conclude the narrative mo-
ment on its own terms rather than wait for the invading army or national 
police force to do it. Housework claims back the time that the occupation 
wants to control in its labeling of events by restoring the time of the ev-
eryday: “I have spent the last two days ruminating the political situation 
and…washing the roof,” Riverbend announces. “While the two activities 
are very different, they do share one thing in common—the roof, and 
political situation, are both a mess” (Baghdad Burning 270). Housework 
can be compared to living under laws that you yourself author, Riverbend 
proposes. Maintaining the private sphere does more than just affirm the 
private sphere as a fact that needs securing, as an actuality; it also marks 
an outside, an alternative, contextualized, self-determining, and non-dis-
possessed temporality distinct from the occupation’s framing and claim-
ing of time, event, and object.
Riverbend’s private sphere chores reference not just an immediate 
group of real-life intimates but also an invisible audience. Offering a 
course in the human cost of war from the humanistic “pen” of the en-
emy, Riverbend constructs herself as a node in a global public policy de-
bate: she discusses with her invisible interlocutors what the new govern-
ment should look like, who should be involved in deciding, how should 
populations get represented, what part religion plays, and what should or 
should not be the role of the US. She is engaged in a campaign of clear-
ing up misinformation on the part of some of her US correspondents but 
also learning from others. The ghostly presence of this absent but inti-
mate audience appears in the frame as Riverbend addresses them—in 
her exchange of impressions, interpretations, and information—as part 
of her educational circle. Though the discussion focuses on the political 
fate of Iraq, it alludes to bigger conceptual questions still, like how to set 
up a democratic system and how imperialism contradicts those efforts. 
As formative thought on what might constitute the independent citizen 
of the future democracy, Riverbend’s on-line informational public of-
ferings form a continuation with her independent household routines 
in claiming time: marking holidays from year-to-year; discussing news 
stories; chronicling the coordination of chores; trying to clean up, sort 
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through, and put in place the disorderly rationality of the political situ-
ation;11 describing the internal adjustment of household technologies 
to the new external regimes of scarcity and control. Riverbend’s Inter-
net involvements implicate her private sphere as part of an educational 
mission, mediating her internal context with absent others to produce 
knowledge outside of official-speak. She comments on blogs from US 
soldiers (Baghdad Burning 59–61), gives a lesson on private contractors 
(78–79), and corrects mistakes in The New York Times about the Iraqi 
tribal structure (87) or about the veil (92). Answering some of the criti-
cisms from her US interlocutors, she invites them inside, to see outside 
the standard tropes: “I wish every person who emails me supporting the 
war, safe behind their computer, secure in their narrow mind and fixed 
views, could actually come and experience the war live. I wish they could 
spend just 24 hours in Baghdad today and hear Mark Kimmett12 [sic] talk 
about the death of 700 ‘insurgents’ like it was a proud day for Americans 
everywhere…” (254). And sometimes, the computer speaks back to her 
as “anonymous” or the “absent other”: “I avoid looking at the computer 
because it sometimes seems to look back at me rebukingly” (255).
Riverbend’s educational conversations with the absent others ultimate-
ly refer to what I would identify as the critical center of the trajectory of 
her narrative: a “haunting” (Baghdad Burning 210).13 During a trip to 
Amiriyah, Riverbend goes on a tour of a bomb shelter. To this shelter, 
Riverbend attributes similar structural meaning as a home, its family 
members gathered in ritual celebration. The shelter, however, was blasted 
to pieces by a “precision” bomb during the festival celebration of Eid in 
1991, locking 400 women and children inside as fire and boiling water 
rose and killed them. Riverbend later learns that the woman who leads 
the tour of the shelter—who refuses to leave the shelter—had lost all of 
her eight children in the tragedy: she had exited the shelter for an instant 
during the festival to retrieve food and clothing at her house, and while 
she was running back, the missile hit.
She had watched the corpses dragged out for days and days 
and refused to believe they were all gone for months after. She 
hadn’t left the shelter since—it had become her home. She 
pointed to the vague ghosts of bodies stuck to the concrete on 
the walls and ground and the worst one to look at was that of 
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a mother, holding a child to her breast, like she was trying to 
protect it or save it. (Baghdad Burning 211–12).
This private sphere reveals the ghostly, absent others traced onto a 
screen, witnessing from elsewhere. The girl-blogger’s obsessions with 
house chores, claiming back time, restore this ritualized private sphere, 
but restore it differently. Public pedagogy inhabits the time of the private, 
breaking into the present with its different time. In this present incar-
nation, the ghosts on the wall are disembodied and detached contribu-
tors to a textual scenario, participating spectators beyond definition or 
location, who come into existence through technological use. Against 
the technologies of imperialism and their destructive privatizations, the 
private sphere has revealed its authentic potential as the public’s “Being-
with-others” that was already within it.14 In the face of the privatization of 
the industry in which she worked and her job, Riverbend herself creates a 
public alternative in autonomous time.
This is not a happy story, nor can it be read as a tragic moment with a 
“silver lining” or an eventual positive outcome. The forces of privatiza-
tion that Riverbend’s war experience heralds are dominant to the point of 
absorbing even the imagination, as Marcuse predicts. Marcuse believes, 
however, that such forces can never be universalized, as they contain an 
imminent but radical difference symbolized through the difference of 
women’s work. Haraway also believes that the current order contains an 
imminent difference, as do most post-Heideggerian philosophies, but the 
imminence is also a reaffirmation through a rearrangement rather than, as 
in Marcuse’s case, an overturning or a replacement: this is, in turn, sym-
bolized through the unavoidable avowal that women’s work is no longer 
locked into its own separate sphere in a neoliberal age. In Marcuse, tech-
nology really has two separate ways of being, in two totally separate tem-
poralities, while in Haraway, the same technology is in the world ironi-
cally, instrumentalized as the melding of opposites, the future absorbed 
within the present, without releasing an essence or meaning outside of 
its immediacy. Borrowing from Haraway, I read Riverbend as portray-
ing a world in which the future portends the continuing intensification 
of the present: the “re-privatization” of women’s labor allows for the in-
tensification of imperialist capitalization even while it conditions her ef-
forts at revealing a different technological connection within a narrative 
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of non-immediacy. The good news is that, unlike in Haraway, Riverbend 
can see the public as not completely blended into the private or disap-
peared under its dominance but, despite all odds, can still envisage it as 
different, resistant, or even radical.
The technologization of Riverbend’s private sphere at first seems like 
an affirmation of the present: the disruptions to the repetition of every-
day practices caused by the war lead to a constant effort to repair what 
was broken in order to restore a private order that seems, regressively, 
to be secluding women, offering up the nation for the profit of others, 
and automating human activity into circular, machine-like routines. This 
perspective shares with Haraway a confirmation that survival demands 
an affirmation and reconstruction of the facts “as is,” and an imperative 
to rearrange the facts rather than to change them. Yet, Riverbend’s work 
in the private sphere also reveals itself through an autonomous wired 
world populated with absent, ghostly others. In this instance, as a pub-
lic exchange of perceptions, the technologized private sphere cannot be 
walled-in and turned into a thing-for-sale. In other words, the world-con-
cept to which it gives rise cannot be reduced to its concrete factuality: 
it reveals a temporal break, a future that uses technologies differently, as 
mechanisms of rational argument, intersubjective recognition, reflection, 
and autonomous critique rather than as tools of appropriation, dispos-
session, and destruction. The private sphere that Riverbend envisions 
offers her the autonomy from the social necessary for social criticism, a 
public autonomy prepared by the social technologies of the present, and 
released by them, but not confined to, blending into, or confused with 
them. Like Marcuse’s, Riverbend’s private sphere—needing constantly to 
narrate itself at the edge of survival—reveals itself, though marginalized, 
as essentially a ghost-like sovereign public of the future.
Notes
1. “One of my premises is that most American socialists and feminists see 
deepened dualisms of mind and body, animal and machine, idealism and 
materialism in the social practices, symbolic formulations, and physical 
artifacts associated with ‘high technology’ and scientific culture. From One 
Dimensional Man to The Death of Nature, the analytic resources developed 
by progressives have insisted on the necessary domination of technics 
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and recalled us to an imagined organic body to integrate our resistance” 
(Haraway 154).
2. “The Greeks lived in a world of self-sustaining things confronting human 
beings with a rich variety of useful potentialities awaiting realization through 
skillful manipulation. Artistic practice resembles craft and belongs to this 
Greek techne as well. By contrast, modern technology dominates nature and 
extracts and stores its powers for later use. Technology organizes vast systems 
of mutually dependent components in which human beings serve alongside 
devices. Nothing any longer has intrinsic qualities that can provide the basis 
of technical or artistic creation” (Feenberg 68).
3. To solve the problem of historical determinism early on, Marcuse turned to 
Heidegger. This move on the part of Marcuse has been controversial among 
his critics. Douglas Kellner believes that Marcuse turned to Heidegger’s 
formulation of “authenticity” as a way of understanding Marx’s category of 
alienation without denying the possibility of the individual’s interactions 
with the historical process. But, “[s]ince Heidegger’s analysis does not allow 
for the possibility of revolutionary change that would overcome ‘fallenness’ 
with a new social structure, the most he can recommend is individual self-
transformation” (48). Though Heidegger does develop an account of Dasein 
as able to move apart from the “idle chatter” of the “they” of inauthentic 
existence, his inability to theorize the concrete historical and social 
conditions of inauthenticity, or how such social conditions could be anything 
but inauthentic, leads Kellner to conclude that “Heidegger…scorned the 
public act” (48).
4. “Being out in the streets is like being caught in a tornado. You have to be alert 
and ready for anything every moment” (Baghdad Burning 40).
5. “Women’s rights aren’t a primary concern for anyone, anymore. People 
actually laugh when someone brings up the topic. ‘Let’s keep Iraq united 
first…’ is often the response when I comment about the prospect of Iranian-
style Shari’a” (Baghdad Burning II 131).
6. “The Myth: Iraqis, prior to occupation, lived in little beige tents set up on 
the sides of little dirt roads all over Baghdad. The men and boys would ride 
to school on their camels, donkeys, and goats…. Girls and women sat at 
home, in black burkas, making bread and taking care of 10–12 children. The 
Truth: Iraqis lived in houses with running water and electricity. Thousands of 
them own computers. Millions own VCRs and VCDs. Iraq has sophisticated 
bridges, recreational centers, clubs, restaurants, shops, universities, schools, 
etc. Iraqis love fast cars…and the Tirgis is full of little motor boats that are 
used for everything from fishing to water-skiing” (Baghdad Burning 34).
7. “I prefer a network ideological image, suggesting the profusion of spaces and 
identities and the permeability of boundaries in the personal body and in the 
body politic” (170).
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8. This may be true of the version of dialectics developed by Marcuse, who—
following Marx—does think that man can ultimately reveal and realize his 
essence in some future, though what would count as this realization is not 
quite so specific (he criticizes Hegel for locating it in the bourgeois state). It is 
not true, however, of all dialectical philosophies. As I have suggested before, 
Adorno, for example, thinks that such reconciliation is the petrification of 
thought, and he attributes this to a Hegelian dialectic which he also believes 
denies an ultimate resolution.
9. The famed president of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) who is most noted 
for assuring George W. Bush and his administration that Saddam Hussein 
was harboring weapons of mass destruction and that the Iraqi people would 
greet American troops as liberators. He was placed on the Iraqi governing 
council and for a brief time in 2005 was prime minister and acting oil minister 
of Iraq, and in 2007, prime minister Nouri al Maliki appointed him to head 
the Iraqi services committee coordinating reconstruction of the public 
infrastructure. Riverbend’s account occurs before Ahmed Chalabi’s fall out 
with US authorities when they discovered in 2004 that he was selling US state 
secrets to the Iranians. As late as 2007, General David Petraeus was singing 
Chalabi’s praises as the person who would restore the connection between 
Iraq’s government and its citizens, and so as vital to the “surge” efforts.
10. Haug believes that feminism steered itself in the wrong direction by trying to 
dislodge the public/private split, even in a technological age, because many 
of its concerns—from reproduction to health care, oppression in the home, 
or inequality—continue to depend on an analysis of the private sphere in its 
present form.
11. For example, she sets the record straight on Abu-Ghraib, disparaging 
American “shock” in responding to the lurid photographs as though they were 
a singular event rather than a continuation in time: “You’ve seen the troops 
break down doors and terrify women and children…curse, scream, push, 
pull and throw people to the ground with a boot over their head. You’ve seen 
troops shoot civilians in cold blood. You’ve seen them bomb cities and towns. 
You’ve seen them burn cars and humans using tanks and helicopters. Is this 
latest debacle so very shocking or appalling?” (Baghdad Burning 263).
12. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs under 
George W. Bush.
13. This connection between the new technologies and communication with 
the dead has been a standard topos in the scholarly literature on new media. 
Many of these perspectives follow on a Heideggerian sense of decenteredness, 
a “Being-towards-Death” that individualizes and objectivizes in the same 
motion. Avital Ronnell, for example, addresses how Alexander Graham 
Bell’s partner, Thomas A. Watson, as being a spirit medium before inventing 
the telephone: “As thing, the telephone will have to be despooked without, 
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however, scratching its essential ghostly aspect. Thus Watson always presents 
the telephone as something that speaks, as if by occult force…. He was already 
himself attuned to the ghost within” (246). Alexander Graham Bell himself 
modeled the telephone on a dead human ear that one of his scientist friends 
had donated to him. The dead specimen started to stand in for Bell’s attempts 
to connect with his mother, Ma Bell: “Now, when mourning is broached by 
an idealization and interiorization of the mother’s image, which implies her 
loss and the withdrawal of the maternal, the telephone maintains this line 
of disconnection while dissimilating loss” (341). For Ronell, ghostliness 
becomes the apparition of the disembodiment that trans-locational 
mediation demands.
14. Discussing how Marcuse appropriated Heideggerian philosophy, John 
Abromeit separates the first part of Being and Time from the second part: 
the first part constructs a “radically individuated” (133) sense of human 
agency that is based on this individual’s ability to build an awareness of itself 
in relation to past and future and to “realize [his own-most possibilities] in 
the future” (135). The second part, meanwhile, indicates that this radical 
individuation can be dynamized “only through a collective effort to change 
the material world” (135). “Departing from his earlier analysis of authenticity 
as Being-toward-death, which had focused on the extreme individuation 
brought about by existing in the full awareness of one’s own mortality, 
Heidegger…shows that [authenticity] can be realized only collectively, within 
a larger context of Being-with others” (136).
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Chapter 8
Neoliberalism as Terrorism; or State 
of Disaster Exceptionalism
Sophia A. McClennen
The connections between the hegemonic exercise of geopolitical pow-
er, the biopolitics of bare life and governmentality, and the free mar-
ket doctrine of neoliberalism were nowhere more apparent than in the 
first round of presidential debates held on September 26, 2008. Barack 
Obama brought the biopolitics of neoliberalism into relief when he spoke 
about how the McCain health care plan was based on the “notion that the 
market can always solve everything and that the less regulation we have, 
the better off we’re going to be” (CNN 9). Obama’s point was well taken, 
but what was missing was recognition of the fact that the idea that the 
market can solve all problems is necessarily linked to the idea that the 
United States can solve the problems of all other states. Both positions 
depend on the same internal logic, the same forms of exception, and the 
same exercise of sovereign power.
This is why the discussion during the debate about healthcare in the 
US has to be read in relation to McCain’s claims about US foreign policy. 
In another moment in the debate, McCain critiqued Obama’s under-
standing of Central Asian politics: “I don’t think that Senator Obama un-
derstands that there was a failed state in Pakistan when Musharraf came 
to power. Everybody who was around then and had been there and knew 
about it knew that it was a failed state” (n.p.). Though Pakistan was wres-
tling with problems—like tensions with India and serious poverty when 
Musharraf took power in an 1999 coup—it had a democratically elected 
government and was far from being what could be described as a “failed 
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state”—that is, a country in social and economic collapse where the gov-
ernment no longer exercises authority. How does it become possible for 
a US senator/presidential candidate to so glibly define Pakistan in that 
way? Who decides when a state has failed? Put differently, who is the “ev-
eryone” that knew that democratic Pakistan was a failed state? Surely not 
the Pakistanis, but also not Obama and not many US citizens either.
Thus, when McCain defended his free-market based economic policy 
or when he casually referred to democratic pre-Musharraf Pakistan as 
a “failed state” that “everyone knew about,” he was demonstrating Carl 
Schmitt’s notion of the sovereign who can decide the exception, who can 
make decisions precisely because he is sovereign, and whose rule is based 
on the inevitable absence of rules. For Schmitt, the only rule is that of 
the sovereign who alone determines a state’s friends or enemies, even in 
those cases when the enemies are the state’s own inhabitants themselves. 
In fact, one of the key arguments that I will make in this essay is that the 
contemporary neoliberal version of biopolitics requires an appreciation 
of how the disenfranchised within the US are integrally linked to extra-
national groups, whether these are stateless enemy combatants or wheth-
er they are entire nations, as in the case of Pakistan.
Prior to the events of 9/11/2001, much US Americanist research fo-
cused on identity issues in a context of nationalism and critiques of na-
tionalism. Against these trends, scholars like Donald Pease and Amy 
Kaplan called for moving away from the ontological framework of nation-
alisms and alternatives to nationalism because of their over-investment in 
identity markers.1 They suggest, in contrast, that it is time to reconsider 
more seriously the role of the state. Pease’s analysis of Ground Zero and 
Kaplan’s research on Guantanamo, for example, argue that any effort to 
reframe identity struggles requires attention to the violent repressive tac-
tics of the US state. Taking my cue from this line of critical work, I argue 
here that the next challenge for those of us interested in the relationship 
between national identities, political possibilities, and global power net-
works concerns understanding the practices, pedagogies, and public im-
age of the state post 9/11.
Suggesting this line of work, though, for US academics requires fur-
ther attending to the troubled context for engaging in lines of inquiry that 
challenge the pervasive turn away from more politically incisive critique 
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that has followed in the wake of 9/11. Arguably, the turn to identity-based 
critique where scholars examine identity markers as the source for prob-
lems of disenfranchisement as opposed to examining political and eco-
nomic structures—like capital, class, and the state—has its origins well 
before 9/11. One could suggest that such shifts were a function of the 
sorts of lines of inquiry that emerged in the 70s and 80s that derived from 
deconstruction’s emphasis on negative critique and distrust of organizing 
concepts in combination with poststructuralism’s focus on language and 
signs as sources of power. Even though these critical trends developed 
in response to an urge to challenge oppressive power structures, when 
they merged with a suspicion of any efforts to find a common ground or 
collective good, they often resulted in positions that were wary of proffer-
ing alternatives. As Masao Miyoshi notes in his critique of the develop-
ment of US humanities-based research, US scholars share “an undeniable 
common proclivity…to fundamentally reject such totalizing concepts as 
humanity, civilization, history, and justice, and such subtotalities as a re-
gion, a nation, a locality, or even any smallest group” (41). This emphasis 
on difference without reference ultimately strips criticism of its context 
and makes any analysis of state structures difficult to sustain.
These trends then combined with the self-censorship and weak, if not 
totally bland, forms of critical engagement that followed from the aca-
demic witch hunts launched by the post 9/11 assaults on higher educa-
tion.2 As Henry Giroux notes in The University in Chains, the post 9/11 
assaults on higher education by various right-wing constituencies were 
met all too often by apathy on the part of progressive academics who 
were either too afraid or too overwhelmed to offer any sort of sustained 
resistance. According to Giroux, “given the seriousness of the current at-
tack on higher education by an alliance of diverse right-wing forces, it is 
difficult to understand why the majority of liberals, progressives, and left-
oriented educators has become relatively silent or tacit apologists in the 
face of the assault” (5). In this context, then, it comes as little surprise 
that there has been relatively little attention to the way that 9/11 facili-
tated a shift in state power, where democratic institutions entered into a 
permanent state of exception and citizens were indefinitely denied their 
rights. But, as I will argue here, attention to the connections between 
neoliberalism’s need to push the state to defend the rights of the market 
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over the rights of the citizen and the war on terror’s restructuring of rights 
both within the US and across nations is a much-needed if not essential 
line of work for any scholar committed to restoring the democratic pos-
sibilities of higher education. One of the greatest threats to progressive 
education in the US today comes from the blind acceptance of corporate 
mentalities, the incorporation of militaristic solutions to conflict, and the 
demonization of other cultures, all of which combine to further a state 
of terror.edu.
The state of exception caused by the war on terror and the corporate 
state of neoliberalism have combined to radically alter civic identities on 
US soil and abroad. In one example, the shared criminalization of the 
immigrant, the refugee, and the disaster victim points to new ways that 
identities have been reconfigured as hostile to “freedom,” where “free-
dom” refers to the sovereign free market rather than to individual rights. 
After mapping the theoretical implications of linking neoliberalism with 
the biopolitics of bare life, the first part of this essay traces this new US 
state, what I am describing as “The Neoliberal State of Disaster Excep-
tionalism.” I then examine this transformation in the particular context 
of US-Afghan relations, where I analyze the dialectics between sovereign 
states and what I call “bare” states, i.e., states that are included in the geo-
political world system by virtue of their exclusion. Unlike the war in Iraq, 
the war in Afghanistan has from the outset been described as an effort to 
rescue a failed state from terrorist influences. Any disasters caused by the 
US invasion are always justified by the previously existing Afghan state of 
disaster. Reading both mainstream media accounts of the US attacks on 
Afghanistan post 9/11 and fictional efforts to narrate Afghanistan (par-
ticularly the novel The Kite Runner and the film Charlie Wilson’s War), I 
argue that the representation of Afghanistan and of US-Afghan relations 
both reveals and conceals the intersections between neoliberalism, ter-
rorism, and the state of exception.
Much of my argument rests on the idea that the post 9/11 state re-
quires attention to a new biopolitical era—one that links the state of 
exception with the free market state of neoliberalism. While a number 
of scholars have taken up post 9/11 biopolitics and a number of oth-
ers have focused on the effects of neoliberalism, few have claimed that 
these two structuring systems are necessarily linked. Naomi Klein brings 
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some of these threads together in her study of disaster capitalism, argu-
ing that neoliberalism thrives on disaster and shock to radically alter civic 
structures and state roles.3 Henry Giroux and Zygmunt Bauman have 
also claimed that neoliberalism brings with it a specific set of biopoliti-
cal practices that radically alter the notion of the citizen and the public 
sphere.4 What these scholars have shown is that there is a symbiotic con-
vergence between neoliberal free market capitalism, which understands 
citizens as consumers or as disposable waste, and an emergency state, 
which increasingly abrogates the rights of entire populations in the name 
of homeland security. Regardless of whether the punishing force is the 
market or the permanent state of war, the result is an onslaught on rights, 
both civic and corporal.
These new identity formations created by the post 9/11 US state, 
though, also rely on earlier paradigms, most significantly that of US ex-
ceptionalism and that of bare life. “American” exceptionalism depends 
on the longstanding belief that the United States differs qualitatively 
from other developed nations—a difference that makes it possible, for 
instance, for the US to be critical of British or Russian/Soviet imperial-
ism but not its own. That the US is superior to developing or undevel-
oped nations is taken for granted. Thus the bombing of civilians in Iraq 
or Afghanistan is justified, whereas the terrorist bombings of US civilians 
are not. What is of particular interest in the current context is the link 
between US exceptionalism and bare life. Giorgio Agamben’s theory of 
bare life claims that state power has always assumed power over life, de-
ciding who will receive the rights of the citizen and who will not. Bare life 
is that life which is included in the state by virtue of its exclusion from 
political life. It is life that can be killed with impunity because it is a life 
without rights. Agamben points out that “if anything characterizes mod-
ern democracy over classical democracy…it is that modern democracy 
presents itself from the beginning as a vindication and liberation of [bare 
life]” (Homo Sacer 9). But the rights of the citizen in the modern state 
still face two problems: first, sovereign power always creates bare life, 
even in modernity, and, second, the increasing commonality of the state 
of exception, or the suspension of law in order to establish rule, makes 
it possible for all citizens to be immediately rendered bare life, to be 
stripped of their rights. According to Agamben, the US entered a state of 
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exception shortly after the 9/11/01 terrorist attacks when it enacted a se-
ries of laws that governed living beings by means of the suspension of law. 
But this retraction of rights was read in keeping with US exceptionalism 
as fundamentally different from the suspension of rights as practiced by 
other states. So, a key feature that affects how we think of this problem is 
the way that the US’s dominant narrative as a free, democratic nation that 
is globally exceptional frustrates any counter claims that suggest that, in 
contrast, the US is like all other states that have limited citizen’s rights as a 
means of preserving power. By making the case of the US’s suspension of 
rights incomparable, and therefore exceptional, the dominant narrative 
of US power then is able to suggest that the US remains in a unique po-
sition, as a consequence of its exceptional democracy, to determine the 
fate of other states.
If US exceptionalism is a geopolitical policy and bare life refers to the 
rights of the being within the borders of a particular state, what happens 
when these spheres can no longer be kept separate? When what a state 
does within its borders necessarily leaks to the global sphere and vice ver-
sa? As a way of interrogating the geopolitical implications of these mutual 
contaminations, it is first necessary to consider the global implications 
and ideologies that derive from Agamben’s theories of the state of excep-
tion and bare life. Considered thusly, it becomes clear that the US state 
of exception requires American exceptionalism and depends not just on 
bare life but also on bare states, that is, on the designation of states that are 
included in the world order solely by the form of their exclusion. In addi-
tion to rethinking the false binary of internal and external state policies, a 
further part of my argument is that it is essential to recognize the symbio-
sis between free market capitalism and the perpetual state of exception.
Agamben’s focus on the force of law misses an opportunity to elabo-
rate on the force of capitalism—a word that never appears, for instance, 
in his State of Exception. Unchecked free market capitalism requires the 
state of exception since the deregulation of the market necessitates the 
destruction of the public sphere and the permanent suspension of the 
rights of the citizen. As mentioned earlier, these ideas are latently devel-
oped in Naomi Klein’s theory of disaster capitalism. Klein argues that the 
blank slate caused by disaster allows for massive transformations in state 
policy. She links megadisasters—wars, massive recessions, and natural 
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disasters—with superprofits. The disaster is the event that sanctions an 
abrupt shift in the function of the state, one which always brings with it 
a loss of rights because the state protects capital rather than people, at 
the same time that it signals an opportunity for neoliberal practices. A 
further key component of Klein’s theories of neoliberalism is her atten-
tion to the biopolitics of shock, where shock affects not just markets but 
bodies, a move that allows her to link torture and a pervasive culture of 
fear with the functioning of the free market. She draws a direct line be-
tween the US’s research into psychological military operations, torture 
tactics, and the fostering of mass hysteria after major disasters and argues 
that these biopolitical practices pave the way for societies to willingly 
cede rights and dignity in favor of so called security and stability. What 
Klein’s theory lacks, though, is more attention to the ideological forces 
that make these shifts possible, especially the history of US exceptional-
ism, in addition to orientalism and its sister stereotypes. Moreover, just as 
Agamben misses capitalism as a biopolitical force, Klein misses the bio-
politics of governmentality. My claim is that the current forms of state 
power require that we put these theories into dialogue.
The theorist who has most worked on establishing these links more 
overtly is Henry Giroux, who considers neoliberalism as a form of public 
pedagogy—a hegemonic force that teaches the public to accept unaccept-
able social practices. Giroux, along with Pierre Bourdieu, has been one of 
the foremost theorists of the ideology and public pedagogy of neoliberal 
practices. As Giroux explains it: “What is often ignored by theorists who 
analyze the rise of neoliberalism in the United States is that it is not only a 
system of economic power relations but also a political project, intent on 
producing new forms of subjectivity and sanctioning particular modes of 
conduct” (Youth in a Suspect Society 7–8). In recent years, a number of 
theorists (i.e., Agamben, Hardt and Negri, Mbembe) have also begun to 
expand on Michel Foucault’s theory of biopolitics—the theory of how 
states govern via the regulation of human life. But Giroux is one of the 
few scholars to develop a theory of neoliberal biopolitics, and he is the 
only one to study how these practices have been directly influenced by 
the post 9/11 militarization of the US security state. The book that most 
explores these links is Beyond the Terror of Neoliberalism. There, Giroux 
writes: “[Neoliberalism’s] supporting political culture and pedagogical 
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practices also put into play a social universe and cultural landscape that 
sustain a particularly barbaric notion of authoritarianism, set in motion 
under the combined power of a religious and market fundamentalism 
and anti-terrorism laws that suspend civil liberties, incarcerate disposable 
populations, and provide the security forces necessary for capital to de-
stroy those spaces where democracy can be nourished” (xxiii). For Gir-
oux, “Democratic politics is increasingly depoliticized by the intersection 
of a free-market fundamentalism and an escalating militarism” that not 
only attacks civil liberties within the United States but also designates en-
tire populations outside of the United States as either disposable or con-
trollable (xx).
US-Afghan relations post-9/11 offer a tragic, yet paradigmatic, exam-
ple of this new biopolitical era. Unlike the war in Iraq, the war in Afghan-
istan has from the outset been described as an effort to rescue a failed 
state. While much time has been spent, especially on the part of Noam 
Chomsky and Jacques Derrida, deconstructing the definitions and trac-
ing the auto-referentiality of terms like “failed states” and “rogue states,” it 
seems to me that the more relevant way of thinking about these issues is 
through the dialectic of what I call the bare state and the sovereign state. 
If the sovereign has the ability to decide which lives can be killed due to 
the suspension of the force of law, then it follows that the sovereign state, 
that is, the state that rules all other states, decides which states will be 
bare states. The sovereign state imposes the rules that determine the ex-
ception. Bare states are those that can be destroyed or manipulated with 
impunity since they are only included in the world system by their ex-
clusion, by the assumption that they have no rights to self-govern. The 
destruction of the bare state by the sovereign state has no legal ramifica-
tions since the bare state has no rights. The focus on the developed world 
in the theories of Schmitt and then also in Agamben ignores the problem 
of states where the sovereignty of the sovereign is always in question. In 
a sense, imperialism is the state of exception writ large, and when states 
do emerge as a consequence of postcolonial independence, that indepen-
dence is akin to bare independence: it is an independence that exists only 
at the discretion of the sovereign state.
Afghanistan is a particularly complex case because it is best described 
as a quasi-postcolonial state. While it has resisted foreign rule, it has had 
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plenty of foreign interference. Located at a geographical crossroads, it 
is a state that came into existence in order to resist the imperial designs 
of the British and Russian Great Game in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. And, as is commonly the case with postcolonial states, the Af-
ghan state was carved across ethnic lines and according to imperially im-
posed geographic boundaries. The key issue, however, is that states like 
Afghanistan are encouraged by sovereign states to operate in ways that 
undermine the rights of their citizens so as to justify their continued ex-
clusion from geopolitical state rights. As Rudyard Kipling puts it in his 
story of Afghanistan, “The Man Who Would Be King,” “nobody cares a 
straw for the internal administration of Native States so long as oppres-
sion and crime are kept within decent limits, and the ruler is not drugged, 
drunk, or diseased from one end of the year to another. They are the dark 
places of the earth, full of unimaginable cruelty” (247). Here orientalism 
combines with the idea of the bare state. Not only is it assumed that this 
is a state which needs oversight and that this is a state where citizens will 
have few rights, if any, but it is also assumed that the so-called sovereign 
of the bare state is genetically incapable of just rule.
The problem for bare states in the era of neoliberalism is not only their 
lack of rights within the world system but also the fact that the deregu-
lative ideologies that buttress the sovereign state/bare state dialectic are 
linked to the needs of market fundamentalism. Arguably, neoliberalism 
is simply the most recent phase of capitalism, the one that most visibly 
exposes the rule of the market as the only rule that capitalism will recog-
nize. The deregulation required by neoliberals is closely linked to the lack 
of rights of bare life. Under neoliberalism, people are products and states 
protect the rights of corporations rather than of citizens. Thus, when neo-
liberalism joins the imperialist bare state/sovereign state structure, the 
result is that the only rules are that there are no rules except those ar-
ticulated by the sovereign system of capital. Of course, in the case of Af-
ghanistan, the idea that the area and its inhabitants represented nothing 
more than products to be exchanged or bodies to be regulated had a long 
history that pre-dated the US’ involvement there.
These ideas of a barbaric land occupied by barbaric people would re-
emerge with particular force in representations of Afghanistan after 
9/11.5 Much was heard of the brutality of Taliban rule, of the plight of 
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Afghan women, and of the tenacious spirit of the Afghan warrior who 
had managed to defend his country from foreign rule for more than 
2,000 years. The most frequently cited resource was that of Rudyard 
Kipling, and Corinne Fowler writes that “during the 2001 conflict, ref-
erences to Kipling were legion” (49). For instance, while in Peshawar at 
the American club, British journalist Ben Macintyre wrote that the spies, 
arms dealers, aid workers, mercenaries, and journalists that congregated 
there all had one thing in common: they all read Kipling as they lived out 
their “romantic fantasies.” “The works of Rudyard Kipling were required 
reading, for Britain’s bard of imperialism captured the wilderness and the 
wonder of the North-West Frontier like no other writer, before or since” 
(Macintyre, The Man Who Would Be King 4). Kipling’s works were cited 
throughout media reports in the days following 9/11 as though they pro-
vided some deep insight into the mystery of Afghanistan and its neigh-
boring countries. News reports carried multiple references from his short 
story “The Man Who Would Be King” and from his poem “The Young 
British Soldier” that portrays Afghans (including women) as particu-
larly brutal:
When you’re wounded and left on Afghanistan’s plains,
And the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains
An’ go to your Gawd like a soldier. (n.p.)
The turn to Kipling may very well have made sense as the United States 
and Britain contemplated overt military action in a country with a rep-
utation for rebelling superior military force. Not only had the Brits suf-
fered military losses there three times (1842, 1841, 1919), but the Soviet 
conflict in Afghanistan from 1979–89 arguably led to the end of the So-
viet Union. Perhaps some of Kipling’s insights into these conflicts could 
serve as useful cautions. Nevertheless, the repeated use of Kipling as a 
source of knowledge about Afghanistan points to the persistence of orien-
talism in the post 9/11 context.
Edward Said suggests that one of the key features of orientalist thinking 
is the assumed fact that there is a fundamental distinction between “Ori-
ent” and “Occident.” But this distinction is not one of simple difference; 
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it is one of hierarchy. This strategy means that, regardless of the relation-
ship between West and East, the West always retains “positional superior-
ity” (7). This positional superiority though holds material force when we 
link this idea to the concept of the sovereign state that determines the 
fate of the bare state, bringing with it a global biopolitics that not only 
separates categories of humanity within nations but across them as well. 
Thus, when US Navy Seal Marc Luttrell describes his mission to Afghani-
stan as “payback time for the World Trade Center,” he is a “special breed 
of warrior,” whereas his enemy is described as “lawless,” “wild mountain 
men” (9, 6, 10, 13). Or when Afghans rebel against foreign invasion, they 
are described as dangerous and unpredictable, but when Western coun-
tries defend themselves from foreign invasion, they are described as righ-
teous and valiant. Not only does such thinking depend on an absolute 
division between East and West, where the West is always understood as 
superior to the East, but it also requires that East and West be understood 
as static entities that do not significantly change over time and that do 
not have substantial variations within themselves. Such practices meant 
that it remained possible after 9/11 to assume that Kipling’s imperialist 
view of the barbarous nature of Afghanistan was still largely true, that 
little had changed; and they depended on ignoring Kipling’s own context 
of writing as one that referred to a specific historical moment that carried 
particular worldviews. The third key feature of orientalism relevant for a 
discussion of the bare state is that it depends on ideas and not simply on 
the use of military and political power to remain in force. When oriental-
ist statements are made in the Western media about Afghanistan, such 
statements themselves serve to strengthen structures of authority that are 
not only material but also hegemonic. Thus, Kipling’s legacy was contin-
ued in Western media representations of Operation Enduring Freedom 
not simply through references to his works, but also through the mere 
practice of producing truth claims about Afghanistan, the nature of the 
Afghan people, and their relationship to the West—truth claims that in-
evitably reinforced the historical legacy of occident versus orient.
For obvious reasons, post-9/11 US coverage did not replicate the Brit-
ish media’s imperialist anxieties, but that did not deter US journalists 
from falling into a pattern of repeatedly rehearsing a series of traits that in-
delibly marked Afghanistan as a threat to Western ways of life. Mahmood 
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Mamdani refers to these practices as “culture talk.” Building on Edward 
Said’s concept of orientalism, contemporary “culture talk” takes its cues 
from works like Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations and under-
stands contemporary conflicts in cultural rather than political terms. 
Mamdani explains that “It is no longer the market (capitalism), nor the 
state (democracy), but culture (modernity) that is said to be the divid-
ing line between those in favor of a peaceful, civic existence and those 
inclined to terror” (18). The key to “culture talk” is the assumption that 
different cultures have different essences, and it requires that cultures be 
understood outside of their historical and political context. In the West, 
post-9/11 “culture talk” meant understanding the crisis in Afghanistan 
as one that was culturally endemic, that of a failure to become civilized 
rather than as a consequence of specific historical and political develop-
ments. As a result, post 9/11 Afghan-related reporting often included 
references to the rise of fundamentalist Islam in the country but rarely 
acknowledged the role played in Afghanistan by Saudi Arabia’s and Paki-
stan’s intelligence agencies (the GID and ISI) who worked during the So-
viet era along with the CIA in helping train and fund the Afghan rebels 
who would later become the Taliban.
Instead of contextually and historically specific reporting, much news 
relied on a series of orientalist, culturalist stereotypes of Afghanistan that 
reinforced a biopolitics of Afghan disposability. One ongoing and persis-
tent feature of media coverage referred to the warlike nature of Afghans 
and to the fact that Afghans “have traditionally greeted outside armies 
with hostility” (“War without Illusions” 22). Fowler also notes that “a 
striking feature of news media coverage of the 2001 bombing campaign” 
depicted Afghanistan as “contemporaneous with medieval Europe”—a 
condition that suggested the almost total lack of anything the West would 
call “civilization” in the nation (64). Another trope of the media was the 
reference to the lack of national unity in a country prone to tribalism and 
ethnic conflict. Ross Benson writes, for instance, that “each ethnic group 
is distrustful of the other and in Afghanistan distrust is cause enough for 
murder” (11). Linked to descriptions of the people as barbarous, uncivi-
lized, pre-modern, and dangerous, the physical geography was described 
as equally treacherous, sometimes due to the ominous mountains and 
desserts and sometimes due to the wreckage left behind by the remnants 
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of the Soviet era.6 All of these practices combine, then, to offer a cultural 
logic to treating Afghanistan as a bare state and to characterizing Afghans 
as undeserving of self-determination.
As a counterforce to much mass media reporting of the conflict, a series 
of cultural texts attempted to offer an alternative view. Bringing public at-
tention to another side of the story was one of the motives behind Mike 
Nichols’ film Charlie Wilson’s War—a quasi-farce about the US’ involve-
ment in exacerbating the conflict during the Soviet Union’s occupation 
of Afghanistan from 1979–89, that was produced by Participant Produc-
tions, a company dedicated to “entertainment that inspires and compels 
social change.” While Nichols does not do enough to link the so-called 
“freedom fighters” of the Soviet conflict with the “barbaric” mujahedeen 
of the post 9/11 moment, the strength of his film is its narrative of US 
exceptionalism’s use of Afghanistan as a bare state. The film traces the un-
likely story of Charlie Wilson, a playboy Texas Congressman, who sin-
glehandedly raised the budget for the covert operations in Afghanistan 
from 35 million dollars in 1982 to 600 million in 1987. Wilson’s interest 
in Afghanistan stems from the twin desires to “kill Russians” and to help 
the Afghans, whom he meets for the first time in a devastating scene in 
a Pakistani refugee camp. The film does an excellent job of pointing out 
the contradictions of US exceptionalism that link humanitarian aid with 
a devastating proxy war. Nichols also underscores the idea of Afghani-
stan as a bare state when he has a CIA member refer to it as “barely a 
country”—a move that links a state with no rights in the global system 
to a state that lacks the infrastructure of modernity. One example of this 
combined bareness is a scene where characters complain about how Af-
ghanistan’s lack of roads makes it less convenient for them to provide an-
ti-Soviet forces with weapons.
Telling this story in the context of the US’ ongoing overt war with Af-
ghanistan, where thousands of Afghan civilians have died, where Afghans 
constitute the largest refugee population worldwide, and where only 6 
percent of the country even had intermittent electricity in 2004, goes a 
long way to correcting the myths and misinformation about the state of 
Afghanistan ( Jones 214). But the film has a few blind spots, not the least 
of which is the lack of voice given to Afghans themselves who are almost 
always screened from a distance, often in scenes that show them being 
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gunned down by Soviets, a practice that tends to justify the US’ role in 
the covert war by reinforcing orientalist stereotypes of Afghans as incom-
prehensible others who needed to be rescued by the US.
In contrast to Charlie Wilson’s War, putting a human face on Afghans 
was one of the primary goals of Khaled Hosseini’s enormously success-
ful The Kite Runner. The narrative covers the life of a boy who grows up 
in Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion, takes refuge in Pakistan and 
then later the United States, only to later return to Taliban-led Afghani-
stan on a quest for personal redemption. Most post 9/11 writing by Af-
ghans falls into the category of “burqa lit,” and, even though a number 
of these books, such as My Forbidden Face and Zoya’s Story were written 
by women who lived in moderate Islamic homes with men who did not 
abuse them, these books tended to focus wholly on the brutality of Tali-
ban rule, which often reinforced a view of Afghan barbarity. Hosseini’s 
text, in contrast, portrays Kabul before the Soviet invasion in significant 
detail, giving Western readers a view of a moment in Afghan history when 
the city was “modern” and “civilized” by Western standards. Even though 
the novel takes a highly romantic and nostalgic tone, a stylistic feature 
that may be explained by Hosseini’s status as an exile from his homeland, 
these lyrical portraits of the city challenged assumptions that Afghani-
stan had been always a barbaric and medieval nation with no connection 
to modernity.
This is the novel’s greatest strength, but it is largely eclipsed by its weak-
nesses which include reducing the existence of the Taliban regime to the 
moral failure of its protagonist and the psychological flaws of his nemesis, 
Assef, the Taliban thug who is simply described as a sociopath. Unfor-
tunately, though, the balance between Afghan specificity and “universal” 
(read Western) themes has been largely lost on Western readers. Meghan 
O’Rourke notes that most readers overlooked or downplayed those fea-
tures of the novel that indicated “otherness”: “Study the 631 Amazon re-
views and scores of newspaper features about The Kite Runner, and you’ll 
find that most fail to mention that the narrator converts from a secular 
Muslim to a devoutly practicing one. Hosseini’s story indulges this read-
erly impulse to downplay what is hard to grasp and play up what seems 
familiar” (par. 6). The fact that the novel did not seem “foreign” was pre-
cisely one of Hosseini’s goals. In an interview, he explained that “It goes 
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back to telling a story that connects with people on a human level. When 
you do that, I think you get people thinking” (qtd. in Sandor). The di-
lemma, though, is that in order for The Kite Runner to depict Afghans as 
humans, as part of a universal, global community, they almost lost their 
Afghannness.
Conveniently, the novel’s presentation of Afghanistan’s problems ig-
nores global geopolitics and the history of US manipulation. At a mo-
ment when US citizens had to grapple with terrorist attacks on US soil, 
such a tale suggested a division between good and evil that inevitably pal-
liated the violent consequences of bombing Afghanistan and that made 
it easier to imagine that the invasion was a just response. Even though 
Charlie Wilson’s War and The Kite Runner were both interested in cor-
recting Western misinformation about Afghanistan, by dealing with pre-
9/11 Afghanistan, they risk leaving audiences ambivalent about whether 
or not the post-9/11 US invasion was a justified humanitarian action.
The story most ignored is the one of how the US invasion has brought a 
neoliberal spin to the Afghan bare state. As a corrective, Ann Jones’s jour-
nalistic memoir Kabul in Winter explains the new neoliberal economics 
of aid and military action at work in Afghanistan post-9/11. Aid, like war, 
is outsourced, allowing contractors to gain lucrative deals that refunnel 
US funds back to the private sector. She explains that since “the underly-
ing purpose of American aid is to make the world safe and open to Amer-
ican business, business is cut in from the start” (242). And to prove the 
point that US policies have rendered Afghans as bare life without rights 
and without the ability to participate in the market, Afghan contractors 
are excluded from competing for these deals since, as one USAID official 
puts it: “they don’t know [US] methods of accounting” (243).
As I close this necessarily sketchy outline of the links between neo-
liberalism, the state of exception, and a new era of biopolitical practices, 
what remains clear is that the productive tensions over the public sphere 
and over Enlightenment commitments to rights and just wars that had 
existed prior to the rise of neoliberalism have been almost entirely dis-
mantled. Market fundamentalism and corporate rights have become the 
rule that determines law with none, or virtually none, of the push back of 
humanistic, egalitarian, democratic ideals. As complex and contradictory 
as those ideals may have been, their absence under the neoliberal state of 
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exception makes possible entirely new forms of human devastation and 
states of terror. Understanding the new era of the neoliberal state of disas-
ter exceptionalism requires attention not just to changes in state policies, 
rights, and biopolitical practices, but also to the ideologies and counter-
narratives that support and resist them. Attending to the links between 
neoliberalism, post 9/11 US imperialism, and the new biopolitical con-
figurations these developments have caused is our next challenge.
Notes
1. See Pease’s “The Global Homeland State: Bush’s Biopolitical Settlement” and 
Kaplan’s “Where is Guantanamo?”
2. For more on these trends, see Giroux and Giroux’s Take Back Higher 
Education, as well as McClennen’s “The Geopolitical War on U.S. Higher 
Education” and “The Assault on Higher Education.”
3. See Klein’s The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism.
4. See Giroux’s The Terror of Neoliberalism: Authoritarianism and the Eclipse of 
Democracy and Bauman’s Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds.
5. I developed some of these ideas about Afghanistan in a previously published 
essay, “Reading Afghanistan post 9/11.”
6. In an example of the first practice, Philip Caputo, who had lived in 
Afghanistan for a month, wrote for the New York Times in early October 2001 
that “The mountains soar to 20,000 feet in the east, and endless deserts lie 
in the west” (27). In an example of the second, Ben Macintyre wrote for the 
London Times that “Bloody war is sewn into the very land of Afghanistan, in 
the form of innumerable landmines” (n.p.).
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Chapter 9
Terror and American Exceptionalism
William V. Spanos
Let us now observe the life of homo sacer…. He has been excluded 
from the religious community and from all political life: he cannot 
participate in the rites of his gens, nor…can he perform any 
juridically valid act. What is more, his entire existence is reduced 
to a bare life [nuda vita] stripped of every right by virtue of the 
fact that anyone can kill him without committing homicide: 
he can save himself only in perpetual flight or a foreign land. 
And yet he is in a continuous relationship with the power that 
banished him precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed 
to an unconditional threat of death. He is pure zoe, but his zoe 
is as such caught in the sovereign ban [excluded yet included] 
and must reckon with it at every moment…. In this sense no life, 
as exiles and bandits know well, is more “political” than his.
– Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer
Introduction
In these inaugural marks, I want to make two crucial contextual points 
about the history of Billy Budd criticism that will help to clarify my fo-
cus in the following essay on Herman Melville’s elusive—indeed, spec-
tral—novella on the drumhead court proceedings that bring it to its cul-
mination in Captain Vere’s sovereign decision to execute the innocent 
Billy Budd. The first has to do with this criticism’s marginalization of 
the historical matrix in which the events on board the H.M.S. Bellipotent 
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are embedded. The second has to do with the question of the identity of 
Melville’s narrator and his audience.
As for the first, Herman Melville’s Billy Budd, written in the last years of 
his life after his withdrawal from the public sphere with the “failure” of The 
Confidence-Man in 1857, has been read by the great majority of the huge 
number of critics who have attempted to unravel its ambiguities since its 
posthumous publication in 1924 as his “testament of acceptance” in old 
age.1 A smaller group has interpreted it as his “testament of resistance.”2
And a third, more recent group, following the anti-binarist directives of 
deconstructive theory, has concluded that it is undecidable,3 thus, in re-
fusing to judge a worldly situation in which power and its deadly effects 
are patent and fundamental, inadvertently siding with the first, politically 
conservative group. Despite the determinative prominence of the glob-
al historical occasion in Melville’s text—the political struggle between 
England and Napoleonic France for dominance over the seaways in the 
name of empire—all three groups have tended to confine the meaning of 
the novella to one form of allegory or another. This allegorical initiative, 
which was inaugurated at the time of the Melville Revival in England in 
the 1920s with the emergence of the opposition between the adherents 
of the acceptance school and the resistance school, was exacerbated with 
the publication in 1962 of Harrison Hayford and Merton Sealts’ “de-
finitive edition,” which categorically deleted the “Preface” of Raymond 
Weaver’s original edition on the basis of their conclusion that Melville 
had discarded it some time along the line (Hayford and Sealtrs qtd. in 
Melville, Billy Budd 1–12). In that “discarded” preface, Melville, uncan-
nily like Alain Badiou, represents the French Revolution as an “event,” 
the radically inaugural “eventality” of which the following Napoleonic 
Wars betrayed in the name of the old dispensation.4 More specifically, he 
represents this epochal event (and the Great Mutiny of British seamen at 
Spithead and the Nore it precipitated) as the mise-en-scène of the events 
on board the H.M.S. Bellipotent, that, in producing a state of emergency, 
a climate of insecurity, and a political situation in which the criminal be-
come the policeman, culminate in the summary execution of the inno-
cent “handsome sailor,” Billy Budd. Despite the fact that this historical 
context pervades the body of the story right down to its capillaries, the 
“official” deletion seems, since then, to have been taken for granted. As 
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a consequence, most readers of Melville’s text have been blinded to the 
epochal war that has rendered the state of exception the rule on board the 
Bellipotent. My purpose in this essay is to put this global historical con-
text back into play. For such a reconstellation brings the patently unequal 
power relations and the sociopolitical conditions incumbent on the es-
tablishment of the state of exception as the norm back from the margins 
where they have been relegated by the effacement of the “evental” global 
matter of the “Preface” to center stage.
As for the second aspect of this history of Billy Budd criticism that 
needs attention—the question of the identity of the narrator—I find 
myself in some degree of solidarity with those—mostly of the resistance 
school—who distinguish his attitude toward the events he narrates from 
Melville’s. But there are two crucial differences between their and my in-
terpretation of the narrator. 1) For them, he is entirely the object of Mel-
ville’s irony, whereas I read him as one who, like Ishmael in Moby-Dick, 
tells the “story,” not, as in the case of the official narrative of the events 
published in their aftermath, to verify a preconceived conclusion, but to 
pursue its “jagged edges” to wherever they take him. Equally, if not more 
important, 2) for them, the narrator is ethnically identityless, whereas I 
read him as an end-of-the-century “American” writing about an epochal 
European event that occurred a century earlier uncannily reminiscent 
of his own contemporary American occasion. More specifically, he is a 
contemporary, Gilded Age American, attuned to the myth of American 
exceptionalism and the strategic importance of the American jeremiad, 
who is acutely conscious of the waning of the frontier, the consequent 
need of the dominant American consciousness for a rejuvenating en-
emy, and the imperial momentum to expand the frontier into the Pacific 
Ocean, epitomized by the historian Frederick Jackson Turner5 and, above 
all, by the naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, the late Melville’s contem-
porary, who was proselytizing on behalf of the expansion of the America 
navy into an imperial fleet6
In short, this inaugural clarification of these two crucial aspects of the 
history of Billy Budd criticism enables us not only to perceive that the 
state of exception, despite its effacement by the history of Billy Budd criti-
cism and commentary in the name of a worldless allegory—an efface-
ment, not incidentally, that mirrors the obliteration of the actual events 
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on board the Bellipotent enacted by the official narrative that the narrator 
appends to his story—is really at the heart of Melville’s novella. It thus 
also allows us to see that this ostensibly Old World story is in fact a cau-
tionary tale addressed to a late nineteenth century American audience 
that is being maneuvered by the dominant culture into embarking on a 
global policy that would tacitly normalize the state of exception—and 
the lying discourse of its “truth”-producing institutions. In so doing—
and this, finally, is more important—the reconstellation I am undertak-
ing will also enable us to perceive that Billy Budd constitutes Melville’s 
uncannily proleptic witness to our own contemporary occasion. I mean, 
of course, the occasion that, in the name of America’s exceptionalist “war 
on terror,” has gone perilously far to render ”the state of exception” and 
the “truth” discourse of its ideological apparatuses—not only political 
parties and religious organizations, but also information media and edu-
cational institutions, i.e., cultural production in general—the norm and 
thus a matter of urgent critical concern.
Under the State of Exception, the Criminal Becomes the Policeman
Following Claggart’s insidious accusation to Captain Vere that Billy 
Budd was fomenting mutiny, the narrator, commenting on Captain Vere’s 
earlier fatherly awareness of the young sailor, concludes, “In sum, Cap-
tain Vere had from the beginning deemed Billy Budd to be what in the 
naval parlance of the time was called a ‘King’s bargain,’ that is to say, for 
His Britannic Majesty’s navy a capital investment at small outlay or none 
at all” (Melville, Billy Budd 95). Bracketing for the time being the trou-
bling reductive rhetoric Vere’ uses to assess Billy’s worth, it will suffice 
to say that, despite Captain Vere’s sympathy for Billy and his visceral dis-
like for Claggart and deep suspicion of his witness, he was visibly incapa-
ble, try as he might, of breaking the uncanny hold his wily subordinate’s 
gaze has on him:
Vere again heard him out; then for the moment stood ru-
minating. The mood he evinced, Claggart—himself for the 
time liberated from the other’s scrutiny—steadily regarded 
with a look difficult to render: a look curious of the opera-
tion of his tactics, a look such as might have been that of the 
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spokesman of the envious children of Jacob deceptively im-
posing upon the troubled patriarch the blood-dyed coat of 
young Joseph. (96)
Vere brings the confrontation to an “end” by deciding to put the ac-
cuser to the test of being confronted by the accused, but, disablingly, in 
a closed setting. In so doing, he succumbs to, in the very act of resisting, 
Claggart’s policing strategy—the insidious strategy based on his knowl-
edge of Vere’s deeply inscribed commitment to the “truth” of the (law-
less) law of the security state and its extreme disciplinary imperatives. 
One of the essential realities of the state of exception is that it enables the 
criminal, by way of its imperatives of secrecy, to all too easily become the 
policeman, the unruly the ruler.
Since this paradox is at the heart of my reading of Billy Budd, it is worth 
pursuing at greater length. The only critic to have read Billy Budd as a 
story about the state of exception is the French critic Alain Brossat in an 
essay, tellingly entitled “L’inarticulable” [The Inarticulate], written in the 
aftermath of 9/11. In fact, this essay reads Melville’s novella as proleptic 
of the state of exception established by the George W. Bush administra-
tion’s declaration of its “war on terror.” Whereas my emphasis in treating 
the state of exception falls on the masters’ reduction of human (political) 
life to bare life, Brossat focuses on the necessarily spontaneous violent re-
sponse of the inarticulate—those who have been dispossessed of a politi-
cal voice by the masters of the earth (Billy Budd’s fist/Al Quaeda’s attack 
on the World Trade Center). Though I find Brossat’s easy identification 
of Billy and the inarticulate of the world with al-Qaeda somewhat prob-
lematic, I am in absolute agreement with his identification of the master-
at-arms, Claggart, as the real power on board the Bellipotent—the “master 
of masters”—and analogously, if only by implication, the “criminal” ele-
ment as the real power in the post-9/11 US.
This identification has been severely contested by the American politi-
cal theorist John Brenkman in a recent substantial essay on Billy Budd en-
titled “The Melvillean Moment.” Sympathetic with Brossat’s association 
of Billy with the plebs, who “are caught in two wars at once, the war be-
tween nations and the ‘immemorial’ one between ‘patricians and plebe-
ians,’” Brenkman goes on to say that Brossat
Terror and American Exceptionalism 201
squanders this insight by oversimplifying the shape of power 
on the Bellipotent. He makes Claggart the epitome of rule on 
the ship, the “‘master of masters’ in a ‘pitiless dictatorial re-
gime exercised by the masters.’” Claggart’s tyranny, dishon-
esty, and persecution of Billy becomes the very image of the 
ship’s governance. (n.p.; forthcoming)
Brenkman goes on to refute this claim by underscoring the difference 
between Claggart’s monomaniacal tyranny and Captain Vere’s humane 
sympathy with Billy just before the moment that, according to Brossat, 
the alleged difference between the masters and the servants—the power-
ful and articulate and the weak and inarticulate—irrupts in what, follow-
ing Walter Benjamin, he calls “mythic violence.” Vere’s fatherly council to 
Billy—“‘There is no hurry, my boy. Take your time’”—Brenkman affirms, 
“implies no such simple alignment of repressive power and speech on the 
one side and silence, powerlessness, and hyperviolence on the other.” 
“The captain,” he goes on,
has had Billy brought to his cabin in the first place because he 
doubts Claggart, and “therefore, before trying the accused, he 
would first practically test the accuser” (Chapter 18). Brossat 
apparently wants nothing to do with this difference between 
Claggart and Vere because it does not gel with the equations 
underlying his argument: if the depraved master-at-arms is 
the equivalent of the warship’s captain, and if the warship is 
the equivalent of the modern state, then the wartime state of 
emergency is the equivalent of democratic rule. (n.p.)
What Brenkman’s vestigial American exceptionalist problematic, like 
that of most critics of Billy Budd, blinds him to, I suggest on the basis of 
a retrieval of the minute particulars of the policing environment neces-
sarily produced by the state of exception, is precisely the stranglehold 
that Claggart, the master-at-arms, has on Vere’s, the captain’s, mind: his 
insidious insight into the higher or “sacred” cause that unerringly de-
termines the latter’s vision and action. In so doing, he also, and more 
importantly, misses Melville’s profound—and proleptic—recogni-
tion that, as I have shown, under the conditions of the state of excep-
tion, the criminal or, more accurately, as the narrator puts it earlier, the 
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“promiscuous lameduck…of morality” (Melville, Billy Budd 65) easily 
becomes the policemen.7
Seen in the dislocating light of the larger global historical context I have 
retrieved from the margins, the narrator’s chapters of Billy Budd that have 
traditionally been invoked to justify the allegorical or universalist read-
ing of Melville’s story undergo, in Louis Althusser’s phrase, a remarkable 
“change of terrain” very much like that undergone by the early chapters 
of “Benito Cereno” at the moment when Captain Amasa Delano’s Ameri-
can exceptionalist frame of reference (his “problematic”) is shattered by 
the revelation that the slaves have been in command of Don Benito’s ship 
from the time he had boarded it.8 These chapters come to be seen, that is, 
not as a prefiguration of the narrator’s final encomium to Captain Vere’s 
affirmation of law and order against revolutionary chaos (nor to Mel-
ville’s testament of acceptance), but as his representation of events that, 
saturated with the ominous aura of the state of exception, lead inexora-
bly to the preordained—“fated”—reduction of Billy’s body to “inarticu-
late” naked life and its execution in the sacred name of the security of the 
ship of state.
The Drumhead Court and the Unerring 
Logic of the State of Exception
This fated, unjustifiable, and violent “end” is inexorably enacted in the fi-
nal chapters that recount Vere’s reaction to Billy’s unintended killing of 
Claggart, his precipitous decision to hold a drumhead court immediately 
and behind closed doors (in secret), his imposition of his judgment on 
the recalcitrant court, and his execution of the innocent sailor. From the 
beginning to the end of this process, Vere is convinced of Billy’s inno-
cence and manifests deep, indeed fatherly, sympathy for the young man. 
But from the beginning to the end, too, Billy’s innocence is ruthlessly 
secondary in the captain’s mind to the security of the ship he commands 
in the name of the King and imperial Britain’s war against Napoleonic 
France. What is ontologically prior to Billy’s living being, that is, is Cap-
tain Vere’s deeply inscribed and unerring loyalty to the (lawless) law of 
the state of exception. This inexorably predetermined momentum should 
be rather obvious to an “informed gaze” (Althusser 24),9 but because it 
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has been rendered invisible by the supervisory gaze of those critics who 
have subscribed to one version or other of the testament of acceptance 
thesis, it will be necessary to spell it out systematically in what follows.
When, for example, the narrator recounts Billy’s deadly reaction to 
Claggart’s accusation during their encounter in the captain’s quarters, the 
first words Vere is given to utter in the aftermath of the death blow—they 
are spoken in a whisper, which is to say, to himself—are, “‘Fated boy…
what have you done?’”, thus going far to verify his criminal policeman’s 
mesmerizing/paralyzing power over his superior: Claggart’s command-
ing knowledge of Vere’s essential identity and, therefore, his foreknowl-
edge of the latter’s response to his allegation of the threat of mutiny. And 
then, after Vere ascertains that Claggart is dead, the narrator, in a trans-
formative moment of understanding that manifests itself as a dislocating 
question, goes on:
Captain Vere with one hand covering his face stood to all 
appearance as impassive as the object at his feet. Was he ab-
sorbed in taking in all the bearings of the event and what was 
best not only now at once to be done, but also in the sequel? 
Slowly he uncovered his face; and the effect was as if the moon 
emerging from eclipse should reappear with quite another aspect 
than that which had gone into hiding. The father in him, manifest-
ed toward Billy thus far in the scene, was replaced by the military 
disciplinarian. (Melville, Billy Budd 99–100; my emphasis)
This decisive transformation of Captain Vere from caring father to un-
deviating military disciplinarian is underscored when, after having called 
the surgeon in to verify Claggart’s death, he suddenly and “vehemently 
exclaim[s]…. Struck dead by an angel of God! Yet the angel must hang!” 
(101; my emphasis). And it culminates after Vere, having removed the 
dead body to a compartment opposite to that in which Billy had been im-
mured and categorically dismissing the surgeon, now deeply troubled by 
his superior’s “desire for secrecy” but compliant as a subordinate in the 
context of martial law, Vere announces his abnormal decision to “call a 
drumhead court” in secret instead of referring the case to the Admiralty, a 
higher and more public authority (101).
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Immediately following this marked double “eclipse”—the transforma-
tion of Captain Vere and, in some significant degree, of the narrator—the 
narrator focuses his narrative on that aspect of the captain’s authoritarian 
decision, above all, his arbitrary insistence on a trial of an obviously in-
nocent sailor to be held in secrecy, that seems not only irrational (as most 
commentary represents this moment), but morally and, above all, politi-
cally troubling to those who have become privy to the events ending in 
the death of Claggart:
Full of disquietude and misgiving, the surgeon left the cabin. 
Was Captain Vere suddenly affected in his mind, or was it but 
a transient excitement, brought about by so strange and ex-
traordinary a tragedy? [This question, not incidentally, applies 
not only to the surgeon, but to the narrator as well.] As to the 
drumhead court, it struck the surgeon as impolitic, if nothing 
more. The thing to do, he thought, was to place Billy Budd in 
confinement, and in a way dictated by usage, and postpone 
further action in so extraordinary a case to such time as they 
should rejoin the squadron, and then refer it to the admiral. 
He recalled the unwonted agitation of Captain Vere and his 
excited exclamations, so at variance with his normal manner. 
Was he unhinged? (102–03; my emphasis)
Tellingly, the narrator goes on to characterize the surgeon’s (and the 
other officers’) hesitant response to the Captain’s dislocating fiat by in-
voking the reductive and corrupting imperatives of the state of excep-
tion—and, by ironic implication, the democratic (public) openness that 
is annulled by the security promised by the abrogation of common law 
(“usage”), including that which guarantees human rights: “No more try-
ing situation is conceivable than that of an officer subordinate under a 
captain whom he suspects to be not mad, indeed, but yet not quite unaf-
fected in his intellect. To argue his order to him would be insolence. To 
resist him would be mutiny” (102).
In commenting on the surgeon’s tentative attribution of mental un-
hinging as the cause of the Captain’s arbitrary decision, the narrator, it is 
true, rightly interrogates a binarist interpretation of sanity and madness 
(and, for that matter, any form of the dyad, identity/difference, that is 
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reduced to the hierarchic binary that privileges order over chaos): “Who 
in the rainbow can draw the line where the violet tint ends and the or-
ange tint begins? Distinctly we see the difference of the colors, but where 
exactly does the one first blendingly enter into the other? So with sanity 
and insanity” (102). But this crucial qualification should not be read, as 
it has been by Barbara Johnson, Eve Sedgwick, Nancy Ruttenburg, and 
Sharon Cameron, as evidence of Melville’s final refusal to judge Vere in 
the name of undecidable ambiguity, a refusal that, as Brook Thomas in 
his critique of Johnson’s reading of Billy Budd, has decisively shown, 
could easily be interpreted as a license for political paralysis (Thomas 
51–78).10 In the next paragraph, the narrator writes, “Whether Captain 
Vere, as the surgeon professionally and privately surmised, was really the 
sudden victim of any degree of aberration, every one must determine 
for himself by such light as this narrative may afford” (102; my emphasis). 
Taking our directive from this suggestion that we read this complex social 
text symptomatically, we see the metaphor of the colors of the rainbow 
used by the narrator undergo a metamorphosis. As I have been suggest-
ing by way of bringing the hitherto marginalized martial law of the state 
of exception to center stage, we are enabled to tentatively conclude that 
the narrator is, in fact, referring to the dedifferentiating arbitrariness—
the allegorization—of Vere’s judgment after his eclyptic transformation. 
I mean, specifically, his arbitrary substitution (similar, not incidentally, to 
that of the imperialist British historians of the Great Mutiny and, as we 
shall see, of the official naval chroniclers of the “inside narrative” of the 
Bellipotent) of an unworldly worldly absolute, not for ambiguity as such, 
but for the (unjust) imbalance of power relations that always pertains in 
the world. And he does this, I suggest, in the name of pointing both to the 
injustice incumbent on reducing the complex socio-political occasion to 
decidable allegorical abstractions and to the political paralysis incumbent 
on reducing the actually existing imbalance of power to utterly undecid-
able ambiguity, that is, to the state of equivalence.
Be that as it may, it is no accident that, after underscoring Captain 
Vere’s transformation, the narrator returns to the larger historical occa-
sion that, in the eyes of the dominant British culture (the “naval author-
ity,” for whom the aftermath of the “suppressed insurrections” was “very 
critical”), justified the establishment of the state of exception:
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That the unhappy event [the death of Claggart] which has 
been narrated could not have happened at a worse juncture 
was but too true. For it was close on the heel of the suppressed 
insurrections [the “Great Mutiny”], an aftertime very critical 
to naval authority, demanding from every English sea com-
mander two qualities not readily interfusable—prudence and 
rigor. Moreover, there was something crucial in the case.
In the jugglery of circumstances preceding and attending the 
event on board the Bellipotent, and in the light of that mar-
tial code whereby it was formally to be judged, innocence 
and guilt personified in Claggart and Budd in effect changed 
places. In a legal view the apparent victim of the tragedy was 
he who had sought to victimize a man blameless; and the in-
disputable deed of the latter, navally regarded, constituted the 
most heinous of military crimes. Yet more. The essential right 
and wrong involved in the matter, the clearer that might be, 
so much the worse for the responsibility of a loyal sea com-
mander, inasmuch as he was not authorized to determine the 
matter on that primitive basis. (103; my emphasis)
In depicting the difficult conditions in which Captain Vere finds him-
self—the tremendous determining force of the “outside” world on the 
“inside” world of the Bellipotent—the narrator, it is true, expresses a 
certain sympathy for his terrible dilemma, even as he emphasizes the 
exacerbation of the imbalance of power—the chilling chiasma—that 
the martial law (the “legal view,” the situation “navally regarded”) has 
produced. But as he proceeds to reflect on Vere’s transformation, he in-
creasingly underscores the dehumanizing consequences of the state of 
exception—consequences that seep into every aspect of life in the public 
realm (the body politic of the Bellipotent). I quote the narrator at length 
to underscore the transformation that he has undergone in the process 
of relating the events that begin with Captain Vere’s response to Clag-
gart’s accusation:
Small wonder then that the Bellipotent’s captain, though in 
general a man of rapid decision, felt that circumspectness not 
less than promptitude was necessary. Until he could decide 
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upon his course, and in each detail; and not only so, but until 
the concluding measure was upon the point of being enacted, 
he deemed it advisable, in view of all the circumstances, to 
guard as much as possible against publicity. Here he may or may 
not have erred. Certain it is, however, that subsequently in the 
confidential talk of more than one or two gun rooms and cab-
ins he was not a little criticized by some officers, a fact imput-
ed by his friends and vehemently by his cousin Jack Denton to 
professional jealousy of Starry Vere. Some imaginative ground 
for invidious comment there was. The maintenance of secrecy in 
the matter, the confining all knowledge of it for a time to the place 
where the homicide occurred, the quarterdeck cabin; in these par-
ticulars lurked some resemblance to policy adopted in those trage-
dies of the palace which have occurred more than once in the capi-
tal founded by Peter the Barbarian. (103; my emphasis)
In highlighting the narrator’s repeated returns to the negative aspects 
in his meditation on Vere’s decision, against “usage,” to convene the 
drumhead court immediately and to carry out the proceedings in se-
cret—which is to say, in a space which is closed off from public scrutiny 
and provides immunity to judges that preside over it—I do not want to 
suggest that he is anticipating an indictment of Captain Vere’s person as 
such, as many critics have concluded in restricting the “case of Captain 
Vere” to the issue of universal morality versus expedience (“chronomet-
ricals” versus “horologicals”). Rather, I am suggesting that the target of 
his concern is wider than Vere or the individual, and more “political” in 
scope. Given the inexorable conditions produced by the insistent im-
pingement of the macrocosmic world on the microcosmic world of the 
Bellipotent (which are further emphasized by the narrator’s return to 
them—“the slumbering embers of the Nore among the crew” that “over-
ruled in Captain Vere every other consideration” [104]—immediately 
after this paragraph), Vere remains a sympathetic figure. Melville’s target, 
rather, as the resonant reference to Peter the Great as “Peter the Barbar-
ian” suggests, is a “civilization” of the “austere” sort—the rule of (pub-
lic) law of the “Power then [at the time of the Napoleonic Wars] all but 
the sole free conservative one of the Old World” (54)—that has been 
transformed into barbarism by the imposition of secrecy, the sine qua non 
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of the state of exception: ultimately, a reign of terror that has legally re-
duced the multitude—its lowly and powerless human victims—to bare 
life. It is a barbarism all the more barbarous in that the inhumane logic 
of its permanent lawless law is capable of harnessing a basically good and 
thoughtful man like Captain Vere as an unwitting agent of its totalizing 
dehumanizing cause: the reduction of bios to zoe, man as political animal 
to bare life.
That such a “civilizational” reading of this climactic passage of Billy 
Budd is a viable one is strongly enforced, I suggest, by recalling a strik-
ingly similar passage in Melville’s White Jacket, here, however, focusing 
on an American naval vessel, unequivocally indicting the dehumanizing 
secrecy that is intrinsic to martial law. It is a passage that, not inciden-
tally, culminates in an overt reference to the Somers Affair, which, it will 
be recalled some critics have said, instigated Melville’s Billy Budd, and 
which, not least, the narrator will invoke later in the chapter when he re-
counts the drumhead court proceedings that terminate in the decision to 
execute Billy:
What can be expected from a court whose deeds are done in 
the darkness of the recluse courts of the Spanish Inquisition? 
When that darkness is solemnized by an oath on the Bible? 
When an oligarchy of epaulets sits upon the bench, and a ple-
bian top-man, without a jury, stands judicially naked at the bar?
Some may urge that the severest operations of the code are 
tacitly made null in time of peace. But with respect to sev-
eral of the Articles [of War] this holds true, yet at any time 
any and all of them may be legally enforced. Nor have there 
been wanting recent instances, illustrating the spirit of this 
code, even in cases where the letter of the code was not alto-
gether observed. The well-known case of a United States brig 
furnished a memorable example, which at any moment may 
be repeated. Three men, in a time of peace, were then hung 
at the yard-arm, merely because, in the captain’s judgment, 
it became necessary to hang them. To this day the question 
of their complete guilt is socially discussed. (Melville, White 
Jacket 177; my emphasis)11
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But we need not appeal to a text published many years before to ar-
gue that what is fundamentally at stake in the narrator’s identification of 
Vere’s insistence on secrecy in the conduct of the “trial” with the terror-
ism of the Spanish inquisition and Peter the Barbarian is the corruption 
of civilization from top to bottom under the aegis of the state of excep-
tion. For this thesis is decisively enacted immediately after this reference 
by the drumhead court, a court—the first lieutenant, the captain of the 
marines, and the sailing master—strategically chosen, secretly convened, 
and single-mindedly determined by Captain Vere. From the beginning 
(as the only eye witness) and throughout the proceedings (as the pre-
siding judge), Captain Vere affirms the essential innocence of Billy Budd 
and expresses his deep, indeed fatherly, sympathy for him. That is to say, 
he acknowledges that, from the moral point of view, Billy is innocent 
and should be exonerated. But at no point in the process does Captain 
Vere deviate from the “law” of the state of exception—and the living dic-
tates of the dead policeman. As the narrator says (in a reference to the 
religious fanatics of the Inquisition serving God?) in inaugurating his ac-
count of the drama: “But a true military officer is in one particular like a 
true monk. Not with more of self-abnegation will the latter keep his vows 
of monastic obedience than the former his vows of allegiance to martial 
law” (Billy Budd 243).
This monkish comportment begins to assert itself openly when Billy, 
having been asked by the troubled captain of the marines why Claggart 
should have “so maliciously lied, since you declare there was no malice 
between you?” is unable to answer him and turns to Captain Vere for 
help. At this point, Vere, despite his natural sympathy for Billy and the 
compelling power of Billy’s helpless appeal, intervenes in his capacity as 
judge of the court by deflecting the captain of the marine’s focus on the 
(natural) moral register to the political. Driven by the inexorable logic of 
martial law, he says:
“The question you put to him comes naturally enough. But 
how can he rightly answer it,” designating the compartment 
where lay the corpse. “But the prone one here will not rise to 
our summons. In effect, though, as it seems to me, the point 
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you make is hardly material. Quite aside from any conceiv-
able motive actuating the master-at-arms, and irrespective of 
the provocation to the blow, a martial court must need in the 
present case confine its attention to the blow’s consequence, 
which consequence justly is to be deemed not otherwise than 
as the striker’s deed.” (107)
Billy’s response to this (to him) unexpected and enigmatic utterance, 
the narrator tells us in a metaphor that resonates with his reduction to 
bare life by Vere’s disciplinary logic, is “an interrogative look toward the 
speaker…not unlike that which a dog of generous breed might turn upon 
his master, seeking in his face, some elucidation of a previous gesture am-
biguous to the canine intelligence.” The court’s response is equally tell-
ing: they read in it “a meaning unanticipated, involving a prejudgment of 
the speaker’s part,” which “served to augment a mental disturbance pre-
viously evident enough” (108; my emphasis). This last is, of course, a 
reference to the disturbed surgeon’s earlier question following Vere’s pre-
cipitous decision to convene a drumhead court: “Was he [Captain Vere] 
unhinged?” But here, in the context of Vere’s relentlessly single-minded 
logic, it assumes a more definite meaning, one that recalls the narrator’s 
identification of Claggart’s as monomaniac (90)—and Melville’s devas-
tating criticism of Captain Ahab’s and the Indian-hater’s metaphysically 
ordained single-mindededness in Moby-Dick and The Confidence-Man, 
respectively.12
Seeing that the members of the court are deeply troubled by his unde-
viating logic—a disquiet, the narrator says, exacerbated by “his phraseol-
ogy, now and then…suggestive of the grounds whereon rested that im-
putation of a certain pedantry socially alleged against him” (109)—Vere 
repeats his monolithic argument, now, however, from his privileged po-
sition as the captain of the “threatened” ship, and thus in terms that ex-
plicitly relate it to the historical/political events—the “crisis” of the Bel-
lipotent’s “security”—that has justified the overt declaration of the state of 
exception as the permanent law. I quote this climactic passage at length 
not only to underscore the lawlessness of the “law” of the state of excep-
tion—the unmovable “center elsewhere” that is “out of reach of freeplay,” 
as it were,13 that inexorably determines Vere’s political “argument,” in-
cluding, not incidentally, the authoritative words concerning the moral 
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issue he puts into the mouths of his subordinates (and later into Billy’s). 
I quote it as well to demonstrate the subtle (casuist) way, epitomized by 
his reduction of those who would protect an innocent Billy’s life from a 
degrading death on moral grounds to “casuists,” his apparent argument 
becomes in the end an arbitrary final judgment: one that suppresses 
the aporias (doubts) which, opened to public scrutiny (the “political”), 
might undermine its higher—“paramount”—authority, or, as one of the 
officers puts it in response, the “lateral light” on “what remains a mystery 
in the matter” that might be shed by the depositions of the members of 
“the ship’s company”:
“Hitherto I have been but the witness, little more; and I 
should hardly think now to take another tone, that of your 
coadjutor for the time, did I not perceive in you—at the cri-
sis too—a troubled hesitancy, proceeding, I doubt not, from 
the clash of military duty with moral scruple—a scruple vital-
ized by compassion. For the compassion, how can I otherwise 
than share it? But, mindful of paramount obligations, I strive 
against scruples that may end to enervate decision. Not, gen-
tlemen, that I hide from myself that the case is an exceptional 
one. Speculatively regarded, it well might be referred to a jury 
of casuists. But for us here, acting not as casuists or moral-
ists, it is a case practical, and under martial law practicality to 
be dealt with.
“But your scruples: do they move as in a dusk? Challenge 
them. Make them advance and declare themselves. Come 
now; do they import something like this: If, mindless of pal-
liating circumstance, we are bound to regard the death of the 
master-at-arms as the prisoner’s deed, then does that deed 
constitute a capital crime whereof the penalty is a mortal one. 
But in natural justice is nothing but the prisoner’s overt act to 
be considered? How can we adjudge to summary and shame-
ful death a fellow creature innocent before God, and whom 
he we feel to be so?—Does that state it aright? You sign sad 
assent. Well, I too feel that, the full force of that. It is Nature. 
But do these buttons that we wear attest that our allegiance is to 
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Nature? No, to the King. Though the ocean, which is inviolate 
Nature primeval, though this be the element where we move 
and have our being as sailors, yet as the King’s officers lies our 
duty in a sphere correspondingly natural? So little is that true, 
that in receiving our commissions we in the most important re-
gards ceased to be natural free agents. When war is declared are we 
the commissioned fighters previously consulted? We fight at com-
mand. If our judgments approve the war, that is but coincidence. 
So in other particulars. So now. For suppose condemnation to 
follow these present proceedings. Would it be so much we our-
selves that would condemn as it would be martial law operating 
through us? For that law and the rigor of it, we are not responsible. 
Our vowed responsibility is in this: That however pitilessly 
that law may operate in any instance, we nevertheless adhere 
to it and administer it. (Billy Budd 110–11; my emphasis)
When Captain Vere realizes that his appeal to duty to the King over 
natural inclination, responsibility to the dictates of the monarch over free 
will, does not appease the uneasiness of the court’s members, he modifies 
his argument against the (female) heart to include “private conscience.” 
In the process, he also modifies his particular appeal to duty to the King 
to include overtly the larger and finally more substantial obedience to the 
“imperial” imperatives of the martial law (the state of exception) and the 
security state precipitated by Britain’s global war against Napoleon:
“But something in your aspects seems to urge that it is not 
solely the heart that moves in you, but also the conscience, 
the private conscience. But tell me whether or not, occupying 
the position we do, private conscience should not yield to that 
imperial one formulated in the code under which alone we of-
ficially proceed?...
“To steady us a bit let us recur to the facts—In wartime at sea 
a man-of-war’s man strikes his superior in grade, and the blow 
kills. Apart from its effect, the blow itself is, according to the 
Articles of War, a capital crime. (101)
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At this point the officer of the marines emotionally interrupts the cap-
tain’s unerring line of thought to remind him that “Billy proposed neither 
mutiny nor homicide.” In response, Vere underscores his invocation of 
martial law against conscience, including its justification of impressment, 
an allusion that cannot help but evoke the memory of Billy’s arbitrary en-
listment into the ranks of the Bellipotent from “The Rights-of-Man,” not to 
say, the anti-Burkean author of the pamphlet from which it drew its name:
Surely not, my good man. And before a court less arbitrary 
and more merciful than a martial one that plea would largely 
extenuate. At the Last Assizes it shall acquit. But how here? 
We proceed under the law of the Mutiny Act. In feature no 
child can resemble his father more than that Act resembles in 
spirit the thing from which it derives—War. In His majesty’s 
service—in this ship indeed—there are Englishmen forced to 
fight for the King against their will. Against their conscience, for 
aught we know. Though as their fellow creatures some of us 
may appreciate their positions, yet as navy officers, what reck 
we or it?... War looks but to the frontage, the appearance. And the 
Mutiny Act, War’s child, takes after the father. Budd’s intent or 
nonintent is nothing to the purpose. (111–12)
Following this reduction of depth to surface, life to bare life, the falter-
ing junior lieutenant, in a last desperate effort to save Billy from hanging, 
asks Captain Vere whether or not the court could “convict and yet miti-
gate the penalty.” Vere, now decisively and with absolute finality, returns 
to the political context: to what I have been asserting from the beginning 
as the indissoluble relationship between the “outside” story (the insurrec-
tions at Spithead and the Nore instigated by the “Revolutionary Spirit”) 
and the “inside” story (the events on board the Bellipotent), that is, to the 
hierarchical relation between “Them” and “Us,” the erratic “multitude” 
under aristocratic/imperial disciplinary rule:
“Gentleman, were that clearly lawful for us under the circum-
stances, consider the consequences of such clemency. The peo-
ple [meaning the ship’s company] have native sense; most of 
them are familiar with our naval usage and tradition, and how 
would they take it? Even could you explain to them—which 
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our official position forbids—they, long molded by arbitrary 
discipline, have not that kind of intelligent responsiveness that 
might qualify them to comprehend and discriminate. No, to the 
people the foretopman’s deed, however it be worded in the an-
nouncement, will be plain homicide committed in a flagrant 
act of mutiny. What penalty for that should follow, they know. 
But it does not follow. Why [narrator’s emphasis]? They will 
ruminate. You know what sailors are. Will they not revert to the 
recent outbreak at the Nore? Ay. They know the well-founded 
alarm—the panic it struck throughout England. Your clement 
sentence they would account pusillanimous. They would think 
that we flinch, that we are afraid of them—afraid of practicing 
a lawful rigor singularly demanded at this juncture lest it should 
provide new troubles. What shame to us such a conjecture on 
their part, and how deadly to discipline. You see then, whith-
er, prompted by duty and law, I steadfastly drive. But I beseech 
you, my friends, do not take me amiss. I feel as you do for this 
unfortunate boy. But did he know our hearts, I take him to be 
of that generous nature that he would feel even for us on whom in 
this military necessity so heavy a compulsion is laid.” (112–13; 
my emphasis)
In the eyes of Captain Vere, in sum, as these speeches insistently and 
chillingly testify in both what they say and leave unsaid, Billy (and the 
common sailors), despite his innocence in the face of a life and death 
charge, is as nothing or a nobody in comparison to the safety of his ship 
and the security of his nation, irregardless of the morality or immorality 
of the latter’s motives and practice. Nowhere in his eloquent and mas-
terfully strategic address to the officers of the drumhead court does he 
invoke the question of the reality of the threat, to say nothing about the 
exceptionalist motives of the King (the dominant imperial culture) he 
(and his officers) so dutifully would obey. Despite Vere’s sympathy, Billy 
is finally only an afterthought to Vere’s monolithic commitment to the 
unerring disciplinary (biopolitical) imperatives of the state of exception, 
and his shipmates, the anonymous erratic vehicle of threat. They literally 
do not count in an accounting (value) system that privileges the security 
of the abstract national whole. This is what I meant when, earlier, I said 
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that Billy did not stand a chance. He and his fellow sailors (the multi-
tude) are, in Alain Brossat’s apt term, “L’inarticulable” (the “inarticulate”), 
in a world in which language—and the institutions of it dissemination—
is utterly controlled by the masters.
Despite their abiding doubts, the members of the drumhead court ca-
pitulate in the end to the Vere’s inclusive judgment, partly because of his 
earnestness, partly in deference to his superior intelligence, but also, as 
the narrator tellingly puts it, partly because of his “closing appeal to their 
[collective] instinct as sea officers: in the forethought he threw out as to 
the practical consequences to discipline, considering the unconfirmed 
tone of the fleet at the time, should a man-of-war’s man’s violent killing at 
sea of a superior in grade be allowed to pass for aught else than a capital 
crime demanding prompt infliction of the penalty” (113). This egregious 
reduction of historical reality in the name of vocation—a higher call-
ing—that is, is further testimony to the insidious moral and sociopoliti-
cal effects of the normalization of the state of exception.
If, then, we are attuned by what precedes Captain Vere’s justificatory 
discourse—his commitment to the security state in the name of the state 
of exception—to the narrator’s overdetermination of those corrosive as-
pects of knowledge production and sociopolitical life on board the Bel-
lipotent that render it a police state, it is difficult not to read that discourse 
as a reactionary political argument. However benign his motives may be, 
Vere not only legitimizes those corrosive sociopolitical conditions but 
also contributes to the establishment of a corrupt moral environment 
that enables less-righteous leaders to take advantage of them with im-
punity. Read in terms of the preceding context established by the narra-
tor, in other words, Vere’s “steadfast” commitment to his calling provides 
license to the executive agency (as opposed to the “people” and/or the 
representatives of the people) to abuse its monolithic power in behalf of 
disciplining—of biopoliticizing—the volatile” multitude. In a way that is 
remarkably proleptic of the entire Cold War and post-9/11 American oc-
casion, the ruthless biopolitical imperatives of martial law Vere privileges 
over the life of the innocent and utterly helpless Billy Budd or, more to 
his point (if we take his remarkably low opinion of the ordinary seamen 
that man the man-of-war he commands, seriously), over the “the people,” 
authorizes the sovereign executive to deliberately annul communication 
216 William V. Spanos
in the social space, institute a climate of fear in the body politic, establish 
the practice of secret policing, produce the informant mentality, deny hu-
man rights to the accused, inflict torture to elicit “confession,” and abro-
gate free speech and public trial by a jury of peers. Read attentively, in 
short, the narrator’s juxtaposition of Vere’s “argument” with the “inside 
story” enables us to see that the latter’s decisionist justificatory voca-
tional discourse authorizes the sovereign executive to produce the truth it 
wants. This is epitomized by the “authorized” account of the events on 
board the Bellipotent, “doubtless for the most part written in good faith,” 
which represents the criminal as the victim and the victim as the criminal 
and ends decisively with an encomium to the peace the execution pro-
duced: “‘The criminal paid the penalty of his crime. The promptitude of 
the punishment has proved salutary. Nothing amiss is now apprehended 
aboard H.M.S. Bellipotent’” (130–31). In thus pointing to the indissolu-
ble relationship between the state of the exception and the fabrication of 
the truth, the narrator’s juxtaposition of the Captain’s argument with the 
actual events on the man-of-war, it also enables us to see that Melville’s 
Billy Budd speaks truth to the power of own contemporary occasion. The 
investigative reporter Ron Suskind bears telling, if unwitting, witness to 
this at the height of the George W. Bush administration’s power:
The aide [a “senior advisor” in the White House] said that 
guys like me were “in what we call the reality-based commu-
nity,” which he defined as people who “believe that solutions 
emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.” I 
nodded and murmured something about enlightenment prin-
ciples and empiricism. He cut me off. “That’s not the way the 
world really works anymore,” he continued. “We’re an empire 
now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while 
you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll 
act again, creating other new realities which you can study too, 
and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors…
and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.” (n.p.)
All of which is to say that Vere’s domesticated Ahabian affirmation of 
the illicit law of the state of exception, despite his unquestionable probity 
and his fatherly sympathy for Billy, opens the door to the formation of a 
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polity in which politics is reduced to biopower and the “people” of the 
body politic to “bare life”: to what, a hundred years later, Giorgio Agam-
ben, following Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt, has called, in its lim-
it situation, the polity of “the [concentration] camp” in his meditations 
on the state of exception in the wake of its increasing presence in modern 
democratic societies:
[T]he birth of the camp in our time appears as an event that 
decisively signals the political space of modernity itself. It 
is produced at the point at which the political system of the 
modern nation-state, which was founded on the functional 
nexus between a determinate localization (land) and a deter-
minate order (the state) and mediated by autonomous rules 
for the inscription of life (birth or nation), enters into lasting 
crisis, and the State decides to assume directly the care of the 
nation’s biological life as one of its proper tasks…. The state 
of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension 
of the juridico-political order, now becomes a new and stable 
spatial arrangement inhabited by the bare life that more and 
more can no longer be inscribed in that order. The growing 
dissociation of birth (bare life) and the nation-state is the 
new fact of politics in our day, and what we call camp is this 
disjunction. To an order without localization (the state of ex-
ception, in which law is suspended) there now corresponds 
a localization without order (the camp as permanent space 
of exception). The political system no longer orders forms of 
life and juridical rules in a determinate space, but instead con-
tains at its very center a dislocating localization that exceeds it 
and into which every form of life and every rule can be virtu-
ally taken. The camp as dislocating localization is the hidden 
matrix of the politics in which we are still living, and it is this 
structure of the camp that we must learn to recognize in all 
its metamorphoses into the zones d’attentes of our airports and 
certain outskirts of our cities. The camp is the fourth, insepa-
rable element that has now added itself to- and so broken—
the old trinity composed of the state, the nation (birth), and 
land. (Agamben, Homo Sacer 175–76)
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Notes
1. This school of Billy Budd criticism was inaugurated after the publication of the 
novella in England in 1924 by such British critics as John Middleton Murray 
(433) and John Freeman (131–36). It received its name with the publication of 
E. L. Grant Watson’s “Melville’s Testament of Acceptance” (227–319).
2. This school was inaugurated in the 1950s by “ironist” readings such as those 
of Joseph Schiffman (128–36) and Phil Withim (115–27).
3. See for instance Barbara Johnson “Melville’s Fist” 567–99 and The Critical 
Difference (79–109); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (91–130); Nancy Ruttenburg 
(344–78); and Sharon Cameron (180–204).
4. “[W]hatever convokes someone to the composition of a subject is something 
extra, something that happens in situations as something that they and the 
usual way of behaving in them cannot account for. Let us say that a subject, which 
goes beyond the animal (although the animal remains the sole foundation 
[support]) needs something to have happened, something that cannot be 
reduced to its ordinary inscription in ‘what there is’. Let us call this supplement 
an event, and let us distinguish multiple-being, where it is not a matter of 
truth (but only opinions), from the event, which compels us to decide a new 
way of being. Such events are well and truly attested: the French Revolution 
of 1792, the meeting of Heloise and Abelard, Galileo’s creation and physics, 
Hayden’s invention of the classical musical style…but also: the Cultural 
Revolution in China (1965–67) [i.e., in politics, love, science, and art]…” 
(Baidou 42; my emphasis, except for “subject”).
5. “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” in The Frontier in 
America History (1–38). This culminating nation-defining essay was first 
delivered on July 12, 1893 at the World Fair in Chicago, which featured “The 
White City,” the Gilded Age’s version of the Puritans’ “city on the hill.” For 
a revisionary account of the American jeremiad as represented by Sacvan 
Bercovitch in The American Jeremiad (1978) that points to the indissoluble 
relationship between American exceptionalism, the expanding frontier (i.e., 
the need for a perpetual enemy), and the state of exception and takes its point 
of departure from Melville’s reading of the origins of the American national 
identity, see Spanos (“American Exceptionalism” 187–241).
6. In The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783.
7. Hannah Arendt makes precisely this still to be fully thought point about 
the politics endemic to the state of exception in her powerful critique of 
the French Third Republic’s handling of the Dreyfuss Affair by way of her 
synecdochical account of the radical anti-Semite, Jules Guerin: “The most 
modern figure on the side of the Anti-Dreyfusards was probably Jules Guerin. 
Ruined in business, he had begun his political career as a police stool pigeon, 
and acquired that flair for discipline and organization which invariably marks 
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the underworld. This he was later to divert into political channels, becoming 
the founder and head of the Ligue Antisemite [sic]. In him high society found 
its first criminal hero. In its adulation of Guerin bourgeois society showed 
clearly that in its code of morals and ethics it had broken for good with it own 
standard” (111). More immediately, chronologically and geographically, I 
think, for example, of the relationship between Senator Joseph McCarthy 
and the US government under President Dwight Eisenhower, and, even 
most recently and tellingly, between Dick Cheney and the US government 
under President George W. Bush. See Barton Gellman’s Angler: The Cheney 
Vice Presidency.
8. See my “Althusserian” reading of “Benito Cereno” in Herman Melville and the 
American Calling (105–22).
9. Althusser is here distinguishing between the “oversight” of capitalist vision 
(its “problematic”) and Marx’s “informed gaze,” which, precisely because it 
is aware of the blindness of super-vision, can see what the latter unwittingly 
is blind to.
10. See Spanos’ The Exceptional State and the State of Exception: Herman Melville’s 
Billy Budd, 68–70 for further commentary on this issue.
11. In their “Notes and Commentaries,” the editors of the definitive edition of 
Billy Budd note this striking parallel, even say that the sentence referring 
to Peter the Barbarian “is nearer than any other in Billy Budd to indicating 
disapproval of Vere’s course of action” (177). Indeed, they go on to point to 
other similar passages in Melville’s writing, most notably in Redburn, Moby-
Dick, and “I am a Chimney.” But they do not pursue its implications.
12. “The white whale swam before him as the monomaniacal incarnation of all 
those malicious agencies which some deep men felt eating in them, till they 
are left living on with half a heart and half a lung. That intangible malignity 
which has been from the beginning: to which dominion even the modern 
Christians ascribe one-half of the world; which the ancient Ophites of the 
east reverenced in their statue devil:—Ahab did not fall down and worship it 
like them; but deliriously transferring its idea to the abhorred white whale, he 
pitted himself, all mutilated, against it. All that most maddens and torments; 
all that stirs up the lees of things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks 
the sinews and cakes the brain, all subtle demonisms of life and thought; all 
evil, to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically assailable 
in Moby Dick. He piled upon the whale’s white hump the sum of all the 
general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam down; and then, as if 
his chest had been a mortar, he burst his hot heart’s shell upon it” (Melville, 
Moby-Dick 184).See also The Confidence-Man; His Masquerades: “The Indian-
hater par excellence the judge defined to be one ‘who, having with his mother’s 
milk drank in small love for red men, in his youth or early manhood, ere the 
sensibilities becomes osseous, received at their hands some signal outrage, or, 
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which in effect is the same some of his kin have, or some friend. Now, nature 
all around him by her solitudes wooing or bidding him muse on the matter, 
he accordingly does so, till the thought develops such attraction, that much as 
straggling vapors troop from all sides to a storm-cloud, so straggling thoughts 
of other outrages troop to the nucleus thought, assimilate with it, and swell 
it. At last, taking council with the elements, he comes to his resolution. An 
intenser Hannibal, he makes a vow, the hate of which is a vortex from whose 
suction scarce the remotest chip of the guilty race may reasonably feel secure. 
With the solemnity of a Spaniard turned monk, he takes leave of his kin; or 
rather, these leave-takings have something of the still more impressive finality 
of death-bed adieus. Last, he commits himself to the forest primeval; there, 
so long as life shall be his, to act upon a calm cloistered scheme of strategical, 
implacable, and lonesome vengeance. Ever on the noiseless trail; cool, 
collected, patient; less seen than felt; snuffing, smelling—a Leatherstocking 
Nemesis’” (149–50).
13. “[T]he center…closes off the play which it opens up and makes possible. 
As center, it is the point at which the substitution of contents, elements, or 
terms is no longer possible. At the center, the permutation or transformation 
of elements…is forbidden. At least this permutation has always remained 
interdicted…. Thus it has always been thought that the center, which is by 
definition unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which while 
governing the structure, escapes structurality. This is why classical thought 
concerning structure could say the center is paradoxically within the structure 
and outside it. The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the 
center does not belong to the totality (is not a part of the totality), the totality 
has its center elsewhere. The center is not the center. The concept of centered 
structure—although it represents coherence itself…is contradictorily 
coherent” (Derrida 279).
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Chapter 10
The Ethics of Trauma/The Trauma of Ethics
Terror After Levinas
Zahi Zalloua
Trauma theory and continental ethical theory share a deep affinity in US 
academia. The former is arguably an example of the latter. And as one 
would expect, for those who are generally hostile to continental philoso-
phy—or its manifestation as literary theory in literature departments—
trauma theory is seen as a doubly suspicious field of study. Emmanuel 
Levinas has contributed perhaps more than any other thinker to the 
fusion, if not conflation, of ethics and trauma. For Levinas, ethics is de-
fined primarily as a hermeneutic disruption provoked by exposure to the 
Other’s alterity. In the paradigmatic face-to-face encounter, the Self expe-
riences a shock when faced with the Other, or when faced with the face of 
the Other, more precisely; we could even say that the face-to-face encoun-
ter is an event of terror. In this paper, I want to explore and scrutinize 
Levinas’s terrorizing model of ethics, looking more closely at the logic of 
victimhood and the rhetoric of passivity that are often associated with 
both trauma studies and a certain brand of postmodern ethical theory. 
More generally, my article aims at the pedagogical difficulties in teach-
ing a Levinasian-inspired ethics: how does one teach about the trauma of 
ethics, about ethics as persecution in a post-9/11 political environment 
characterized as a perpetual “War on Terror”?
Indeed, an ethics of the Other worthy of its name must pass through 
the test of politics; an ethical philosophy of absolute alterity must invari-
ably confront the material realities of politics. Yet such a test always risks 
distortion if it ends up resulting in the mere translation of ethics into 
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politics. In tackling this thorny issue, I have chosen to focus on the im-
age of the Jew as a recurrent figure of radical otherness: a figure whose 
deployment often entails a dangerous conflation of ethics and politics.
From Sartre to Levinas, continental philosophers have turned and 
returned time and again to the example of the Jew as the paradigmatic 
object of and model for ethical inquiry. In Anti-Semite and Jew, Jean-Paul 
Sartre was arguably the first twentieth-century philosopher to romanti-
cize the Jew, setting him in opposition to France’s outmoded and diluted 
bourgeois self.1 More than a figure of marginalization, the Jew gains in 
Levinas’s work far greater rhetorical force. Levinas dedicates his book 
Otherwise than Being “To the memory of those who were closest among 
the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions 
on millions of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred 
of the other man, the same anti-Semitism.” Levinasian ethics and trauma 
studies are both the result of, and a response to, the Holocaust, to the state 
of philosophy after Auschwitz. They radically challenge prior notions of 
autonomy and comprehension—two key notions for traditional ethical 
theory. The challenge to comprehension comes from a desire to respect 
the opacity of the Other, from a recognition of the dangers of hermeneu-
tic violence; my relation to the Other is not a relation of knowledge. This 
interpretive sensibility is emblematic of what I call an “ethics of trauma.” 
And what I call “the trauma of ethics” is a further qualification of the 
Self ’s rational agency and interpretive capacity. Ethics is not an interpre-
tive attitude that one can adopt or refuse; rather, ethics is something that 
terrorizes me (ethics as persecution), that interpellates me, and compels 
me to act. In this respect, ethics is a profoundly heteronomous condition.
Anyone who has taught Levinas, however, knows that the pull toward 
abstraction is strong: how does such an ethics of the Other translate into 
real everyday life? Recourse to examples often function to counter this 
pull, to satisfy the hunger for specificity. Levinas does offer some exam-
ples. He refers to the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, but it is the 
figure of the Jew (as we saw in his dedication) which seems to exemplify 
best the perplexities of his ethics. A host of questions, however, immedi-
ately arise: what is at stake in thinking the Other as Jew?2 Is a rhetoric of 
exceptionalism or exemplarity, with its unavoidable ontological residue, 
at odds with shifting political realities? Within this paradigm, what then 
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becomes of the Arab, the Other of the Jew, the Other of the Other, so to 
speak?3 Does trauma studies, in its desire to bear witness to the past sub-
ject of suffering—in its attempt to come to terms with the subject after 
Auschwitz—bracket from analysis present operations of power? Would, 
then, a more sensitive historical approach expose the Palestinian as the 
Other of the Israeli? Finally, should we, as Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek 
have more recently urged, critically revisit a paradigm of ethics that has 
been identified almost exclusively with radical alterity, an interpretive ho-
rizon under which the Jew as a paradoxical figure of exemplary otherness 
has flourished? In pursuit of these questions, I would like to turn here 
to a brief account of Levinasian ethics and its major detractors, and then 
trace the way the debate over the viability of an “ethics of alterity” spills 
over and implicitly frames the politically contentious discussion of the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
In his polemical study Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, 
Alain Badiou exposes the mystification of difference so prevalent in con-
temporary ethical and political discourses. Returning to the source, as it 
were, Badiou flatly rejects Levinas’s contention that the Other is “without 
mediation” (Levinas, “Meaning and Sense” 53). To recall, in Totality and 
Infinity, Levinas describes the face-to-face encounter as a crucial instant 
of cognitive frustration; the Other’s face exceeds my attempt at interpre-
tive mastery, bringing into question my autonomy, spontaneity, and self-
sufficiency (50). For Badiou, however, Levinas’s ethics of alterity is both 
dubious and deceptive; it claims to treat all others as others but in fact 
distinguishes between others who resemble oneself and those who do 
not. As Badiou puts it, “[T]his celebrated ‘other’ is acceptable only if he is 
a good other…. That is to say: I respect differences, but only, of course, in 
so far as that which differs also respects, just as I do, the said differences” 
(Ethics 24). On Badiou’s account, an ethics of alterity is profoundly ideo-
logical; it only masquerades as a respect for difference; in reality, it prac-
tices the crudest kind of ethical reductionism.
Levinas’s own struggle with articulating a philosophy of the Other 
that is not simply formal and abstract is brought to light most clearly in 
a radio interview broadcasted shortly after the massacres of hundreds of 
Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Israeli-occupied 
Lebanon in 1982. News of the massacres shocked the world and deeply 
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affected the Jewish community, leading the interviewer to ask Levinas, 
“Emmanuel Levinas, you are the philosopher of the ‘other.’ Isn’t history, 
isn’t politics the very site of the encounter with the ‘other,’ and for the 
Israeli isn’t the ‘other’ above all Palestinian?” Levinas answers:
My definition of the other is completely different. The other 
is the neighbor, who is not necessarily my kin but who may 
be. But if your neighbor attacks another neighbor, or treats 
him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another 
character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least we are 
faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is 
wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who 
are wrong. (“Ethics and Politics” 294)
Levinas’s response disappoints; it even calls into question his entire 
philosophy of the Other. Martin Jay voices what came to be a common 
response to Levinas’s stance on the massacres, on what distinguishes a 
good neighbor (neighbor as kin) from bad neighbor (neighbor as enemy): 
“Here the infinity of alterity, the transcendence of mere being by ethical 
commands, the hostage-like substitution of self for other, are abruptly 
circumscribed by the cultural-cum-biological limits of permissible kin-
ship alliance” (87).
On this reading, it is not Levinas’s philosophy of the Other itself that is 
questioned, but only its inconsistency or “misguided” application. What 
could be more contrary to Levinasian ethics than an appeal to religious 
and national sameness (as the basis for ethical or political action)? More-
over, Levinas’s comment that “there are people who are wrong” seems 
to confuse the victim and the aggressor. In the context of an answer ad-
dressing the massacres of Sabra and Shatila, it is clear that the persecuted, 
fragile, vulnerable Other here is the Palestinian refugee, not the Israeli oc-
cupier. Yet more recently, Robert Bernasconi cautioned that this line of 
inquiry is misleading in that it risks distorting Levinas’s actual account of 
the Other. According to Bernasconi, Levinas refuses “to treat the notion 
of alterity as a sociological category that might be applied as a cultural 
or ethnic designation” (247). In other words, the Levinasian Other is 
not a postcolonial Other; it is never the by-product of a process of oth-
ering. On one level, Bernasconi is absolutely right; Levinas’s philosophy 
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of the Other must be situated within the phenomenological tradition, a 
tradition that Levinas seriously questions by challenging the powers of 
consciousness to grasp the meaning of its enigmatic object (the face of 
the Other). As a result, any self/Other relation is always (at some level) 
asymmetrical, involving both a joining and disjoining, proximity and dis-
tance, a “relation without relation” (rapport sans rapport), as Levinas calls 
it elsewhere (Totality and Infinity 80). So the Palestinian cannot lay any 
special claim to being the Other of the Jew/Israeli. Yet, on another level, 
Bernasconi’s careful (one could say faithful) reading of Levinas’s Other 
minimizes the phantasmatic investment in the image of the Jew as a fig-
ure of radical alterity, an image that Levinas, as we have seen, does much 
to perpetuate. Evoking the Palestinian as the Other of the Israeli might be 
interpreted less as a descriptive account of the ethico-political situation 
than a rhetorical move aiming at disrupting an ideologically captivating 
image of the persecutor and the persecuted.
Less concerned with assessing Levinas on his own terms, Slavoj Žižek 
raises questions about the political viability of Levinasian ethics. What 
Žižek finds most problematic in Levinas’s language is not the inconsis-
tency of his thought, Zionist ideology, or cold indifference to the plight of 
the Palestinians, but the necessary failure to translate theory into practice, 
the failure of an ethics that cannot produce a progressive politics. “What 
Levinas is basically saying is that, as a principle, respect for alterity is un-
conditional (the highest sort of respect), but, when faced with a concrete 
other, one should nonetheless see if he is a friend or an enemy. In short, 
in practical politics, the respect for alterity strictly means nothing” (Or-
gans without Bodies 106). In his essay “Neighbors and Other Monsters: A 
Plea for Ethical Violence,” Žižek develops this line of critique, taking is-
sue with what he sees as the Levinasian fascination with the Other, which 
blinds one to the suffering of concrete others: “[T]he true ethical step is 
the one beyond the face of the other, the one of suspending the hold of the 
face, the one of choosing against the face, for the third” (183). True eth-
ics, then, necessitates a move away from the dyadic moment of the face-
to-face encounter (the ethical proper) to an incorporation of the Other’s 
others (the political proper).4
A typical gesture among readers sympathetic to Levinas who would 
prefer to de-emphasize the tension or friction between ethics and 
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politics while still alluding to their significant differences is to argue for 
the incommensurability of the two realms.5 Rather than pursuing this ap-
proach, however, Badiou, like Žižek, calls for an ethics grounded in the 
recognition of the Same:
The whole ethical predication based upon recognition of the 
other should be purely and simply abandoned. For the real 
question…is much more that of recognizing the Same…. The 
Same, in effect, is not what is (i.e. the infinite multiplicity of 
differences) but what comes to be. (Ethics 25, 27)
As one could expect, Badiou’s way of thinking of the political and the 
ethical makes him especially hostile to the language of exceptionalism. In 
his 2005 piece “Uses of the Word ‘Jew,’” published in his book Polemics—
a text that has generated harsh criticism6 —Badiou contests the mystical 
meaning of the notion of “Jew”:
Today it is not uncommon to read that “Jew” is indeed a name 
beyond ordinary names. And it seems to be presumed that, 
like an inverted original sin, the grace of having been an in-
comparable victim can be passed down not only to descen-
dants and to the descendants of descendants but to all who 
come under the predicate in question, be they heads of state 
or armies engaging in the severe oppression of those whose 
lands they have confiscated. (160)
While critics have tended to minimize somewhat the relevance of Ba-
diou’s Polemics, I would stress its significance for an understanding of 
Badiou’s ethical and political position. If the Badiou of the book Ethics 
pursued a critique of an ethics of alterity, the Badiou of Polemics histori-
cizes his critique through a careful analysis of the Jew as an ideological in-
terpretive category, as a fetishized predicate. Though there are no explicit 
references to Levinas in this essay, Levinas’s thought, I would argue, is 
far from absent. In fact, it is precisely the following type of passages from 
Levinas’s Difficult Freedom that Badiou finds most objectionable:
The traumatic experience of my slavery in Egypt consti-
tutes my very humanity, a fact that immediately allies me to 
the workers, the wretched, and the persecuted people of the 
The Ethics of Trauma/The Trauma of Ethics 229
world…. Among the millions of human beings who encoun-
tered misery and death, the Jews alone experienced a total 
dereliction. They experienced a condition inferior to that of 
things, an experience of total passivity, an experience of Pas-
sion. (11, 26)
The traumatic experiences of Jews endow them with a unique capacity 
to identify with the suffering of all others. Their trauma attests to the uni-
versal human core of ethical subjectivity, to their exemplarity as a people: 
their trauma is a sign of both their uniqueness (their election) and hu-
manity’s vulnerability (we are all potentially Jews).
Badiou’s critique alerts us to the convoluted metaphysics, to the phan-
tasmatic structure, underpinning this use and abuse of the signifier Jew: 
“[W]hat is at issue is to know whether or not, in the general field of pub-
lic intellectual discussion, the word ‘Jew’ constitutes an exceptional signi-
fier, such that it would be legitimate to make it play the role of a final, or 
even sacred, signifier” (Polemics 158). The problem here for Badiou is not 
that the current representation of Jews as victims somehow distorts the 
actual history of Jews. On the contrary, Badiou repeatedly acknowledges 
the historical tragedy of the Jews and insists on the need to remain vigi-
lant and to denounce explicit and latent anti-Semitism whenever it mani-
fests itself. His point rather is that a certain ideology of the Jew, “a certain 
philo-Semitism” (159), as he calls it, generally conditions mainstream 
Western discussion of Israeli politics.7 The Jews’ unprecedented histori-
cal suffering transforms them as a people from “victims” to “Victims” of 
Humanity, guaranteeing them the (timeless) status of (morally untouch-
able) Other—giving them, in turn, a paradigmatic status in trauma stud-
ies.8 But such a metamorphosis has political implications, especially for 
anyone who finds him- or herself opposed to Israel and its policies. This 
transformation gives the right to the Israeli Jew, as to any Jew, to profess 
his or her universalism (the history of Jews is the history of Humanity9
) and to maintain a right to difference (a righteous defense of the Jew-
ish state, a state to which the charge of state terrorism can never stick, for 
example). The Jews are always the object of terror—never the subjects 
or agents of terror. Attempts to expose the uneasy relation of these two 
claims, to scrutinize their dubious conflation, often earn the critic the 
pernicious label of anti-Semite. With this ubiquitous threat, Palestinians 
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and advocates of the Palestinian cause are, as a result, constantly silenced, 
discredited, or excluded from the realm of rational public discourse, 
amounting to, as Badiou points out, nothing short of “political black-
mail” (Polemics 162).
It is clear that the Self as victim, though not an unproblematic ethical 
model, does open up or provide you (for the one who can claim this you) 
some avenues for remedy. To claim victimhood, or better yet to have an 
ostensibly “neutral” third party (such as the Western media) claim it for 
you, can often succeed in arousing, in the international public arena, feel-
ings of pathos (guilt, empathy, pity, compassion, etc.) that are becoming 
a precondition for understanding a people’s plight. Unless I can see you 
as a victim—as someone who has endured an injustice and can only re-
act in defense, never offensively, I will not be amenable to empathizing 
with you nor moved to intervene and rectify the political situation. In her 
article “Compassion and Terror,” Martha Nussbaum makes some perti-
nent observations about the precondition for compassion between Self 
and Others. In her example, it is the poor. Nussbaum considers the rea-
sons why some people fail to cultivate any sense of compassion toward 
them. She writes: “People who have the idea that the poor brought their 
poverty upon themselves by laziness fail, for that reason, to have com-
passion for them” (15). It is not difficult to expand Nussbaum’s reading 
to the Palestinians. For those who fail to have compassion for the Pales-
tinians, the Palestinians are seen as responsible for their condition. The 
story goes as follows: the Palestinians had several chances at peace and 
co-existence with Israel, from 1948 to Bill Clinton’s last push in 2000; but 
each time, the Palestinians chose violence over peace. The Palestinians 
therefore cannot be seen as victims—objects of empathy and compas-
sion—if they are construed as the primary agents of their misery.
This narrative helps to explain the failure of the mainstream American 
public to be outraged by the continued hardship of the Palestinians.10
In the American imaginary, the Palestinian is not a traumatized subject; 
seeing him as a heteronomous subject, a fractured cogito (which would 
constitute an attempt at comprehension, an attempt at understanding 
the social, economic, and political conditions which could have helped 
to produce him as a so-called terrorist) is simply interpreted as an en-
dorsement, rationalization, or justification of Palestinian violence. In the 
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American imaginary, the Palestinian is thus never the victim but almost 
always the Israeli’s aggressor.11 But what explains this persistent mis-
recognition of the Palestinians? Is it a public relations matter, a failure to 
convey their message to the rest of the world, especially to the US gov-
ernment and the dominant Western media? An affirmative answer would 
unduly simplify the problem. The problem of the Palestinians is first and 
foremost a structural problem, having more to do with a deeply ingrained 
image of the Palestinians, caught within the prism of Orientalism, and 
more recently the “War on Terror.”
As an alternative to a Levinasian account of radical alterity, which is at 
once ahistorical and historically biased when it comes to the Israeli/Pal-
estinian conflict, Žižek and others have productively turned to the notion 
“homo sacer” in their discussion of the abject condition of the Palestin-
ians. Homo sacer is a legal notion, of course, brought back in ethical and 
political circles by Giorgio Agamben. In ancient Roman jurisprudence, 
“homo sacer” designated the excluded or exiled Other par excellence, 
someone who is cast out of the community, who could be killed with 
impunity by anyone but whose life lacked any sacrificial value (since it 
no longer possessed any worth). Living in the occupied territories, where 
psychological humiliation is part of everyday existence, Palestinians can 
be said to occupy the undesirable position of the homines sacri; Palestin-
ians have become non-citizens dwelling in zones of exclusion, perpetu-
ally robbed of their dignity, reduced to “bare life,” and made to appear to 
an international public as less than human—that is, barbaric, irrational, 
and evil. Žižek exposes the Palestinians’ overdetermination:
The logic of homo sacer is clearly discernible in the way the 
Western media report from the occupied West Bank: when 
the Israeli Army, in what Israel itself describes as a ‘war’ op-
eration, attacks the Palestinian police and sets about system-
atically destroying the Palestinian infrastructure, Palestinian 
resistance is cited as proof that we are dealing with terror-
ists. This paradox is inscribed into the very notion of a ‘war 
on terror’—a strange war in which the enemy is criminalised 
if he defends himself and returns fire with fire. (“Are We in a 
War?” par. 3)12
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Their designation as terrorists functions to dehumanize Palestinians 
(they are only terrorists) and to forestall their inclusion (as mature ratio-
nal agents) in any serious and balanced peace negotiations: Israel needs a 
true partner in peace, goes the argument, which requires that Palestinians 
renounce their “identity” as terrorists. According to this perverse reason-
ing, the Israeli military is helping the Palestinian people overcome them-
selves through its targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders, which of 
course comes with acceptable “collateral damage.” We could even say that 
Israelis are engaged in their own “civilizing mission,” using force only in 
order to achieve a noble end. Lacking the “concept of compromise,” Ar-
abs, according to former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, are doomed 
to barbarism, while Israel, in an obscenely self-serving assessment, repre-
sents a “vanguard of culture against barbarism…a villa in the middle of a 
jungle,” a “protective wall” to the West (qtd. in Slater 180).
Israel’s more recent 2009 Gaza invasion crystallized the Palestinians 
status as homines sacri. The failure to generate outrage among the gen-
eral American public could be explained as a result of Israeli censorship, 
which successfully limited the visual transmission of the Palestinian dev-
astation on cable news outlets, neutralizing, in turn, the potentially un-
settling effects of pathos in the observer (the American public) of Pales-
tinian suffering. Yet such an explanation is again at best only partial. What 
contributed greatly to this indifference, or failure to empathize with an 
all-too-distant Other, to see their lives as “grievable,” as Judith Butler’s 
puts it in her most recent book Frames of War, was again the relatively 
unchallenged ideological narrative—the Israelis as victims, and the Pal-
estinians as aggressors—that pre-existed the Gaza war and continues to 
inform if not determine the American public’s (mis)understanding of the 
Palestinian question.13
New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg is a case in point. Justifying Is-
rael’s right to defend itself, Bloomberg said: “I can only think what would 
happen in this country if somebody was lobbing missiles onto our shores 
or across the border.” On Israel’s brutal disproportional response to 
Hamas’ firing of rockets into Israel, Bloomberg was equally unyielding, 
providing us again with a hypothetical example: “If you’re in your apart-
ment and some emotionally disturbed person is banging on your door, 
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screaming, ‘I’m going to come through this door and kill you!’ do you 
want us to respond with one police officer, which is proportional, or with 
all the resources at our command?” Fortunately, yet also sadly, this all-
too-common frame or narrative found a critical response not from the 
mainstream media but from late-night comedian Jon Stewart, who, on 
Comedy Central’s cable program the Daily Show, humorously decon-
structed the framing of the problem, the narrative of victim and perpetra-
tor with this follow-up to Bloomberg’s comment: “I guess it depends if I 
forced that guy to live in my hallway… and make him go through check-
points every time he has to take a sh*t!” (qtd. in Hishmeh n.p.). We can 
of course radicalize further Stewart’s response by saying “it depends if I 
kicked that guy out of his own home, and now live in it…and took out a 
restraining order on him.”
Like the Sabra and Shatila massacres, the Gaza war made visible the 
ethico-political inadequacies of seeing the Jew as simply the Other. Amer-
ica’s “War on Terror,” along with its clear and distinct logic of good and 
evil, facilitated even further the US identification with Israel, as well 
as the Palestinians’ identification with international terrorism. While 
the Israelis were depicted as a mirror image of the Americans (unjustly 
shocked and traumatized by the violence of the Islamic Other14 ), Pal-
estinians—like the terrorists or “Islamo-fascists” who attacked America 
on 9/11—were depicted as profoundly evil, hating the freedom of Israe-
lis and their democratic way of life.15 This Manichean way of interpret-
ing the Gaza offensive puts the blame of civilian casualties squarely on 
Hamas and thus helps to preserve the self-proclaimed moral superior-
ity of the Israeli government—exemplified in the self-righteous claim of 
possessing the “world’s most moral army.” This mythic view of the Israeli 
military, however, faced serious objections from within, not only from Is-
rael’s human rights groups but more significantly from some of its own 
veterans. For instance, one soldier, under condition of anonymity , testi-
fied as follows to his moral predicament and personal struggle to make 
sense of the prescribed rules of engagement:
We were supposed to... burst through the lower door, start 
shooting inside and then... I call this murder... in effect, we 
were supposed to go up floor by floor, and any person we 
identified, we were supposed to shoot. I initially asked myself: 
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Where is the logic in this? From above they said it was permis-
sible, because anyone who remained in the sector and inside 
Gaza City was in effect condemned, a terrorist, because they 
hadn’t fled. (qtd. in Harel n.p.; emphasis added)
The logic is unfortunately all too clear; the logic that justifies the mur-
der of innocent civilians is precisely the same logic that fixes the identity 
of terrorists and victims according to a phantasmatic field, and places the 
burden of proving one’s innocence on those deemed guilty by reason of 
ethnic and religious affiliations. Seeing the possibility of war crimes in the 
actions of the “world’s most moral army” in effect demystifies Israel’s ex-
clusive claim to victimhood,16 “humanizes” the enemy, opening the pos-
sibility of not treating the Palestinian as “homo sacer” (the Palestinian is 
seen as someone who can be both killed and murdered). It also introduc-
es a critical distance between the history of Jews and the current politics 
of Israel. Recognition of the former does not entail a blind endorsement 
of the latter. Judith Butler, speaking as a Jew herself, argues along these 
lines for a self-scrutinizing use of victimhood: “historically we are now 
in the position in which Jews cannot be understood always and only as 
presumptive victims…. No political ethics can start with the assumption 
that Jews monopolize the position of victim” (The Precarious Life 103).
Badiou, for his part, articulates his objection in slightly different terms, 
calling for dislodging the meaning of the Jew from the hegemony of 
“the tripod of the Shoah, the State of Israel and the Talmudic Tradition,” 
which, he says, “stigmatizes and exposes to public contempt anyone who 
contends that it is, in all rigour, possible to subscribe to a universalist and 
egalitarian sense of this word” (Polemics 230). Consistent with the thrust 
of his philosophy, Badiou favors a rhetoric of the concrete universal (as 
opposed to Jewish universalism—a universalism, as we have seen, that 
posits and sustains the Jew as exemplary victim only by denying others, 
such as the Palestinians, the claim to victimhood). Badiou’s universalism 
demands a radical reconfiguring of Jewish identity, as otherwise than ir-
reproachable victim, racist Zionist, and intolerably religious. To his cred-
it, Badiou applies the same logic to the Palestinian or Arab signifier:
A more immediately relevant consequence is that the signifier 
‘Palestinian’ or ‘Arab’ should not be glorified any more than 
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is permitted for the signifier ‘Jew’. As a result, the legitimate 
solution to the Middle East conflict is not the dreadful insti-
tution of two barbed-wire states. The solution is the creation 
of a secular and democratic Palestine, one subtracted from all 
predicates, and which, in the school of Paul—who declared 
that, in view of the universal, “there is no longer Jew nor Greek” 
and that “circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is 
nothing”—would show that it is perfectly possible to create a 
place in these lands where, from a political point of view and 
regardless of the apolitical continuity of customs, there is “nei-
ther Arab nor Jew” (Polemics 164; emphasis added).
Uncompromising in his rejection of identity politics, Badiou advocates 
a philosophy of subtraction, a philosophy that suspends or strips away the 
inessential in order to get at a “generic humanity” (Infinite Thought 51).
Badiou can be seen here as extending Gilles Deleuze’s own illuminat-
ing observation on the type of identitarian claims made both by Israelis 
and Palestinians. In a 1982 interview with Elias Sanbar titled “The Indi-
ans of Palestine,” Deleuze offers the following commentary:
The opening pages of the first issue of your journal [La Re-
vue d’Études Palestiniennes] contain a manifesto: we are “a 
people like any other people.” The sense of this declaration is 
multiple. In the first place, it is a reminder, or a cry. The Pales-
tinians are constantly reproached with refusing to recognize 
Israel. Look, say the Israelis, they want to destroy us. But for 
more than 50 years now, the Palestinians have been struggling 
for recognition as a people. In the second place, the declara-
tion marks an opposition with the manifesto of Israel, which 
says ‘we are not a people like any other people’ because of our 
transcendence and the enormity of our persecutions. (199)
Both of these passages capture the ambivalent exemplarity of the 
Palestinians, each passage highlighting a different aspect of their exem-
plarity. Deleuze’s claim that Palestinians are “‘a people like any other 
people’” stresses their representative status; they too hunger for recog-
nition and suffer from the lack of it. Badiou’s passage is perhaps more 
abstract, pointing to a social reality still to come, where in their secular, 
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universalist appeal, an appeal open to all political subjects, Palestinians 
will compel Jews and Arabs alike to bracket communal interests, to over-
come their outdated logic of particularism, their pragmatic and phan-
tasmatic attachments to religious and ethnic differences, and embrace a 
shared co-existence under new universal ideals. Here, the exemplarity of 
the Palestinians would reside not in their uniqueness, instantiated in their 
victimhood and suffering (past and present), but in the boldness and 
courage of their political vision, in their practice of subtraction. Likewise, 
Israelis could affirm an alternative universality by deciding to rethink the 
very notion of a “Jewish state,” abandoning its myth of a sacred origin in 
favor of a more democratic and egalitarian political regime.17
Yet is there another way to address the shortcomings of identity poli-
tics without adopting a universalist stance? Is it really a matter of choos-
ing between the unity of Humanity (a prescriptive universalism) or an 
ethics of alterity (a resilient particuliarism)? It depends, of course, on the 
meaning one finally ascribes to alterity or difference. In the context of the 
Nation-State, preserving difference, as we have seen, takes the form of so-
cial antagonism. The phenomenon of Israel dramatizes this point, since 
its antagonism is not only directed against Palestinians and its defenders 
but also against other Jews (“the Jews of the Jew,” as it were). Žižek de-
scribes the latter attitude as a “Zionist anti-Semitism”:
[W]ith the establishment of the Jewish Nation-State, a new 
figure of the Jew emerged: a Jew resisting identification with 
the State of Israel, refusing to accept the State of Israel as his 
true home, a Jew who subtracts himself from this State. This 
Jew includes the State of Israel among the states towards 
which he insists on maintaining a distance… It is this un-
canny Jew who is the object of what one cannot but designate 
as Zionist anti-Semitism: Zionists perceive him as the for-
eign excess disturbing their Nation-State community. (“The 
Strange Rise” n.p.)
Rescuing and updating this other (and more productive) genealogy 
of the Jew as profoundly other to him- or herself, always in excess of his 
or her existing phantasmatic and symbolic identity complicates a simple 
choice between universalism (the transcendence of one’s facticity) and 
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particularism (the mystification of one’s predicates).18 For this Jew, the 
call for election not only takes the form of suspicion toward the state of 
Israel but of radical skepticism toward his or her election, sustaining, in 
the words of Jacques Derrida, “the terrible and indecisive experience 
of…election” (31).
Detaching the signifier Jew from any ahistorical ontological claims 
opens it up to inscription within different, less totalizing, less certain 
and more provisional systems of signification. Palestinian critic Edward 
Said made ample use of such a possibility in one of his last interviews. 
Responding to his Israeli interlocutor’s observation that “[he] sound[s] 
very Jewish,” Said boldly concurred: “Of course. I’m the last Jewish in-
tellectual. You don’t know anyone else. All your other Jewish intellectu-
als are now suburban squires. From Amos Oz to all these people here in 
America. So I’m the last one. The only true follower of Adorno. Let me 
put it this way: I’m a Jewish-Palestinian” (2000).19 Playfully troping the 
signifier Jew, Said creatively gestures toward the possibility of thinking 
beyond the Jew and Arab as monolithic differences, producing his own 
unlikely example of the Jewish-Palestinian. Thinking the Palestinian as 
Jewish today is clearly not an attempt to silence Jews, to speak for them, 
to appropriate their trauma, but Said’s “Levinasian” (I dare say) gesture 
toward rethinking the Jew (and his own Palestinian identity) as otherwise 
than being—not by abandoning the language of difference, but by travers-
ing it and adapting it, short-circuiting, in turn, any fixed or timeless nar-
rative of the victim.
Notes
1. For Sartre, the Jew’s identity persists in its defiance of France’s assimilative 
Republican ideal and demoded bourgeois values: “Jewish authenticity 
consists in choosing oneself as Jew—that is, in realizing one’s Jewish 
condition. The authentic Jew abandons the myth of the universal man…he 
ceases to run away from himself and to be ashamed of his own kind” (136). 
For other examples of continental philosophers and critics using the Jew 
as a privileged sign for alterity, see, in particular, Jean-François Lyotard’s 
Heidegger and “the Jews” and The Differend: Phrases in Dispute; Maurice 
Blanchot’s “Being Jewish” in The Infinite Conversation; Julia Kristeva’s Powers of 
Horror: An Essay on Abjection; Jacques Derrida’s Judeities: Questions for Jacques 
Derrida; and Emmanuel Levinas’s Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism.
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2. Joseph Massad traces this intellectual bias in favor of the Jew from Sartre to 
Žižek. I wish to nuance Massad’s view by looking more carefully at the ways 
some of these philosophers have scrutinized the ideological deployment of 
the Jew in the realm of public discourse. See Massad’s “The Legacy of Jean-
Paul Sartre.”
3. The opposition Jew/Arab is itself questionable, since it juxtaposes a primarily 
religious difference (Jew) with an exclusively ethnic one (Arab). Imagining 
the Arab as the Other of the Jew reveals the deep connection of the Jew 
to the Nation-State of Israel. The Jew’s enemy/Other is Israel’s enemy, the 
Arab states (although in recent years, in the context of the “War on Terror,” 
Israel’s enemies include non-Arab states like Iran, under the broader category 
of the Islamic Other). For a lucid account of the discursive construction 
of the enemy in this context, see Gil Anidjar’s The Jew, the Arab: A History 
of the Enemy.
4. “If there were only two people in the world, there would be no need for law 
courts because I would always be responsible for and before, the other. As 
soon as there are three, the ethical relationship with the other becomes 
political and enters into the totalizing discourse of ontology. We can never 
completely escape from the language of ontology and politics” (Levinas, 
“Dialogue” 21–22).
5. Levinas puts the matter in terms of a potential contradiction between these 
two distinct realms: “[T]here’s a direct contradiction between ethics and 
politics, if both these demands are taken to the extreme” (“Ethics and 
Politics” 292).
6. See, in particular, Eric Marty’s Une querelle avec Alain Badiou, philosophe.
7. For Joseph Massad, such philo-Semitism not only informs Western media 
coverage but also conditions much of the Left’s discourse on the Israel/
Palestinian conflict. Many so-called progressive intellectuals remain “blind 
to the ultimate achievement of Israel: the transformation of the Jew into the 
anti-Semite, and the Palestinian into the Jew” (par. 17).
8. Cécile Winter makes a similar point: “[T]he ideological frame mounted at 
Nuremberg laid the foundations for a durable edifice. The ‘Crime’ against 
‘Humanity’, the first, the incomparable and absolute, the inaccessible, 
definitive yardstick of all others, elevated its victims to exemplary status. The 
‘Victims’, once jews, became ‘Jews’. ‘Jew’, that is, turned into a metonymical 
signifier for Humanity… ‘Jew’ is the Victim par excellence” (223).
9. Levinas warns Jews not to take this universality lightly, that their election 
comes with an even greater sense of duty, an infinite responsibility to and for 
the Other: “We have the reputation of considering ourselves to be a chosen 
people, and this reputation greatly wrongs this universalism. The idea of a 
chosen people must not be taken as a sign of pride. It does not involve being 
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aware of exceptional rights, but of exceptional duties. It is the prerogative of a 
moral consciousness itself. It knows itself at the centre of the world and for it 
the world is not homogeneous: for I am always alone in being able to answer 
the call, I am irreplaceable in my assumption of responsibility. Being chosen 
involves a surplus of obligations for which the ‘I’ of moral consciousness 
utters” (Difficult Freedom 176–77).
10. For a critical account of the American media’s preferential treatment given 
to Israel, see Marda Dunsky’s Pens and Swords: How the American Mainstream 
Media Report the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.
11. Candidate Obama’s comment that “no one has suffered more than the 
Palestinians” generated a fury of objections, which subsequently led him to 
qualify and diminish the full force of the statement, blaming the cause of 
the suffering on Palestinian leadership: “nobody has suffered more than the 
Palestinian people from the failure of the Palestinian leadership to recognize 
Israel, to renounce violence, and to get serious about negotiating peace and 
security for the region” (South Carolina Democratic Debate n.p.). This is a 
myopic judgment, lacking both nuance (all the causes mentioned are internal 
ones) and political courage (a missed opportunity to challenge the political 
status quo), which is also tantamount to blaming the victim.
12. Derek Gregory also notes, “Israel’s offensive operations were designed to turn 
the Palestinian people not only into enemies but into aliens, and in placing 
them outside the modern, figuratively and physically, they were constructed 
as…homines sacri” (187).
13. This emphasis of the management or conditioning of grievability can be seen 
as a further qualification to the Levinasian face-to-face encounter (understood 
as a privileged pre-discursive or unmediated space outside of power). “It is 
not enough to say, in a Levinasian way,” Butler argues, “that the claim is made 
upon me prior to my knowing and as an inaugurating instance of my coming 
into being. That may be formally true, but its truth is of no use to me if I lack 
the conditions for responsiveness that allow me to apprehend it in the midst of 
this social and political life” (Frames of War 179).
14. The notion of “Islamic terrorism” makes terrorism “constitutive of the very 
identity of Islam” (Žižek, Iraq 45).
15. For example, Democrat Representative Eliot Engel from New York stated, 
“The terrorist organization that runs Gaza called Hamas…thinking that it 
can use terrorism as a way of somehow getting its state, must understand 
that in order to gain acceptance of nations in the free world, that it needs 
to renounce terror, that it needs to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and 
that it needs to abide by all previous resolutions that were signed by the 
Palestinian Authority. It doesn’t do it because it’s a terrorist state. It doesn’t 
do it because its vow is to destroy the Jewish State of Israel. It doesn’t do it 
because, like Hezbollah and like Osama bin Laden and like al Qaeda [sic], 
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it thinks it can use terrorism to establish its aims and goals, but it cannot.” 
Republican Representative Dana Rohrabacher from California offered a 
similar one-dimensional assessment of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict: “The 
hate-filled radicals who launched missiles into Israel—Hamas triggermen, 
not Israeli pilots—are the ones who are really responsible for the horrible 
mayhem we are witnessing in Gaza. The radical Islamists ruthlessly and 
without any remorse did what they knew would bring retaliation and result 
in the slaughter of their own people. The hatred of Israel in the hearts of these 
Hamas radicals clearly outweighs their commitment to the safety and well 
being of their own people. That’s a hard fact. And that after shooting rockets 
into Israel, they hide among and behind non-combatants—women, and 
children—makes their actions even more despicable.” These comments, and 
those of many other government officials, can be found on AIPAC’s web-
document titled “American Leaders Speak Out in Support of Israel’s Right 
to Self Defense.” While it might be convenient for such US leaders to draw a 
“moral” distinction between the guilty Hamas and the innocent Palestinian 
population (and thus acknowledging that not all Palestinians are a priori evil), 
the distinction itself should be seen as profoundly ideological, distorting 
the all-pervasive logic that interprets and transforms any violent form of 
resistance (even in self-defense) to Israeli military into an act of terrorism. 
Before Hamas, it was of course the more secular Palestinian Liberation 
Organization that was subjected to the same logic.
16. The sheer imbalance in the death toll (totaling 13 Israelis and 1,417 
Palestinians, as estimated by The Palestinian Center for Human Rights in 
Gaza) troubles the portrayal of the Israeli as sole victim.
17. Israel as a Jewish state and Israel as a truly democratic nation are mutually 
exclusive. As Etienne Balibar puts it, Israel as a Jewish state “is not only 
relentlessly expanding at the expense of Palestinians, but, within its own 
borders, it reduces them to second-class citizenship deprived of numerous 
rights and symbolically excluded from equality with ‘real Israelis’ in owning 
their common land” (“Universalité de la cause palestinienne,” Le Monde 
diplomatique 27).
18. Similarly yearning to liberate the word “Jew” from its sense of destiny, Judith 
Butler writes: “The ‘Jew’ is to be found, substantively, as this diasporic excess, 
a historically and culturally changing identity that takes no single form and 
has no single telos” (Precarious Life 126).
19. Alain Finkielkraut sarcastically objects to Said’s words, seeing in them a 
further assimilation and policing of Jews: “These are strange times for real 
Jews. Not long ago, they were on the lookout, ready to strike down anti-
Semitism wherever it dared rear its head. They were determined never again 
to succumb to hatred, and to clip the wings of anyone who spoke of them as 
‘dirty Jews.’ What they weren’t expecting—and what makes it all the more 
disconcerting—was to be faced with a grievance that is in its form moral 
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and not brutish, virtuous and not vile, an altruistic grievance, sure of its 
legitimacy, full of kindness, and steeped in concern. While they are used 
to hearing themselves denounced as Jewish traitors, they did not expect 
to be denounced as traitors to their Jewishness” (26). What Finkielkraut 
fails to appreciate about Said’s comment is its profound ethical thrust, its 
demystifying and denaturalizing call, a call not intended to diminish the 
agency of “real” Jews but to unsettle reified narratives about “authentic” Arab 
and Jewish identities.
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